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SUMMARY
The aircraft design process is characterized by increasing certainty and decreas-
ing design freedom over time. This means that some of the most important design
decisions are made at a time when little information is available to quantify the im-
pact of those decisions. The goal of most advanced design methods is to increase the
information available at the conceptual design stage to allow the designer to make
the best decision possible. However, by the nature of the problem, there will always
be some differences between the performance estimates computed during conceptual
design and the performance of the final product. These differences may result in per-
formance constraint violations, which can have severe financial impacts. As a result,
constraint violations may necessitate downstream design changes to bring the aircraft
back into compliance with requirements; these design changes will also have impacts
on both cost and schedule. The ability to estimate the likelihood of late-stage design
changes and the impact of said changes is key to mitigating the overall risk of a design
and ensuring the business success of a product.
Reliability methods already exist to account for design uncertainty, and they have
been applied to aircraft conceptual design studies. These techniques measure the
likelihood that a design will comply with constraints by assessing the aircraft’s per-
formance under simulated uncertainty. However, existing reliability methods are not
formulated to easily account for some important aspects of aircraft design. In fact,
such methods are unable to account for much of the complexity associated with the
sizing process commonly employed during conceptual design. Few methods account
for the staged nature of aircraft design, and those that do often ignore some aspects
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of the stages of design; specifically, reliability methods rarely deal with the concept
of the design freeze associated with the transition from aircraft conceptual design to
later design stages. Reliability methods also fail to account for the remedial nature
of design when a performance constraint is violated due to uncertainty.
These remedial elements mitigate undesirable performance outcomes resulting
from the development of uncertain design parameters throughout the design process.
These “mitigation actions” bring the design back into compliance with constraints
by adjusting design parameters external to the initial set of conceptual design pa-
rameters. By accounting for these mitigation actions, new reliability metrics can
be developed. In addition to capturing the probability of compliance of the design,
the designer can determine the probability of success after accounting for outcomes
which can be recovered through mitigation actions. This additional information helps
to determine the true likelihood that a design can successfully meet all of the require-
ments, giving the conceptual designer access to additional information which will
enable better design decision making.
This work describes the development of a method by which the gaps identified
within existing reliability methods can be filled. Hypotheses are developed in an at-
tempt to fill the gaps which exist between reliability methods found in literature and
the aircraft design process. Filling these gaps results in the development of a design
methodology referred to as Aircraft Recovery through Mitigation & Optimization
under Uncertainty for Reliability (ARMOUR). The ARMOUR method leverages tra-
ditional Reliability-Based Design Optimization and augments it to include concepts
specifically taken from aircraft design including aircraft sizing, uncertainty margins,
and mitigation actions. Within this thesis, a step-by-step formulation of the AR-
MOUR methodology is created which describes the necessary phases from initial
identification of the need for an aircraft though model development and execution of
the method. The step-by-step formulation is demonstrated on the conceptual design
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of a large civil transport aircraft. The ARMOUR method is then tested by comparing
the new capabilities it enables to previously existing aircraft uncertainty assessment
methods. As part of this process, the detriments of potential alternate implemen-
tations are demonstrated. Once tested and constructed, ARMOUR is exercised to
explore relationships which were obscured or unobservable without it.
The contribution to the field of probabilistic aircraft conceptual design is the con-
current quantification of three elements in one decision making environment: the
probability of compliance (from traditional reliability), the total probability of design
recovery after failure (by modeling mitigation actions), and traditional design criteria
such as vehicle weight or block fuel (from sizing). This new information affords the
decision maker the ability to query the trade space between a design’s overall proba-
bility of success1 and traditional design criteria, creating a novel way to quantify the
trade-off between risk and performance and to target a specific level of compromise
between the two. The ARMOUR methodology enables the selection of design vari-
ables and uncertainty margins which both meet reliability goals for the compliance
and success of the aircraft and also simultaneously optimize a traditional aircraft
design performance metric. In this way, a design that efficiently meets reliability
requirements can be found.
1Throughout this thesis, the overall probability of success means the design’s probability of




The commercial aircraft design process is characterized as a long and expensive en-
deavor that balances high risk with high rewards. The design of a new aircraft can
take many years from concept to entry into fleet and can cost billions of dollars [68].
The potential payout of a successful aircraft design can be significant. The guiding
motivation for this thesis is to improve civil aircraft conceptual design by bring-
ing information from preliminary design forward into the conceptual design stage.
Specifically, there is a desire to quantify the impact of design uncertainty on aircraft
performance as well as the total likelihood that a design will meet performance goals.
This information must be processed such that it will be useful to conceptual design-
ers, allowing them to select designs with some advanced knowledge of the potential
downstream impacts of their choices.
To accomplish this goal, the design process of a civil transport aircraft is examined
as it relates to the stages of design. How and why parameter uncertainty will vary for
progressive stages is examined. The impact of uncertainty on aircraft performance is
established. Also, a theory for how a design team could react to performance shortfalls
resulting from uncertainty realizations is developed and a template for constructing
representative actions is proposed. These effects are integrated into a methodology
which will allow for the assessment of multiple reliability metrics. One metric is
the probability of compliance: a reliability measure which is based on traditional
uncertainty assessment methods. The second metric is the probability of recovery, a
new metric that indicates the likelihood that a designed aircraft can be “recovered”
through actions available to design teams in later stages of aircraft development.
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The resulting overall methodology integrates this information to allow the designer
to select a design concept with more information than would otherwise be available
during conceptual design.
1.1 Aircraft Design Uncertainty
The decisions made during the conceptual design stage of the civil aircraft design
process are often the most impactful on the final performance and cost of a product.
Figure 1 illustrates this concept by demonstrating conceptually how changes occur
during the design process, focusing on the advantages of Integrated Product and
Process Development (IPPD) [82]. IPPD specifics are outside the scope of this thesis,
but the principles shown in the diagram are still useful. The stages of design are
illustrated as proceeding from left to right on the diagram. The number of changes
for a traditional ’Serial’ approach to design within each stage of the design process is
compared with the number of changes associated with IPPD. IPPD focuses on more
changes earlier on in the design process. The reason for this is illustrated by the third
line, “Cost of Change.” This curve is meant to show qualitatively that changes which
occur further along in a design process will become increasingly expensive. Just as
with IPPD, this thesis is intended to help designers make the best early decisions
possible, thus avoiding heavy costs down the line.
Motivated by the cost of changes later in design and emerging techniques, a
paradigm shift was predicted in Aerospace Engineering by the National Science
Foundation’s 1996 Strategic Planning Workshop [83]. Figure 2 illustrates what this
paradigm shift would look like conceptually. This diagram shows “Today’s Design
Process” compared to a theoretical “Future Design Process,” and attempts to show
the advantages therein. Again, the x-axis illustrates the stages of design, proceeding
from left to right. The primary goals of this paradigm shift are threefold. First is
to delay any commitment to the cost of a design until later, illustrated by the “Cost
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Figure 1: Cost of Change [82]
Committed” curve moving from left to right where most of the final costs are only
locked in at very late stages of design. This is accomplished in part by retaining design
freedom until later in the design process, shown in the “Freedom” curve which moves
from left to right. Both of these goals are dependent on the third set of “Knowledge”
curves moving from right to left. The idea is that freedom can be maintained in part
by bringing knowledge earlier in the design process to where the information will do
the most good.
This thesis is primarily focused on bringing knowledge of the effects of potential
actions taken during later design stages forward into conceptual design. This is
represented in Figure 2 by moving the knowledge curve to the left as depicted in
this image. The premise is that accomplishing this will afford the decision maker
more information when making the most important early design decisions.
As a more concrete example, assume an airframe manufacturer, Company Z, has
decided to bring a new civil transport aircraft to market. They have performed
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Figure 2: Paradigm Shift [83]
their due diligence in examining the marketplace and are confident of the necessary
requirements. Their research has shown that multiple performance requirements exist.
Key among these requirements are a design mission, which will require the vehicle
to meet a defined long range at a specific payload capacity. Other performance
requirements will exist on the aircraft, and Company Z knows it needs to meet these
constraints as well.
Initially, little is known about the still theoretical aircraft. As designs are devel-
oped, more information decisions are made to further define the details of the new
aircraft. To make these decisions, additional information is needed in the form of
more detailed analyses. A multitude of decisions must be made in order to com-
pletely define an aircraft with enough precision for it to be constructed. Trying to
make all of these decisions in a single step would be intractably complicated. Instead,
decisions are made first at a very high level and with increasing granularity as design
proceeds. These increasingly detailed decisions necessitate additional information,
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requiring more detailed models.
To implement this, commercial aircraft design is broken up into multiple stages
[75]. Typically, more information is known about the design at each progressive stage,
and more detailed decisions are made at each progressive stage. This requires more
detailed and longer analyses to be performed, as illustrated on the left of Figure 3.
As a result of this increasing need for information and increasing time requirements,
fewer or smaller scale design changes are generally considered during each progressive
stage. Particularly when leaving the conceptual design stage, many of the selected
parameters are considered “frozen” - that is to say that they will not be considered for
change during later design stages under normal circumstances, reducing the number
of dimensions available and reducing the number of designs to consider. This concept
is illustrated by the triangle on the right of Figure 3.
Figure 3: Increasing Time Requirements per Analysis Leads to Fewer Considered
Designs in Progressive Stages of Aircraft Development
The process of starting with a low level of fidelity and increasing the fidelity
over time has a notable consequence on the certainty of the aircraft’s performance.
When the gross design characteristics are being selected, the least is known about the
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aircraft performance. This design uncertainty can lead to the vehicle performance not
matching the performance predicted during early design stages. Unfortunately, this
is in conflict with the goal of performance guarantees established in early purchasing
contracts.
Because a later design stage uses more detailed tools, more people, and has a more
concrete design concept, the performance of the aircraft is better known. Rephrasing,
conceptual design is less certain than later design stages, meaning that performance
estimates will be different from what is realized later. Improperly planning for this
uncertainty can lead to a loss in performance relative to expected levels, meaning
that a design may no longer meet its performance goals. This performance drop can
result in a failure to meet requirements placed on the aircraft, threatening the ability
to bring the vehicle to market.
The concept of using uncertainty quantification to enhance aircraft design is not
in and of itself original. Zang et al. describes benefits to aerospace vehicles and the
barriers encountered when adopting uncertainty-based design methods [96]. They also
characterize the then-current state of the art and list avenues in which NASA can
advance the field. Zang’s work is not unique, as a plethora of efforts too numerous
to list exist which have applied uncertainty quantification to aircraft and aircraft
component designs [30, 84, 93].
The uncertain aspect of aircraft design has been well-known, and aircraft com-
panies do anticipate these errors. For deterministic design processes, engineers often
include uncertainty margins (e.g. a weight penalty over the predicted aircraft empty
weight) in their early analyses in an attempt to account for problems which will occur
downstream. The application of margins, however, is based on historical information
or engineering judgment. Additionally, these margins give no quantification of how
reliable the resulting system is - potentially leading to an over-designed product or
one with unacceptably low reliability.
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Company Z was not ignorant of the inherent uncertainty in aircraft design during
previous aircraft designs, but it did not have a method to quantitatively capture the
likelihood of meeting the resulting probabilistic constraints. Instead of any quantita-
tive assessment, Company Z imposed conservative margins on the uncertain variables
when performing deterministic design to “over size” the aircraft in the hope that this
conservatism would account for the uncertain performance. However, Company Z is
aware that they had no way to know exactly what level of conservatism would be
required.
1.2 Uncertainty Quantification and Management Tools
Engineering risk can be thought of as the probability of an adverse event occurring
combined with the consequence or impact of that event. Depending on the relative
severity of these metrics, different uncertainty quantification (UQ) techniques can be
employed. Formalized UQ techniques fall into two main categories: Robust Design
Optimization (RDO) and Reliability-Based Design Optimization (RBDO). In general
Robust Design Optimization is concerned with minimizing the sensitivity of perfor-
mance to outside factors when a degradation is likely but non-critical [87]. On the
other hand Reliability-Based Design Optimization is concerned with minimizing the
probability of failing to meet a target level of performance because such a failure
could be catastrophic [32].
The concept of robustness arises from Robust Design Optimization, a process
originally developed by Gen’ichi Taguchi [87]. Taguchi’s concept of robustness is
primarily concerned with minimizing the loss due to a product varying from its design
specification – a situation which will naturally occur during the manufacturing of a
large number of products [7]. These losses can be substantial, but are assumed to be
generally non-catastrophic to the usability of the product. A robust product is one
that is insensitive to variation. Figure 4 demonstrates this concept for an arbitrary
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objective function.
Figure 4: Robust Design Optimization
To enact robust Design Optimization, some form of the optimization algorithm
in Equation (1) is followed [95]. A design (𝑥) is solved for which minimizes some
function (𝐹 ()), which is a combination of both the mean (𝜇) and standard deviation
(𝜎). This combination of mean and standard deviation is usually a weighted sum,
but can be any form which takes both pieces of data into account.
Find: 𝑥
Minimize: 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑝) = 𝐹 (𝜇𝑓 (𝑥, 𝑝), 𝜎𝑓 (𝑥, 𝑝))
ST: 𝑔(𝑥, 𝑝) ≤ 0
𝑥𝐿 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑥𝑈
(1)
Reliability is a related but distinct concept from robustness. The core premise of
reliability is the likelihood that an item will continue to function, often for a specified
period of time [32, 95]. This is often formulated as the ability of the product to meet
or exceed its design specifications, regardless of associated uncertainty. This concept
is illustrated in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Reliability-Based Design Optimization
Reliability-Based Design Optimization is formulated mathematically in Equa-
tion (2). The optimizer searches for a design (𝑥) which minimizes the mean of a
metric of interest. The minimization is constrained to keep the likelihood that the
design will satisfy any or all constraints (𝑔()) above some specified value (𝑅).
Find: 𝑥
Minimize: 𝑓(𝑥, 𝑝) = 𝜇𝑓 (𝑥, 𝑝)
ST: 𝑃 (𝑔(𝑥, 𝑝) ≤ 0) ≥ 𝑅
𝑥𝐿 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑥𝑈
(2)
Huyse differentiates the areas of applicability of these techniques in Figure 6 with
regards to probability (frequency) and consequence (impact) [40]. Some processes
align very obviously with one category or the other. For instance, component per-
formance is often more concerned with Robust Design, since the likelihood of an
adverse event is high, while its consequence is usually just a (relatively) minimal loss
in vehicle performance [40]. Any safety problem will invariably be suited towards an
RBDO-like formulation, based on the very high consequences associated with aircraft
failure and the desire to keep the likelihood of those failures to an absolute minimum.
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Indeed, Reliability-Based Design largely arose due to structural safety concerns, and
a vast number of articles have been published on the subject of RBDO as applied to
structural safety [27, 52, 89, 92], as well as spacecraft [84], transonic compressors [46],
and car doors [94], among others.
Figure 6: Uncertainty Classification [40]
Methods exist which combine Robust Design Optimization and Reliability-Based
Design Optimization into one, such as “R2BDO” [73]. Methods like these often
take the general structure of RBDO optimization in Equation (2) and augment the
objective function to more closely mimic the one found in Equation (1).
Vehicle design can fall into either category, RDO or RBDO, depending on the con-
cerns being addressed and the associated assumptions being made. If, in the current
environment of carbon emissions concerns and potential regulations, the designer is
uncertain as to whether the aircraft will be allowed to fly at its design Mach number
or whether it will be forced to fly at a lower one, then designing for robustness to the
operating speed of the aircraft would make perfect sense.
On the other hand, if the primary concern of the designer is meeting performance
targets such as takeoff or landing field lengths while designing with imperfect predic-
tion tools, then a reliability approach would be more logical. The catastrophe in this
case would be to the company’s bottom line upon designing an aircraft that cannot
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fly out of certain airports, rather than a safety concern as with the case of structural
design.
Put more generally, the latter set of assumptions looks at cases where redesigning
is expensive and missing certain performance targets is unacceptable. As a result,
it is desirable for violations of these performance constraints to be infrequent. This
thesis is concerned with this second set of assumptions, where performance losses are
very unlikely to happen by design, but are of great concern when they do happen.
So under this scenario Company Z is concerned about missing their performance
constraints. They may violate established contracts with their customers, potentially
resulting in heavy fines or a loss of sales. Such an event could be catastrophic to the
financial health of the company. Thus, they consider reliability-based methods to be
appropriate for their aircraft design problem. However, they feel that RBDO alone
does not account for the complete design process as it has been implemented in the
past, as it has can lead to over-sized aircraft with no ability to recover from missed
performance targets.
1.3 Missed Performance Targets
Increased reliability cannot be achieved without costs. To increase reliability, the
aircraft is designed such that it is more conservative, meaning that its performance
is further from the constraints. This conservatism will adversely affect other metrics
like gross weight and fuel burn. Increasing this reliability too far will lead to an “over-
designed” product, one whose performance has been degraded in excess of what is
reasonably required due to excessively high reliability goals.
In other words, there is an inherent tradeoff between the level of reliability and
design performance. Because of this tradeoff, it is not always desirable to drive a
design to 100% reliability - in fact, doing so could degrade the performance sufficiently
that the resulting product may not even be marketable! Thus, even with tools like
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RBDO, an aircraft may still fail to meet its performance constraints (i.e.𝑃𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒 > 0).
Also, because designing to an extremely high reliability becomes more and more
expensive in terms of both actual cost and vehicle performance, increasing reliability
becomes a balancing act between spending the money up front when it may not
ever be required and spending the money down the line when costs are higher. This
balance will be chosen differently for different designers/companies, but will almost
never result in a 0% chance of failure.
If a design fails to meet one or more requirements, the aircraft may not be mar-
ketable, may fail to meet regulations, or it could be incompatible with airports. Most
of these outcomes would result in a loss in sales that could be catastrophic for the
company given the amount invested in a new aircraft design. It is undesirable to
redesign the aircraft at this later stage because analyses up to this point would need
to be discarded, representing a wasted investment. However, it would often be worse
to simply give up on the project development or to release an inferior product, both
of which could result in a loss of market share.
1.3.1 Mitigation Actions
If a design fails to meet performance constraints, some aspect of the aircraft must
change to bring the aircraft into compliance. These changes must affect the missed
targets directly, but should also have a minimal impact on prior design decisions.
These “mitigation actions” are changes taken to recover a design in the later design
stages which has failed to meet one or more requirements. Mitigation actions are
separate decisions from the original design choices, and are only taken in the event
that they are needed due to the extra cost required. These actions provide an oppor-
tunity to leave the original design parameters frozen, while using alternate degrees of
freedom to “tweak” the aircraft’s performance. However, their application requires
an experienced designer to make changes such that new problems are not introduced.
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For instance, the reaction to not meeting an approach speed requirement might be
to change the wing’s high-lift device. However, re-designing this device would make
the wing heavier, especially since the wing structure was not originally designed to
handle this load. One extreme real world example of this type of balance is presented
in Section 1.3.2.
Chief engineers are traditionally responsible for making these finessed late-stage
design changes. They possess the necessary experience and authority to take action
when the traditional design process has not yielded an aircraft that meets performance
requirements. However, the action that can be taken at this stage is necessarily limited
so as not to alter the aircraft too much or violate any additional constraints. The
particular actions that may be taken vary from company to company.
Raymer describes the possibility of mitigation actions in his traditional aircraft
design book. When discussing design “fixes” Raymer mentions that
“Some of these things, though, are fixes to aerodynamic problems discov-
ered later in design development or flight test. [. . . ] Later on it is too
difficult to change the overall geometry, and so if unexpected problems
are found, they must be fixed in some other way [75].”
This view of mitigation actions is limited in scope to aerodynamics, but it does de-
scribe the concept and motivation of these changes. Specifically, Raymer references
the uncertainty inherent in the design process and the temporal nature of reducing
that uncertainty. He mentions the discovery of a failure too late in the design process
to make gross changes to the design. Motivated by the need to fix this problem with-
out changing the geometric variables, other avenues of mitigation are implemented.
Implicit in this statement is the fact that the aircraft resulting from these changes is
less ideal than a different design which would have been selected if the problem had
been foreseen.
Finding good examples of mitigation actions in the literature is difficult. This
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is likely due to a number of considerations. If the performance of an aircraft is not
grossly outside of desired specification, mitigation actions will be small changes to
the vehicle. Additionally, mitigation actions as defined in this thesis are changes that
happen primarily during the internal development of an aircraft. These late stage
changes may not even be considered a form of mitigation by the design team execut-
ing them; they may simply be seen as an expected reaction to common, inevitable
problems. Finally, companies are understandably reluctant to publish any details of
their proprietary design processes, as the release of such information could potentially
aid a competitor by revealing the philosophies of the company.
1.3.2 The 747 and the “Sutter Twist”
While many examples of mitigation are considered proprietary information and diffi-
cult to find, there are a few well-publicized examples of late design mitigation actions
that had large impacts on the company. Such an example can shed light on the
hidden processes in action during preliminary and detailed design. Joe Sutter, the
lead designer of the 747, describes one such change in his autobiography, which he
attributes to having saved the 747 as a successful aircraft and potentially Boeing as
a company [86].
We had pretty much finished our 747 aerodynamics testing when a
crisis erupted over the 747’s wing. From an aerodynamic and performance
standpoint, we had a wing that worked, but our structures people began
getting lots of troubling data from wind-tunnel testing.
Analysis showed that the outboard wing was carrying too much load.
The pressure distribution wasn’t in the right place for this load to be
properly supported by the internal structure. Because of the accelerated
pace of development, this realization came quite late in the design process.
[. . . ]
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A new wing simply wasnt an option; we would have to fix what was
wrong with the current wing. [. . . ]
Hopes rose at the idea of leaving the inboard wing intact and starting
the twist only outboard of the outer engine nacelles. If it worked, it would
be one tenth as difficult and costly as twisting the entire wing. At my
instigation, Jim Hoy performed a rudimentary analysis to evaluate the
concept and found that twisting the outer wings would actually yield 80%
to 90% of the required benefit of twisting the entire wing. [. . . ]
My people redesigned the 747’s wing for an outboard twist, which
completely solved the loads problem. This expedient solution worked so
well that it got the attention of the press, which labeled it the Sutter
twist, a name it still has today. [86]
This example shows a major aircraft development program running into significant
“show-stopper” problems very late in the design process. Changing the design at
that stage is considered unacceptable, so a different solution must be found to the
problem. The solution -twisting the outboard wing- is one which could have been
designed into the vehicle initially, but was not considered. These types of changes
usually cause the structure of the vehicle to change and increase the weight of the
vehicle. Also, there is enormous reluctance to change much of the aircraft because
doing so would be “horrendously complex and expensive,” but some form of alteration
was necessary. Thus, the minimal change required was implemented to meet the
constraints, incurring the lowest penalty option available.
So in this use case Company Z wants to consider scenarios like this one when
designing their aircraft. While such changes to the design at a late stage are undesir-
able, they are significantly preferable to scenarios under which the design cannot be
recovered. The hope is that by including these “mitigation actions” in an uncertainty
process, a better design can be selected which will have the same overall reliability as
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an oversized design would, with knowledge of how frequently these mitigation actions
would be necessary.
1.4 Motivation
As has been described in this section, uncertainty in early design stages can poten-
tially contribute to a design not meeting necessary performance constraints in later
design stages. In the real world, should such a problem arise in later design stages,
the chief engineer will take necessary actions to bring the design into compliance, if
any such actions exist for the failure mode encountered. These mitigation actions are
preferred to be of minimal impact to the design choices that have already been made,
but are currently not included in early design stage planning. Knowledge of how these
mitigation actions could affect a design’s overall probability of success through recov-
ery could help distinguish designs with otherwise similar performance and compliance
characteristics from one another.
Since mitigation is a response to the presence of uncertainty, probabilistic methods
will be necessary to perform this analysis. In order for these design options to be
modeled in conceptual design, the following questions must be addressed as part of
the design process: How likely is it that Mitigation Actions will be needed? How likely
is it that Mitigation Actions will be successful? Can the answers to these questions
be additional criteria for choosing designs during conceptual design?
The anticipated outcome of this thesis is the acquisition of a set of knowledge about
mitigation actions that can be used to make conceptual design decisions. Among this
information is the probability of recovery, i.e. the probability that a non-compliant
design can be made compliant using mitigation as well as the expected value of the
block fuel, which is a measure of the penalty associated with the mitigation action.
With this additional information at hand, certain designs that seemed equivalent
before accounting for mitigation may be differentiated by the ability to mitigate
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them, and if a specific amount of risk is acceptable the design may target this risk
level to find the most efficient design at a given probability of success.
1.5 Dissertation Overview
This thesis presents a way to quantify the recoverability of design (the likelihood that
mitigation actions will be effective at recovering a design under detrimental uncer-
tainty scenarios) and a methodology for including this information in the conceptual
design decision making process. It does so by evaluating the uncertainty space for
each design. For points in the uncertainty space which are non-compliant, the mit-
igation space is investigated in an attempt to find a level of mitigation actions that
can make the design compliant. The additional points which become compliant once
mitigation is included are the recoverable space, and the probability of recovery is the
number of points which have become compliant divided by the number that failed
before implementing mitigation. Armed with this information for each design, as well
as the expected value of block fuel which was required to achieve the mitigation, the
designer would have the ability to trade the cost of mitigating against the additional
design performance achieved for that cost.
Chapter 2 contains necessary background information including an overview of
aircraft design, a description of uncertainty applied to design, example probabilis-
tic methods which have been used for aircraft, reliability calculation methods, the
compatibility between traditional RBDO and mitigation actions, Pareto optimality,
and surrogate models. Chapter 3 describes the methodology employed in solving the
problem, including relevant sets of research questions and hypotheses, as well as the
experiments needed to test the hypotheses. In Chapter 4, canonical problems are con-
structed to test the posed hypotheses. The results of the hypothesis testing will lead
to the formulation of a step-by-step methodology in Chapter 5, developing guidelines
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for implementation. Chapter 6 develops a specific implementation of the method-
ology on the conceptual design of a large civil passenger transport to demonstrate
the overall methodology. Chapter 7 contains the results of the example implemen-
tation, including final hypothesis testing, demonstration of the overall methodology,
and trade studies explored utilizing the ideas explored in this thesis. Chapter 8 de-





This chapter reviews available literature related to the aircraft conceptual design
process under uncertainty. By examining the work present, the state of the art of
uncertain aircraft design is established. Existing methodologies are examined for
their appropriateness to the current problem. Where possible, these implementations
will be leveraged. Where no existing work exists within the realm of aircraft design,
an attempt will be made to cross-pollinate methods from other fields. If no existing
methods are sufficient, the best existing methods will be selected to move forward
with and augmented to fit the problem at hand.
First, aircraft design is reviewed, paying particular attention to the stages of
design and failure during later design stages due to uncertainty. The concepts of
uncertainty applied to aircraft design are examined. This is followed by an investi-
gation of uncertainty quantification methods which have previously been applied to
aircraft design under uncertainty. Traditional reliability calculation algorithms from
Reliability-Based Design Optimization are examined to determine their strengths
and weaknesses. The concepts of Pareto optimality and surrogate models are also
discussed, as they are leveraged to aid this work.
2.1 Aircraft Design Overview
The aircraft design process is traditionally performed through sequential analyses
which increase in fidelity as design decisions are made and design degrees of freedom
are locked down. This is necessary because of the scope of aircraft design, which inte-
grates together the disciplines of aerodynamics, propulsion, controls, and structures
among others; the decisions made in these different areas interact and are dependent
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upon one another making the entire problem impossible to solve at once. By breaking
the process into sequential steps through which more is known at each iteration, these
interactions can be reduced by assuming values that will be computed later in more
sophisticated analyses. Often these assumptions are based on historical data which
should theoretically provide a value somewhere near that which will be computed
later.
Aircraft companies regulate this process by scheduling design reviews at critical
points. These reviews examine the design choices made and provide buy-in from the
company’s ultimate decision makers. The approved design choices are then fixed as
the design moves forward.
2.1.1 Stages of Design
Sources describe the stages of aircraft design differently. Raymer describes a three
stage process of conceptual, preliminary, and detailed design, followed by Fabrication
as a separate process as illustrated in Figure 7 [75].
Every aircraft company goes through a conceptual design phase. During this
phase, many aspects of the vehicle will be in flux and little-to-nothing may be final-
ized. Wing geometry, weights, cabin layout, the engine, and many other aspects may
still be up in the air. However, some aspects are often predetermined. The vehicle’s
passenger load, payload requirements, design range, takeoff and landing lengths, and
many other aspects can be fixed based on federal guidelines or market studies. Dur-
ing design, some of these parameters can be treated as input variables, but many
cannot. Thus, the design is more than simply inputting the known parameters and
letting equations determine the vehicle’s characteristics; instead, the vehicle must be
iteratively analyzed using the fuel required to meet the range requirement and fuel
available based on the overall size of the aircraft. Once these two quantities match,
the aircraft is considered sized to the design mission.
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Figure 7: Stages of Design [75]
21
Figure 8 shows a deterministic design space. In this design space, two design vari-
ables are shown, 𝑥1 and 𝑥2. Using aircraft analysis codes, the performance of designs
constructed with a particular combination of design variables can be assessed. These
performance characteristics can be compared to aircraft requirements or constraints
to determine whether the vehicle will be compliant with all constraints. For this
conceptual diagram, three constraints are shown via blue curves. The hash-marked
side of these lines indicate that further change of a design variable in this direction
will cause the constraint to be violated. These constraints restrict the available space
for design selection to the region on the non-hashed side of all of the constraint lines.
The remaining space is available for design selection. Assuming an objective function
were imposed on the design, an optimization could occur to select a design point.
This theoretical design point is shown by a blue dot.
Figure 8: Deterministic Design Space
Eventually a company will settle on a concept with which to move forward. The
design up to this point is considered “frozen” and the vast majority of decisions
made will no longer be considered for change. At this juncture, the design enters the
preliminary design stage. During this phase, engineers use more detailed tools and
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analyses to refine their assessments of the component designs. Keane and Nair point
out that the refined analyses and increased engineering team “severely restricts the
number of different configurations that can be considered during preliminary design
[44].” Thus, the gross geometry of the vehicle and its overall weights will remain fixed
while these more detailed analyses are implemented. During these refinements, the
estimates from conceptual design may prove to be incorrect. The vehicle drag may
be higher or lower than anticipated; component weight estimates may be incorrect;
the engine may perform better or worse than expected.
Aircraft companies do anticipate these errors and have a set of tools to address
them: uncertainty margins. Uncertainty margins are commonly used during con-
ceptual design to provide “wiggle room” in the decisions made. These margins are
often an attempt to account for uncertainty when the aircraft design process is only
executed deterministically [58]. Uncertainty margins can be implemented by making
more conservative assumptions about the uncertain design values during the concep-
tual design process. This conservative assumption will affect the performance of the
aircraft
The need for a uncertainty margin can be illustrated by a simple thought ex-
periment examining only a single performance constraint and a single uncertainty
variable. The design mission range of an aircraft – a possible performance constraint
– is highly dependent upon the aircraft drag, among many other things. If the drag
prediction capability of the conceptual design tool is not precise as illustrated in Fig-
ure 9, then the performance of the vehicle will vary. Since drag negatively impacts
aircraft range, an increase in drag from the design predicted value will degrade the
range of the created vehicle. If no capability is implemented to oversize the deter-
ministic vehicle (e.g. a uncertainty margin), the designer will have little-to-no ability
to influence the reliability of the aircraft.
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Figure 9: Uncertainty without Uncertainty Margins
An alternative kind of “margin” takes the form of a constant additive or multi-
plicative factors on certain constraints (as with structures [98]). This kind of “perfor-
mance target setting” or “probabilistic safety margin [18]” is shown conceptually in
Figure 10. This form of target setting has been implemented for aircraft conceptual
design under uncertainty [62].
Figure 10: Deterministic Design with Target Setting
Unlike performance target setting, uncertainty margins do not affect the perfor-
mance of the vehicle by a consistent push-off factor. When the physical implications
of this margin are processed through a performance assessment, the margin may cause
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a different level of impact on the performance depending upon the design condition
being investigated.
After conceptual design, uncertainty margins are often used during the aircraft
design process as a way to deal with problems which arise. For example, during
preliminary design the wing structures team may determine that the previously es-
timated structural weight of the wing has been exceeded now that more detailed
analyses have been performed. In such a case, the Chief Engineer may “allocate” a
portion of the empty weight uncertainty margin to the wing structures group as a
bookkeeping measure to keep the aircraft’s weight and performance on target.
Unfortunately, margins are generally determined by design experts or historical
values and are not compared to a quantitative calculation of the reliability which
results from the margin application [65]. A problem with this approach is that it is
difficult to anticipate how much margin will be needed for a given design. The mar-
gins necessary will depend on the selected design point, the performance constraints
imposed on the design, and the impact that any uncertainty has on these constraints.
No evidence has been found of an aircraft design study accounting for both design
uncertainty and uncertainty margins.
Quantitative selection of a uncertainty margin is important because if a margin
is not selected appropriately, there will be some cases a selected margin may be
more than sufficient, causing the vehicle to be considered “over designed” because a
more “sporty” vehicle could have been selected with smaller margins and still meet
requirements. The next section talks about the opposite circumstance, in which the
uncertainty margin is insufficient to account for the effects of uncertainty.
2.1.2 What Happens When a Design Fails?
Sometimes margins are insufficient to account for unforeseen inaccuracies. Keane and
Nair mention that because “the design freezes early on during the design process, [. . . ]
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even when the design team knows that the design suffers from some shortcomings, it is
often very difficult to go back and change it [44].” It is theoretically possible to return
back to conceptual design and start the design process over; however, it is unlikely
that a company would prefer to do so unless all other options have been exhausted.
The process of taking an aircraft through the design stages requires money, time,
and effort. It seems reasonable to assume that a company would not simply throw
away its investment unless it was convinced that the design was not salvageable.
Understandably, most companies attempt to have very few changes happen to the
aircraft later in the design process. As mentioned by Anderson, “If major changes
were demanded during this stage [preliminary design], the conceptual design process
would have been seriously flawed to begin with [2].”
Instead, it is in these cases that small late-stage changes, mitigation actions,
may need to be applied by the chief engineer to recover the design and associated
investment without exorbitant additional resources. This kind of situation is exactly
what Sutter described in the quote in Section 1.3.2 when talking about problems
encountered during the 747’s development. Stanley Kandebo also references similar
actions taken by Pratt & Whitney when they were developing the F135 engine for the
Joint Strike Fighter [43]. Quotes from the director of the F135 programs, William
Gostic, show how the product can continue to be adjusted even after system and
development demonstration engines have been tested.
With the [STOVL] version of the JSF battling weight issues, any ad-
ditional thrust that can be generated by the engine, as well as any chance
to save weight, will be closely scrutinized. “Thrust is a big issue and is
especially important for the [STOVL] powerplant” Gostic said.[. . . ]
“Right now we have a plan to get the [STOVL] engine to the target
weight, and have identified a number of things to actually get the engine
below the target,” Gostic said.
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It is apparent that these mitigation actions exist in the real design process of an
aircraft; however, they are very rarely modeled in the conceptual design process. The
goal of this thesis is to model them within this process with a probabilistic approach.
Further, it will be shown that knowing the impact of these mitigation actions during
conceptual design can help designers select a better, more flexible aircraft.
The presence of uncertainty in the design process requires a shift in how the design
process is modeled from the method used for deterministic outcomes. Since a model
must emulate a process in the real world, this process dictates how uncertainty should
be integrated into the design model. However, different types of design follow different
processes. The first one examined experiences uncertainty around the assumptions
made when designing the aircraft. The second experiences uncertainty around certain
design parameters which cannot be computed in the early stages of design. The two
types of studies are similar in their components, but they operate in a different order.
To describe them adequately, a clarified description of deterministic aircraft design
modeling is needed.
2.1.3 How Deterministic Design is Modeled
Aircraft design can be modeled using two processes that are often used together
to evaluate a particular design. These two steps are usually performed in tandem
during aircraft design studies. Sizing occurs first to define the final design of the
vehicle. Afterwards, this vehicle is input into a performance analysis tool to evaluate
any additional off-design conditions.
Eventually, design will progress into more detailed analysis. It is too expensive to
leave the design completely open beyond that point because a company would spend
vast amounts of resources using detailed methods to analyze designs which would not
be used. Thus, a company will freeze the design and then apply high-fidelity tools to
analyze it further. During this later phase, the overall aircraft design (especially the
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gross geometry) will likely no longer change, but more information about the aircraft
will become known. Thus, the uncertainty about the performance of the vehicle will
decrease, but the design parameters will remain the same.
2.1.3.1 Sizing
Sizing is the act of designing a vehicle to meet a set of performance constraints, usually
based on a design mission. Sizing can be accomplished by iteratively adjusting sizing
variables (usually the vehicle’s weights) and evaluating the resulting aircraft with a
performance analysis. This means that a sizing tool can be created by combining a
performance analysis with an internal optimizer. Aircraft design tools use this form
of iterative application of a performance analysis to size a design to a particular set
of conditions [59].
Sizing takes the input of a goal parameter, commonly aircraft design range, and
seeks the appropriate fuel weight to accomplish that mission. This is often referred
to as a “fuel balance [78].” During this process, a sizing tool will select a guess of
the aircraft’s overall weight and dimensions. That aircraft will be used to deter-
mine its fuel capacity or 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒. The vehicle is then flown through the required
mission analysis to determine how much fuel was needed to complete the mission,
𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑. With this information, an updated takeoff gross weight (TOGW) will
be calculated, and the process repeated until the fuel volume meets the needs of the
mission (𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 = 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑).
A decrease in the weight of fuel required will lead to a reduced empty weight of
the vehicle, further reducing the fuel required. This “snowball effect” will allow the
vehicle to find the minimum size capable of accomplishing the mission while meeting
all other design inputs. The process described above amounts to a performance
analysis of the aircraft at each step of the iteration - essentially, each step in a sizing
analysis is in effect a different aircraft, where only the final aircraft is selected because
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the rest violate the laws of physics or are oversized to the design mission.
Changing the assessment condition will result in a different vehicle because the
optimizer will react to the new condition and size the vehicle differently. Obviously,
this would be the expected behavior if the design variables are altered, as the “design”
would be different. Changing the sizing mission range or payload will also have an
important effect. It is worth noting that other assumed parameters can have a strong
impact on the final vehicle size. Changes to the vehicle’s drag polar, component
weight factors, cruise conditions, and many others will have an impact on the final
size of the vehicle.
The process of sizing is not exclusive to aircraft design. For example, after thermo-
dynamics have been assessed, turbofan engines go through an almost identical process
in which components are scaled photographically to meet a thrust target while keep-
ing the thermodynamics constant [91]. For the purpose of this thesis, sizing will be
defined as any process during which many design parameters are scaled through a
common variable to meet a specific (performance) requirement while maintaining the
other design variables in a non-dimensionalized format.
2.1.3.2 Performance Analysis
Performance analysis is a step in which a previously sized aircraft is analyzed for a
prescribed mission, usually a mission of secondary importance to the sizing mission.
During this performance analysis, the aircraft itself does not change and is considered
fixed, meaning the design parameters, component weights, drag polars, and other
characteristics do not change. In many cases, performance analysis uses the vehicle’s
fuel weight as an input and outputs the aircraft’s resulting range.
Unlike with a sizing analysis, performance analyses need not always specify a
particular mission. Instead, an analysis can be performed to assess the vehicle’s per-
formance for individual flight condition. For example, an aircraft’s final approach
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speed to an airport is dependent on only the vehicle’s geometry, aerodynamic charac-
teristics, and its landing weight. Thus, an entire mission does not need to be specified
to measure this condition.
A key distinction between performance analysis and the sizing iteration discussed
in Section 2.1.3.1 is that during performance analysis the vehicle’s overall size remains
fixed. Neither vehicle geometry nor maximum gross weight will not adjust to meet
any constraints imposed upon the aircraft, and the aircraft will remain as the user
specified. This distinction will be important when considering the question of how to
model the separate stages of design under uncertainty.
2.1.3.3 Deterministic Constraints
For deterministic design, sizing codes may already have constraint analysis available as
settings with an internal optimizer [59]. To be consistent with optimization literature,
individual constraints (𝑔𝑖(𝑥)) will be constructed with the form seen in Equation (3).
𝑔𝑖(𝑥) ≥ 0 := (𝑦𝑖(𝑥)− 𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑖) ≥ 0 (3)
Where 𝑦𝑖(𝑥) is a performance metric evaluated for a specific design, 𝑥, an un-
certainty scenario, and 𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑖 is the performance limit associated with performance
metric 𝑦𝑖. This form can be handled by a plethora of available optimizers. Obviously,
these constraints will impact the selection of design settings. However, this determin-
istic formulation only ensures that constraints will be met for a real design if the final
vehicle performance is equal to or better than what is predicted during conceptual
design or if the margins, which were not set via any reliability analysis, happen to be
sufficient.
2.2 Uncertainty in Aircraft Design
A discussion of uncertainty would be incomplete without a discussion of the kinds
of uncertainty that may be faced. The risk community breaks uncertainty into two
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categories: aleatory and epistemic uncertainty [35, 69]. Aleatory uncertainty is re-
lated to events which are inherently random; as a result it cannot be reduced, only
(sometimes) predicted. Epistemic uncertainty, on the other hand, is related to a
lack of knowledge about the process being observed. This description is exactly like
the uncertainty that has already been discussed for aircraft design. Since this thesis
focuses on values which will become known at a later point in time but must be as-
sumed in the early stages of aircraft design, its purpose is to account for the epistemic
uncertainty surrounding these design decisions.
Considering the modeling described in Section 2.1.3, it will be illustrative to con-
sider how different forms of uncertainty would be modeled using these different pro-
cesses. Explicitly, at what location in the process of sizing and analysis should cer-
tain types of uncertainty be modeled to achieve a desired effect? This thought is
expounded upon in Research Question 1, located in Section 3.1.
Figure 11 shows conceptually the goals of uncertainty quantification. Namely, the
ability to select a design point with confidence based on the possible outcomes of the
performance of the vehicle.
Figure 11: Design Space with Confidence
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Daskilewicz et al. point out three possible sources for the kind of uncertainty
being modeled here [24]:
 Analysis approaches that employ simplified physics and empiricism in concep-
tual design;
 higher abstraction and incomplete definition of the intended air vehicle geometry
in conceptual design; and
 variability or addition of features in the preliminary design, detailed design, and
production phases that were unmodeled in conceptual design.
2.2.1 Performance Constraints
Figure 8 illustrates the idea of constraint analysis as it is traditionally used in con-
ceptual design. The goal is to choose the most efficient (usually the lightest) design
that meets all requirements. However, Figure 11 is a more realistic depiction of the
design process, in which the exact values of design parameters which will meet con-
straints may not be known. For a deterministic design, the best design is clearly one
that meets the constraints while minimizing the objective function. However, design
uncertainty may cause the selected vehicle to miss its performance constraints when
analyzed in detail in later design stages. Thus, for the design process including un-
certainty, the best design point is not as clear as for deterministic design since each
point inside the “fuzzy” constraint region will have a different chance of satisfying
constraints and a different performance; these two metrics are usually in opposition
to one another.
Obviously, if the design is selected well, there will be scenarios –in this formulation,
outcomes of the uncertainty variables– in which no constraints are violated. These
scenarios are useful information for the designer, but this falls squarely in the well-
researched realm of Reliability-Based Design Optimization as described in Section 2.4.
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Aspects of this method, will be borrowed and augmented for the current work, but
more interesting to the current problem is analyzing what happens when a design
fails.
Figure 12 shows the constraints in the design space for a single uncertainty out-
come, dubbed Scenario A. On the left (Figure 12(a)) the design space is illustrated
with a deterministically designed aircraft at an assumed value of the uncertain param-
eters. The right side (Figure 12(b)) shows this uncertain parameter assumption. An
uncertainty scenario other than the design condition, scenario A, is then considered.
This new uncertainty scenario changes the performance of the vehicle. The impact
of this performance change is seen in Figure 12(a) as a shift in the constraints within
the design space.
(a) Scenario A Design Space (b) Scenario A Uncertainty Space
Figure 12: Uncertainty Scenario A
The aircraft design was selected at a particular assumption of the uncertainty
values and fixed at the end of conceptual design. Later, in the preliminary design
stage, it is observed that empty weight of the vehicle is much higher than anticipated.
This would have an effect on the performance of the vehicle, moving the constraints
in the design space. It is expected that some constraints would be affected more than
others. The vehicle may now be violating constraints, depending on how different the
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outcome was from the assumed design conditions.
Figure 13 shows the constraints in the design space for a different uncertainty
outcome, Scenario B. Once again, the left chart (Figure 13(a)) illustrates the design
space while Figure 13(b) on the right demonstrates the uncertainty space. Whereas
Scenario A resulted in a higher empty weight than was estimated in conceptual design,
Scenario B results in a higher cruise drag value than was predicted. In this case
a different constraint may be affected than was affected in Scenario A, causing a
different constraint violation than in the previous scenario.
(a) Scenario B Design Space (b) Scenario B Uncertainty Space
Figure 13: Uncertainty Scenario B
Where Scenario A resulted in a higher empty weight than was estimated in con-
ceptual design, Scenario B results in a higher cruise drag value than was predicted.
In this case a different constraint would be affected than was affected in Scenario A.
At minimum, it is reasonable to assume that they would violate the constraints by
different amounts. If the design must be brought to the same minimum level of per-
formance with respect to the constraints, then different mitigation actions, described
further in Section 2.2.2 would be taken in the preliminary design stage to remedy
these two different scenarios, even though both started with the same design point.
Uncertainty quantification tools attempt to look at all possible scenarios. This
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can be done via brute force methods like Monte Carlo Simulation or a variety of more
sophisticated tools like those described in Section 2.4. However it is accomplished,
these methods and others like them aid the decision maker in selecting an appropriate
push off from the deterministic constraints to allow for an acceptable level of relia-
bility. This concept is illustrated in Figure 14. Figure 14(a) shows a representative
aircraft design space with the deterministic design requirements illustrated by the
blue hashed lines. The resulting design point is shown by the blue dot. Figure 14(b)
on the right shows the space of uncertainty variables. A correlated distribution has
been imposed on these variables, indicated by the distributions on the axes and the
concentric, angled contour lines in the chart itself. For each different scenario in the
uncertainty space, the constraints in the design space will move. By assessing this
entire distribution of uncertainty variables, probabilistic locations of the constraints
in the design space can be located. In the design space, this is conceptually shown
by the distributions on each of the design constraints. The green constraint lines
correspond to a best-case scenario of where the constraint lines could end up, while
the red constraint lines represent a worst-case or a bad but unlikely scenario. If one
were to design with reliability as the primary goal, a conservative design point like
the one shown by the red dot might be selected.
2.2.2 Mitigation Actions
When the design fails to meet one or more constraints due to changes in the pre-
dicted capabilities of the aircraft, the chief engineer will step in. As mentioned in
Section 1.3.1, mitigation actions are designed to respond to these performance short-
falls. Figure 15 shows how this could work conceptually for a scenario which violates
a constraint. Figure 15(a) on the left show the design space with a constraint vio-
lation caused by some uncertainty scenario, just like the one observed in Figures 12
and 13. Figure 15(b) show the available mitigation space when the constraint is
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(a) Design Space with Confidence (b) Uncertainty Space for Confidence
Figure 14: Design with Confidence Bounds
violated. Just like with the design space, the mitigation space is impacted by the
constraint violation, reducing the available space. The origin in the mitigation space
represents the behavior of the design under the selected uncertainty condition when
no mitigation action has been imposed. The fact that this portion of the mitigation
space violates the constraint simply implies that the design will not be compliant
with the constraints when no mitigation action is used. The open white space in the
mitigation contour plots show the available mitigation actions which would bring the
design back into compliance.
Moving to this available level of mitigation is equivalent to applying a mitigation
action during preliminary design will bring the design back into compliance with the
violated constraints. The reaction to this applied mitigation action will be seen in the
design space as the constraints moving with respect to the design point. Since the sce-
nario is now compliant with the constraints, this scenario is considered “recoverable”
through the available mitigation actions.
It is possible that the mitigation action will not have enough effect to alleviate
the constraint violation. In this case, the scenario will be unrecoverable.
If the mitigation action were only to affect the intended response with no other
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(a) Deterministic Design with Constraint Viola-
tion
(b) Mitigation Space for Constraint Violation
Figure 15: Constraint Violation
consequences, then this would be wonderful. However, the example from Sutter
cited in Section 1.3.2 implies that this is not the case. Indeed, it is assumed that
most actions will incur some form of engineering penalty. If there were no penalty
or negative consequences to mitigation actions whatsoever, then the action would
likely have already been implemented before preliminary design, regardless of any
uncertainty considerations. At minimum, mitigation actions will likely increase the
empty weight of the vehicle, either directly or through the need for a reinforced
structure due to the changing design.
These penalties will have a direct impact on the mitigation space. Consider a
constraint which is highly dependent on the empty weight of the vehicle. If the
mitigation action employed (𝑚1) in Figure 15(b) were to have a large empty weight
penalty associated with it, application of this mitigation action may cause another
constraint to be violated. Figure 16 shows how the mitigation space could change
with mitigation penalties imposed.
It is easy to imagine a scenario where a design is already very close to a (non-
violated) constraint for a particular scenario. In such a case, mitigating may cause
that design to violate the other constraint before enough mitigation is applied to fix
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(a) Deterministic Space (b) Mitigation Space
Figure 16: Constraint Violation with Mitigation Penalties
the constraint originally violated. In such cases, it is very possible that no viable level
of mitigation action will exist which could fix the design, even though the original
violated constraint may be alleviated. In this case, the scenario is also unrecoverable.
The cost of potential mitigation actions would be helpful in determining the us-
ability of mitigation actions. Unsurprisingly, no information is available in the liter-
ature to quantify the cost of potential mitigation actions. This information may be
available to an aircraft manufacturer behind closed doors. Instead, the engineering
penalty discussed above will be used in place of a financial cost. Practical applica-
tions of the methodology proposed in this thesis would do well to incorporate this
cost information.
2.2.3 How to Address Uncertainty: Margin vs. Mitigation Actions
It will be helpful to clearly delineate margins and mitigation actions, as while they
are very different actions taken by the design team, they are intended to serve similar
purposes.
Margin variables (ℎ) can indeed be thought of similarly to design variables - they
are set when the aircraft is designed/sized. Mitigation variables (𝑚) are reactions
to performance shortfalls, and are used only when necessary. Both of these variable
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types are intended to address uncertainty, but in very different ways. The financial
analogy would be that margins are like saving money ahead of time just in case, while
mitigation actions would be equivalent to taking out a loan when things go awry.
Assume that the designer does not trust his code’s empty weight prediction be-
cause it’s a conceptual-level tool and/or the vehicle is very new. He may believe
that resulting aircraft might weigh more (which is bad) than the code or less (good)
than the code’s prediction. To compensate for the possibility that the vehicle may be
heavy, he can add an empty weight margin, increasing the weight predicted by the
code. Because the aircraft is still being sized, the design will compensate (e.g. the
aircraft will get bigger to carry enough fuel to meet the design range). If the designer
has set the margin well, he can be reasonably sure that my aircraft will meet its
performance requirements. Hopefully, through an uncertainty quantification method,
he can then quantify the likelihood. For the sake of this discussion, assume that the
designer set the margin and design well, and the resulting design has a probability of
compliance of 90 percent.
Now what if, despite the uncertainty margin being in place, an uncertain scenario
is encountered which puts the design performance in that ten percent region where the
design fails a performance requirement? This scenarios is where mitigation actions
will come into effect. A design team would try every trick at their disposal to fix the
vehicle and bring it into compliance with the constraint. Mitigation actions are a set
of these fixes that are considered acceptable, to some extent or another.
A nuance of this whole setup is that the idea of knowing “how much mitigation
action to apply?” for a given design is very complicated, and may not actually be
sensical. Mitigation actions are only relevant to the design AND the uncertainty
scenario in question, and statistics of the results might lend themselves to very easily
incorrect interpretations. Mitigation levels may make some sense if evaluated using
conditional probability with respect to the uncertainty scenario being investigated.
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This concept is beyond the scope of this study. However, it may be a beneficial area
to explore for future work.
2.3 Probabilistic Methods Applied to Aircraft Design
This section examines a subset of probabilistic methods which have been previously
applied to aircraft conceptual design. These are examined both to assess how prior
analyses have been performed and to determine whether any methods can be directly
appropriated for use in this thesis.
2.3.1 Robust Design Simulation
Mavris et al. introduced the idea of applying reliability analysis to aircraft systems
design with the development of Robust Design Simulation (RDS) [56]. The core of
RDS is described in Equation (4). Since all random variables 𝑌 are purely economic
variables and have no impact on the performance of the vehicle, the performance of
the aircraft can be modeled deterministically. The output of RDS is a design (𝑋)
which maximizes the probability of meeting a single economic design objective while
deterministically meeting all performance constraints.
Maximize: 𝑃 [𝑍(𝑋, 𝑌 ) ≤ 𝑧0]
Subject to: deterministic performance constraints
(4)
where 𝑍 is the overall economic objective, 𝑋 is a vector of deterministic design
variables, 𝑌 is a vector of random economic variables, and 𝑧0 is the target of the
objective function.
In order to accomplish this, surrogate models of the responses are generated using
a design code. These surrogate models are then used via Monte Carlo Simulation
(MCS) to generate a second set of surrogate models, this time of the Cumulative
Distribution Function (CDF) of reliability as a function of the design variables. The
optimizer in Equation (4) then uses these CDF surrogates in conjunction with the
response surrogates to find the design with the highest probability of success.
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Figure 17: Robust Design Simulation
Mavris and DeLaurentis extended this concept to combined economic and tech-
nology uncertainties [57]. However, in this extension, the technology assessment and
Robust Design Simulation are performed in separate, sequential steps. Additionally,
the assessment method for technology studies is formulated differently than reliability
studies, as will be explained in Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2.
While its implementation is cumbersome, specifically the surrogate models of sur-
rogate models, the inclusion of reliability as a response to be optimized rather than
just as a constraint is novel. This optimization has the potential to counter a pitfall
of RBDO noted by Bordley and Pollock in 2009, namely the rejection of a design
with much higher probability of satisfying constraints in favor of one with a slightly
better value in the traditional objective function [11]. This idea of maximizing the
probability of success will be explored again with another tool, Pareto Optimality, in
Section 2.5.
2.3.2 JPDM
Obviously, the limitation of RDS of only allowing for a single probabilistic constraint
is a significant restriction. Thus, one of the developers of Robust Design Simulation,
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Bandte, improves upon the work started in RDS by introducing Joint Probability
Decision Making (JPDM) [4]. JPDM introduces the probability of success of meeting
constraints on multiple criteria simultaneously. This method is used for analyzing
aircraft at a system level through one of five different analysis schemes, based on
either MCS or Fast Probability Integration (FPI). This reliability measure was used
to optimize the design of aircraft.
Both RDS and JPDM use the probability of meeting the specified goal(s) as their
only metric for optimization. Additionally, both methods were conceived with the
idea of performance constraints being met deterministically, and changing the design
to meet probabilistic economic constraints. Their implementations still serve as useful
examples of RBDO methods applied to aircraft design.
2.3.3 Stochastic Programming with Recourse
Stochastic Programming is another method of uncertainty quantification which is
distinct from RBDO and RDO, but with many conceptual similarities [8, 53, 79].
Particularly of interest to the current problem, Dantzig and Beale first developed
a formulation for treating stochastic programming with fixed recourse - a concept
extracted from Stochastic Programming - which is considered as a way to fix problems
arising from the uncertainty present in conceptual design during later design stages.
[23, 6]. Choi examined the concept of Stochastic Programming with Recourse as a
way to handle aircraft design uncertainty [20].
Notable differences exist between reliability-based implementations and Stochastic
Programming with Recourse. One of the founding principles of Stochastic Program-
ming with Recourse methodology is the assumption that there will always be an
available recourse to any unexpected scenario. While any engineer worth his salt will
endeavor to find an available solution should a problem occur, it seems unreason-
able to assume this will always be the case. The changes to the design may simply
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be too drastic. Additionally, recourse actions are found in a space identical to the
original design variables. While the method proposed in this work does not prohibit
such changes to the design, the operating assumption is that the design will not be
altered except in those limited ways explicitly considered by the philosophies of the
individual(s) executing the method.
Stochastic Programming with Recourse assumes that, aside from the imposed
penalty function, the “best” design can be reached after the uncertainty has been
resolved. In other words, the designer will re-examine the original conceptual space
to determine the best design now that the resulting values of the uncertainty variables
are known. The existing design will then be altered to match as closely as possible to
this new design selection. The penalty function is imposed to illustrate that, unless
the design process is truly reinitialized, this resulting design will retain information
from the failing design and thus will be an imperfect representation of the best design
for the encountered scenario. This assumption may be acceptable for small changes
to the design parameters, but it runs counter to the founding assumptions of this
thesis – specifically that the design parameters will generally not be altered after
the conceptual design stage is completed. Additionally, the penalty from recourse is
not processed through the assessment tool, thus ignoring any secondary effects of the
imposed penalty on the aircraft’s performance. Thus, Stochastic Programming with
Recourse will be used only as motivation in the current work.
2.3.4 Multi-Stage Reliability-Based Design Optimization
Nam et al. applied Multi-Stage Reliability Based Design Optimization (MSRBDO)
to aircraft design as a way to deal with the staged nature of the design process
[63, 64]. The concept of MSRBDO is based off of traditional Reliability Based De-
sign Optimization with some significant augmentations. Like all reliability methods,
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MSRBDO attempt to address the issue of making design decisions under the pres-
ence of uncertainty. Traditional Reliability-Based Design Optimization assumes that
all decisions are made very early in the design process, long before the uncertainty
is reduced. Multi-Stage RBDO alters this assumption based on the principle that a
longer developmental time will allow the designer to delay some decisions until a later
point in time. At this later point, some but not all of the uncertainty will be reduced
through additional analyses. At this point more design decisions must be finalized,
with a reduced amount of uncertainty. This concept is illustrated in Figure 18.
Figure 18: MSRBDO Simulation of a Complex System Design Problem [63]
MSRBDO assumes that this ability to delay design decisions is a natural process
of the staged nature of long development time designs like new aircraft. Indeed, many
decisions about the specifics of an aircraft are left until later design stages, including
after the design freeze. Some such decisions remain because the limitations of con-
ceptual stage design tools do now allow for the finalization of all detailed decisions.
MSRBDO assumes that no penalties are incurred by making these decisions at a
later stage. These decisions were delayed because they did not need to be finalized
at the conceptual design stage. Instead, additional analyses are performed. These
analyses will likely be assessing more fine changes to the aircraft configuration. In
this case, more detailed analysis tools will be required. These tools require more
time, energy, and more information than conceptual design tools. MSRBDO requires
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these advanced stage analysis capabilities. If one were to implement full MSRBDO,
analyses would need to be performed at all levels for each instance of a design decision,
leading to an explosion of assessments while using highly sophisticated tools. In the
time required to perform such an assessment, multiple aircraft could be designed in
detail.
MSRBDO is founded on three key assumptions [63]:
1. Reducible Uncertainty: Designers have accumulated some knowl-
edge, which also means cumulative reduction in uncertainty has been
achieved from the previous work.
2. Retained Design Space: Designers hold a certain degree of design
freedom that can be exploited to correct the decisions made at pre-
vious stages with increased knowledge.
3. Decision for Feasibility: Designers determine the present stage vari-
ables such that the committed design combined with anticipated de-
cisions at ensuing stages guarantees a target feasibility of the present
stage.
The example problem discussed in Chapter 1 maintains the first assumption:
uncertainty will be reduced at some later point in time during the design process.
However, the second assumption does not hold for this problem. In the motivating
problem, it is assumed that most or all of the uncertainty will not be reduced until
after the design has proceeded into later stages when more detailed analyses will be
employed. Since the design is assumed to be “frozen” at the end of the conceptual
design stage, none of the conceptual level design parameters should be changed at
this later stage. The only time any changes should be implemented late on would be
when performance has fallen outside acceptable constraints. The design should only
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be remedied by a small subset of mitigation actions to recover the performance. Ad-
ditionally, the third assumption is somewhat true and somewhat false. the designer
will still select the best design at the current stage that will still meet requirements
later down the line; however, the later design decisions are not intended to occur
unless absolutely necessary.
The aircraft example problem used by Nam to demonstrate two-stage MSRBDO
(TSRBDO) on an aircraft design process illustrates some of the practical limitations
of this method [64]. The design problem does not incorporate any sophisticated pre-
existing sizing analysis into the method. Further, though MSRBDO is motivated
by the concept of later design decisions being made after more detailed analyses
have reduced the uncertainty surrounding the design, no such detailed analyses are
included. Nam cites his reasoning for
Nam states that one of the potential flaws of MSRBDO is the need for detailed
analyses. These detailed analyses are generally considered inappropriate for concep-
tual design because they take significant time to analyze a proposed design during a
time in which many tradeoffs are occurring. the “design and analysis tools that are
commonly used during the conceptual design phase do not support high resolution
of designs required to capture the impacts of hypothetical design changes that would
take place in the detail design phase [63].”
”In addition, computational practicability must also be considered in designing an
MSRBDO problem. The computational effort required to solve MSRBDO increases
exponentially with the number of stages, therefore becomes prohibitive very quickly
[63].”
MSRBDO assumes access to detailed analysis tools and the ability to run those
tools in a very quick manner. Further, MSRBDO assumes that there will be enough
knowledge known about the theoretical design to utilize those tools. The analysis
tools used during later design stages not only take more time and manpower to
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execute, they also require more detailed information about the design itself. This
level of information is beyond the level of information that typically exists during the
conceptual design stage of aircraft development.
For example, Company Z has a wing structural analysis tool that it typically
uses during preliminary stage of design. The tool can optimize the wing’s internal
configuration for minimum weight based on an input aerodynamic load distribution.
Typically, this information is given to the structural engineers by the aerodynamics
engineering group based on their own assessment of the configuration of the wing.
Both of these assessments take significant time. Further, neither of these assessments
can even begin to take place until the aircraft’s overall configuration is known.
Assessing either of these disciplinary analyses will take significant effort both in
terms of time required to perform the analysis and time required to even setup the
analysis in the first place. Company Z simply does not perform this level of more
detailed analyses during conceptual design. The company will be especially reluctant
to perform these analyses for hundreds or thousands of designs.
2.4 Reliability Calculation Methods
Determining the reliability of a design is an important part of assessing the uncertainty
of aircraft conceptual design. In order to accomplish this, some method must be
employed to assess under what scenarios the aircraft will successfully comply with
requirements and under what scenarios it will fail. The field of Reliability-Based
Design Optimization is filled with many methods to accomplish this task. Some of the
available methods are reviewed below in an effort to determine which is appropriate
for the problem at hand.
Reliability methods are often established to measure the likelihood that a design
47
will comply with an individual reliability constraint. It is also possible to deter-
mine the reliability of achieving compliance with multiple separate constraints si-
multaneously (aka joint probability), depending on the reliability calculation method
employed. Further, it is even possible to formulate a methodology which employs
different reliability goals on individual constraints as discussed in [60].
2.4.1 Sampling Methods
Sampling methods include Monte Carlo simulation, importance sampling, and adap-
tive sampling. Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) is a sampling method frequently used
for reliability analysis [48, 54, 72]. It is also commonly used in Aerospace Engineering
[12, 29, 47].
MCS first draws a set of 𝑛 random samples (𝑈 = (𝑢1, 𝑢2, . . . , 𝑢𝑛)) from predefined
distributions [36]. For each of these samples, a deterministic simulation is employed
to analyze the function’s response to these input distributions (𝑦1, 𝑦2, . . . , 𝑦𝑛). For
MCS to approximate a function such as the expected value of the input distribution, a




𝑖 = 1𝑛𝑦𝑖 (5)
A key advantage of Monte Carlo Simulation is that it that the accuracy of the
results can be specified by the number of simulation runs used [95]. Regardless of the
number of dimensions being assessed, it can be shown that the error of probabilistic
estimations made using Monte Carlo simulation will reduce approximately with the
square root of the number of assessment points. Thus, it is commonly used as a point
of comparison for new methods within the reliability community. Even for tested
methods, MCS is often used to check the final result of many RBDO studies.
Sampling methods, and specifically Monte Carlo simulation have a long history of
association with reliability analyses either through direct application or error checking
[39, 32, 31, 71].
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Another advantage of Monte Carlo simulation is the ease with which it can sim-
ulate different distribution types. By default, computer random number generators
create uniformly distributed variables; however, through transformations, almost any
distribution type can be simulated. Additionally, Monte Carlo simulation can also
generate correlated random distributions through a Cholesky decomposition [34].
2.4.2 Constraint Approximation Methods
For probabilistic methods which do not employ sampling methods, the integral of the
constraints over the uncertainty space must be calculated directly or approximated
in another manner [25]. Since the Limit State Function (LSF) – the boundary with
active constraints – can be arbitrarily complex, an approximation is usually preferred.
The following reliability analysis methods all employ some form of approximation.
Because the distribution of the performance is not known, it is often easier to simply
the integrand of the uncertainty space. This is accomplished by transforming the
original random variables by a Rosenblatt transformation [77]. In the literature,
these spaces are called the 𝑋-space and the 𝑈 -space, respectively.
In actuality, a transformation is needed to translate 𝑋-space to a 𝑈 -space for
easy integration and then an inverse transformation used on the 𝑈 -space to acquire
the 𝑋-space for function evaluations (𝑓 and 𝑔). In practice, the transformation from
𝑋 to 𝑈 is largely irrelevant. For methods like the First-Order Reliability Method
(FORM), the 𝑈 -space will always look the same aside from the number of variables:
standard normal distributions. Thus, only transformations for 𝑈 to 𝑋 are required,
and this can be done outside of the main FORM method (between method and
function evaluation). This makes integration easy because the iso-contours are all















The probability of being in an area is now straight-forward to calculate once the
















𝑑𝑢1𝑑𝑢2 . . . 𝑑𝑢𝑛 (7)
It is desirable for the integration boundary approximation to be the most accurate
at the point where it will have the highest contribution to the integral. Because
all uncertainty variables now have uncorrelated standard normal probability density
functions, the point where 𝑔(𝑢) = 0 comes closest to the origin will be the the location
of the largest contribution to the aforementioned integral. This point is dubbed the
Most Probable Point (MPP) of failure [19]. Since the MPP is the point which will have
the largest contribution to the probability of failure, it is where the most accuracy is
demanded, and boundary approximations will be centered about this point. Figure 19
demonstrates the concept of the MPP pictorially.
Figure 19: Most Probable Point (MPP) of Failure
Methods to search for the Most Probable Point (MPP) of failure are described in
Section 2.4.2. Finding this most probable point constitutes a second ‘loop’ for any
optimization process [3]. This occurs because the act of finding the Most Probable
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Point requires its own optimization, separate from the optimization of the design
itself. Once the MPP has been obtained, the reliability index 𝛽 is calculated. This
reliability index is equal to the magnitude of the distance between the MPP and the
origin in the U-space or 𝛽 = ||𝑢||. How the reliability index and the MPP are used
differ depending on the method used to calculate the reliability of the system.
The First Order Reliability Method (FORM) is an algorithm approximate the
bounds of a Limit State Function (LSF) (i.e. constraint) by first locating the closest
approach of the constraint to the center of the uncertainty space [97]. Since this
point will contribute the most to an integral over the failure region, the boundary of
the constraint is approximated linearly around this MPP. Because FORM assumes
the constraint to be linear, it will by definition be tangent to a sphere at distance 𝛽,
where 𝛽 is the magnitude of the vector |𝑢|, the vector which defines the location of
the MPP. Since the entirety of the uncertainty space is assumed to be uncorrelated
standard normal distributions, the reliability can be measured using the CDF of a
standard normal distribution as in Equation (8).
𝑅 = Φ(−𝛽) = 1− Φ(𝛽) (8)
Where Φ() is the CDF of a standard normal distribution.
Obviously, the linearity assumption will be less accurate the more curved the
actual constraint is. Also, the method is only designed to handle one constraint at
a time. Despite these limitations, FORM is widely used in RBDO literature due to
its ease of implementation and relatively few number of function calls compared to
higher order methods.
Hasofer and Lind proposed this kind of formulation in 1974 in order to en-
sure invariance of the calculated reliability with respect to the Limit State Func-
tion [33]. Rackwitz and Fiessler furthered this method in 1978 to be applicable to
non-normal distributions by incorporating ‘equivalent-normal’ distributions, approxi-
mated around the MPP [74]. Hohenbichler and Rackwitz expanded this algorithm in
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1981 to be usable for non-normal, correlated random variables in the Advanced First
Order Reliability Method (AFORM) by employing the Rosenblatt transformations
[76]. The combination of these methods is shown in Equation (9) and is commonly
referred to as the Reliability Index Analysis (RIA) [51], the Hasofer-Lind Rackwitz-
Fiessler (HL-RF) algorithm [32], or the first-order reliability analysis [90].
Minimize: ||𝑢||
Subject to: 𝐺(𝑢) = 0
(9)
RIA with HL-RF can be difficult to solve if the LSF (i.e. 𝐺(𝑢)) is complex and an
implicit function, and it does not converge for some problems [49]. Tu et al. introduces
an alternate way to locate the Most Probable Point, dubbed the Performance Measure
Approach (PMA) or the first-order inverse reliability analysis [90]. This method is
formulated as in Equation (10).
Minimize: 𝐺(𝑢)
Subject to: ||𝑢|| = 𝛽𝑎
(10)
The Performance Measure Approach has many potential benefits over the Reli-
ability Index Approach, especially in terms of the stability of the optimizer due to
the spherical constraint of the search area, as opposed to the arbitrarily-shaped con-
straint of 𝐺(𝑢) = 0 in RIA. It has the ability to be much more efficient at finding
the MPP than RIA, but this is dependent on the constraint in question, thus hybrid
approaches are sometimes used instead.
The Second Order Reliability Method (SORM) is very similar to FORM [32, 97].
The method still finds the Most Probable Point of failure and expands the reliability
analysis about that point. However, once the MPP has been found, SORM uses
a second order Taylor-series expansion around the MPP to find the boundary of
integration for the reliability calculation which can be seen in Figure 20.
The second-order approximation more accurately approximates the boundary of
integration; however, this does not come without a cost. Because it needs second order
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Figure 20: First (FORM) and Second Order Reliability Methods(SORM)
information, SORM calculates a Hessian matrix around the MPP. This calculation
is obviously far more involved than the simple 𝑅 = Φ(−𝛽) = 1 − Φ(𝛽) employed by
the First Order Reliability Method, requiring many more function calls. Because of
the computational cost to calculate the Hessian matrix, especially for costly objective
functions, and the relative simplicity of FORM, the Second Order Reliability Method
is infrequently preferred.
All methods described up to this point have been so called “Double-Loop Single-
Vector” approaches to reliability analysis. In other words, a design decision is made,
then a set of analyses are performed at a single design condition to determine the
reliability of that design, then the other loop of design decision making is returned
to, and so on. There are entire classes of reliability methods which employ a single
loop, designing and estimating reliability simultaneously [100, 38, 60, 26]. For reasons
which will be covered later, these methods are not considered for the current work.
Depending on the results of experiments to be performed, they may be recommended
for future work.
Alternatively formulations to probability theory exist including Evidence theory,
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possibility theory, and interval analysis. These alternatives are ignored for the current
work because bounds-based methods like interval analysis and possibility theory (and
to a lesser extent, Dempster-Shafer theory) are often bypassed by engineers because
they tend to generate more conservative designs relative to probability theory methods
[40, 95]. Additionally, Huyse points out that the bounds of engineering uncertainty
often cannot be accurately identified [40]. Indeed, sometimes all that can be said with
any confidence for an early engineering prediction is that it is 1) probably inaccurate
and 2) that the prediction is more likely to be close to the final answer than extremely
far off.
A significant problem exists with constraint approximation methods which may
limit their applicability to aircraft design problems. Generally, these constraint ap-
proximations methods assume that each constraint can be treated independently or
that only the most active constraint is relevant to the problem at hand. They, gen-
erally, do not consider joint probability distributions [62]. This can be significantly
problematic for aircraft design because the selected designs frequently have multiple
active constraints, meaning that some form of joint probability is crucial to determin-
ing the actual likelihood that a design will be successful under uncertainty.
2.4.3 Probabilistic Methods and Mitigation Actions
Reliability Based Design Optimization is indeed well-suited to ensuring reliability
in a design under uncertainty. However, there is no framework established by the
literature to include possible mitigation actions taken by the Chief Engineer in an
RBDO framework. Choi and Nam demonstrated the closest concept to a mitigation
action-equipped framework in the forms of Stochastic Programming with Recourse
and Multi-Stage Reliability-Based Design Optimization, respectively. However, both
methods have aspects which limit their usefulness for the current problem.
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Stochastic Programming with Recourse has limited applicability because the abil-
ity to apply infinite recourse to match any other design condition is incongruent with
the assumptions at the start of this work - specifically, that mitigation actions are
small changes and limited in scope. Additionally, the implication of effectively re-
turn to the conceptual design decision during recourse is in direct conflict with the
pre-established phases of aircraft design. MSRBDO uses more detailed analyses, re-
quiring more time and additional assumptions on information yet to be obtained.
Further, each ’stage’ requires both an uncertainty assessment and an optimization
loop; this will increase computational requirements exponentially with the number of
stages considered. Both Stochastic Programming with Recourse and MSRBDO both
fail to account for the fact that the aircraft size and outer mold line will remain fixed
after the conceptual design stage.
All existing Reliability-Based Design Optimization methodologies have additional
aspects limiting its implementation in practical aircraft designs. RBDO methodolo-
gies do not explicitly account for the sophisticated sizing processes typical of aircraft
design. RBDO does not account for uncertainty margins of the type typically used
in the conceptual design stage of aircraft development.
Again, this work is not intended to change the design process as it stands. The goal
is merely to bring information about later stages earlier to allow for better decision
making during the conceptual design stage. Thus, it is determined that there exists
no directly usable framework for aircraft design including mitigation actions.
The motivation for this thesis remains the same. Thus, it would still be enlighten-
ing to consider the possible mitigation strategies that a company’s design philosophies
would allow. Restructuring an RBDO-like framework to integrate these actions would
allow a conceptual design study to mimic more realistic design processes. By examin-
ing the impact of the uncertainty space, a probability of compliance can be assessed.
Further, by assessing the mitigation space for failed uncertainty scenarios, the process
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could represent a surrogate of a Chief Engineer’s attempts to recover a failed design
in the later stages of design.
2.4.3.1 Measuring Mitigation Success
To actually measure the successfulness of mitigation, the process must be examined
further. For each outcome of the uncertainty variables, the vehicle performance will be
different. Obviously mitigation will not be required if, given an outcome, the vehicle
naturally complies with all constraints. Thus, to accurately measure the amount of
mitigation required for a vehicle, the method must ensure that for compliant outcomes
(𝑔(𝑥, ℎ, 𝑢) ≥ 0) the level of mitigation is zero (𝑚 = 0).
For non-compliant outcomes the amount of mitigation required will vary depend-
ing on which constraints have been violated and by how much. For example, if a design
were found to have too high a drag during cruise, it may require some additional fuel,
more efficient engines, and/or alterations to the aerodynamics. Conversely, if that
same design were instead found to perform adequately in cruise but instead had an
excessively long takeoff field length, it would make far more sense to up rate the
engine thrust, potentially sacrificing some engine life to meet the takeoff field length
performance constraint. Furthermore, the magnitude of each of these problems will
dictate the amount of mitigation required in each scenario. This implies that selecting
an appropriate level of mitigation for each outcome of the uncertainty variables will
not be uniform for all scenarios of a given design. This will incur a “third loop” to
the calculation process, where the first two loops are the set of design points and the
set of uncertainty points.
2.5 Pareto Optimality
Designing for reliability and performance is a multi-objective optimization with com-
peting objectives. Increasing the probability of success will also tend to increase the
weight and fuel requirements of the vehicle. In such a case, a standard optimization
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routine may be insufficient. While an overall evaluation criterion (OEC) may be used,
this formulation requires the decision maker to prescribe preferences between objec-
tives a priori. This may be acceptable in some cases, but the exact tradeoff between
these objectives is not yet known. Additionally, a set of designs can be found that are
Pareto optimal means that no other design exists which is equivalent or better in all
metrics of interest. These designs form what is known as the Pareto Frontier, a set of
designs in which to improve in one metric, another must be worsened [28, 80]. Any
designs which are not on the Pareto Frontier have at least one other design which
is categorically better than it is, meaning it is at least equivalent in all dimensions
and is better than it in at least one metric. Thus, only designs lying on the Pareto
Frontier will be of interest to a decision maker. Figure 21 shows a example Pareto
frontier in two dimensions. By only considering designs lying on the Pareto Frontier,
the decision maker can dramatically decrease the number of designs to consider.
Figure 21: Example Pareto Frontier
The application of Pareto Optimality to RBDO concepts is not without precedent.
Zou and Mahadevan used three different approaches to calculate the Pareto Frontier
for bi-objective RBDO problem dealing with a car door [99].
If specific probability of compliance and success goals are known during conceptual
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design, then a single objective, constrained optimization technique will be appropri-
ate. However, should a preference not be specified, it may be prudent to explore
Pareto Frontier-finding algorithms.
2.6 Surrogate Models
Surrogate models are a tool for performing analyses more rapidly, rather than a
direct method of analyzing design uncertainty. Surrogate models use the principles
of regression to create a mathematical model of a more complex code. This model
runs much faster than the original, ideally with minimal loss of fidelity. The model
is constructed by first establishing a design of experiments, which determines which
values to assess using the original tool in order to build the surrogate model [13]. It is
important that the range of values used in the design of experiments be large enough
to encompass values which may be input into the surrogate model, since the model’s
predictive power decreases rapidly outside the original data range.
Because of the sheer number of points that must be evaluated in the exploration
of mitigation assessments for different uncertainty scenarios across a design space,
surrogate modeling will likely be a necessary step of implementing the methodology
proposed in this thesis. Of specific value is the reduction of time to run a single loop
of the performance analysis. Since the methodology will require running multiple
repetitions of the performance tool for different uncertainty and mitigation levels,
this reduction will have a great impact on the ability to evaluate the probability of
recovery. This will be especially important as the method is tested over the course of
its development.
For reliability analyses employing a Most Probable Point of failure, a surrogate
model need only be accurate in the region near the MPP, since that it where the
reliability is calculated [50]. Allaix and Carbone propose a method to improve the
ability of Response Surface Equations (RSE) to accurately predict the Limit State
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Function (LSF) [1, 16, 50]. Their method iteratively solves for the Most Probable
Point (MPP) of the LSF using the First Order Reliability Method (FORM) on a
second order RSE. At the MPP predicted by the RSE, an appropriate rotation of
the coordinate system is found for determining new Design of Experiments for the
creation of another more accurate RSE. This iterative method shows an improved
approximation of the probability of failure. It is unclear whether this method would
be amenable to multiple failure modes and thus will not be explored further in this
thesis.
Multiple methods exist for implementing surrogate models. Two common ones
are explored below due to their popularity, Response Surface Methodology (RSM)
[45] and Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) [17].
2.6.1 Response Surface Methodology
Response surfaces are a general class of surrogate models designed to emulate the
results of a more detailed analysis code for a smaller subset of problems [61]. They
generally take the form of an equation relating the output responses to the set of input
variables through a polynomial equation. The generalized equation for a second-order
response surface equation is shown in Equation (11) [37].














Once the model has been created it is tested for accuracy against both the original
values and a set of test cases which are independent from the cases to which the
model was fit. The metrics used to test accuracy look at how much of the variability
of the model is accounted for by the response surface; the distribution of the error in
the model to make sure there are no patterns in the errors; the quantiles of the error
between the fit cases and the testing cases, as well as the predicted values as compared
to the actual input values. If the results of these tests are sufficient the model may
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be used in lieu of the original analysis code with confidence that the results will be
similar.
Due to their polynomial function, Response surface equations are generally less
effective with irregularly-shaped response spaces. The next surrogate model imple-
mentation examined is one which intends to address this shortfall of RSEs.
2.6.2 Neural Networks
Neural networks, or Artificial Neural Networks (ANN), are a form of surrogate model
that work well when the results of an analysis are likely to be non-linear [9, 21, 81].
The principles behind ANNs are modeled on networks of neurons in animal brains,
drawing on these systems’ ability to recognize patterns and make predictions based
on that learning. ANNs are typically constructed with layers of nodes which connect
input values to output values. The connections between the nodes and the weights of
the connections are updated as the system ‘learns’ and this process over time results
in a surrogate model that is capable of predicting highly nonlinear behavior. The
ability to build these models is a common analytical software feature and is therefore
widely available.
2.7 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, necessary background information was derived from a review of avail-
able literature. The staged aircraft design process was examined. The impacts of
uncertainty on this process were illustrated. Previous methods implemented to quan-
tify aircraft design uncertainty were examined for their strengths and weaknesses.
Reliability calculation methods employed by RBDO implementations were explored.
Pareto optimality for competing objectives was established. A discussion of the use
and potential shortcomings of surrogate models was also reviewed.
Research Objective: Quantify uncertainty during the design process
60
for a new aircraft, including a sophisticated sizing analysis, uncertainty
margins, and mitigation actions.
Based on this review, gaps still exist within the available literature. There exists
no explicit discussion of the treatment of uncertainty when considering both sizing
and performance analysis and the dangers of incorrect implementation. Methods exist
which treat variables like uncertainty margins, but none exist which tread uncertainty
margins directly. There is no existing method which has any implementation miti-
gation actions. Choi’s Stochastic Programming with Recourse constitutes the most
closely-related implementation but even that has significant foundational differences
with the concept presented in Chapter 1.
These gaps are expounded upon in Chapter 3. The Research Objective is divided
into specific research questions. Possible answers to these questions are formulated
as hypotheses. These hypotheses are tested in Chapter 4. Based on these results, a
step-by-step methodology is proposed in Chapter 5, and the final implementation of
this formulation is demonstrated Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER III
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES
In this chapter, the information from Chapter 2 is synthesized. This leads to research
questions which must be answered in order to formulate the implementation of the
methodology. Potential answers are constructed in the form of hypotheses - educated
guesses based on the literature and/or preliminary experiments. Once these hypothe-
ses have been developed, experiments can be developed to test the validity of these
theories. These experiments are further expounded upon and exercised in Chapter 4.
As stated earlier, the motivation of this thesis is to improve the civil aircraft
conceptual design process by integrating information from preliminary design. This
indicates that the main goal of this thesis should be to assess the probability of com-
pliance and the probability of recovery for an aircraft design process by incorporating
mitigation actions within Reliability-Based Design Optimization frameworks. To this
end, a reliability calculation method will be borrowed from RBDO practices. The
motivation behind Stochastic Programming with Recourse will be modified to fit the
problem formulation at hand. From this, mitigation actions will be incorporated into
the reliability framework to find the probability of recovery from accounting for the
actions of the chief engineer.
3.1 Implementation of Reliability Analysis
As discussed in Section 2.2, there is inherent uncertainty in a new aircraft design.
Modeling this design uncertainty along with its effects is a critical element of this
thesis. The effects of this uncertainty will be realized during preliminary design or
later in the design process. However, many aspects of the aircraft geometry and
design characteristics are frozen at the end of the conceptual design stage. Just as
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with two-stage stochastic programming, the initial decision variables (𝑥) should not
be directly influenced by the uncertainty variables (𝑢) [5]. These frozen characteristics
are unable to be altered in later stages of design. Thus, the design selection, geometry,
and overall gross weight of the vehicle are fixed before the effects of uncertainty are
realized during preliminary design. Instead, other changes - mitigation actions - will
be made to the vehicle to try to recover the aircraft in scenarios where it fails to meet
one or more performance constraints.
Aircraft sizing tools are not inherently designed to emulate this exact process,
specifically with regards to uncertainty and mitigation actions. However, the building
blocks necessary to emulate this process do exist. The main building blocks –vehicle
sizing and performance analysis– can be employed to create a model of this process.
Care must be used with regards to where in the modeling process to apply the uncer-
tainty so that the true design process is emulated accurately. This observation leads
to the first research question, below.
Research Question 1 How should aircraft design with uncertainty be
modeled for reliability analysis, accounting for the stages of design?
The process of modeling aircraft design consists of two steps: vehicle sizing and
performance analysis. Because the vehicle will be sized during conceptual design, the
vehicle sizing analysis must be used to emulate that stage. Performance analysis will
be used to emulate the preliminary design stage because the aircraft geometry and
overall weights remain unaltered during both this stage of the design process and
this modeling technique. These two stages have a logical order, since the stages of
design happen in a chronological sequence. The conceptual design stage occurs before
the preliminary design stage; thus, vehicle sizing must occur before the performance
analysis.
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Fortunately, this structure limits the set of options for where design uncertainty
can be modeled. In effect, there are only two competing options: model the uncer-
tainty during the later performance analysis stage or model the uncertainty during
the sizing loop. These options are examined in Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2, respectively.
3.1.1 Modeling Uncertainty during Analysis
Modeling design uncertainty during the performance analysis means that the uncer-
tainty impacts will be observed only after the vehicle sizing is completed. Thus, the
uncertainty scenario(s) will have no impact on the vehicle size or geometry. Restating,
a particular design point will be sized identically, regardless of uncertainty realization
– the same vehicle will always proceed from the sizing step. This vehicle will still
perform differently due to the influence of the uncertainty variables, as expected of
an uncertain design. Logically, modeling this process for a single design would entail
the steps depicted in Figure 22 and described below.
Figure 22: Modeling Uncertainty during Analysis
First, values for design parameters (𝑥) are selected. The design selection may
come directly from the designer or via an optimization algorithm. Next the aircraft is
sized using those design parameters and a design mission. Additionally, values must
be assumed for the uncertainty variables in order to complete the sizing process. The
full implications of these assumed values are discussed in Section 3.2. The values
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of uncertainty variables are introduced after the aircraft sizing is complete. This
will change the performance of the vehicle; however, the vehicle’s design will not
change because sizing has already occurred and design parameters remain unaltered.
Finally, the vehicle’s performance is analyzed under this new scenario. In response
to the changing uncertainty variables, the vehicle’s performance (e.g. range, TOFL,
etc.) will change.
In other words, this process experiences uncertainty around specific aspects of the
design itself. Uncertainty during design stems from the design process mentioned in
Section 2.1.1. In conceptual design, rapid tradeoffs are desired so that more designs
can be considered and compared quickly. Thus, the models and design tools used in
the conceptual phase are faster than those of later phases. In these later phases, higher
fidelity tools are used to further refine what is known about the design, reducing the
uncertainty in the aircraft’s characteristics and performance. However, because these
tools are more refined and take more time to run, the overall design is frozen after
conceptual design and does not undergo major changes in the later phases.
3.1.2 Modeling Uncertainty during Sizing
Modeling uncertainty in the sizing step of aircraft design is equivalent to changing the
design assumption of a vehicle, and creates a different vehicle each time the uncertain
value is reassessed. This occurs because the optimizer is allowed to adjust the final
design to the specific circumstances associated with the uncertain outcome. For a
particular design, this type of process follows these basic steps. First, for each value in
a distribution of possible a-priori known uncertainty values different combinations of
aircraft parameters are chosen. The aircraft is then sized to those aircraft parameters
and uncertainty values. Finally the performance is analyzed at these same values.
This process is summarized graphically in Figure 23.
This process experiences uncertainty around the assumptions made during design.
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Figure 23: Modeling Uncertainty during Sizing
This type of modeling is most commonly represented by technology studies which exist
to assess the usefulness of a suite of technologies on potential future aircraft and to
determine which to fund for further development. The end result of this type of study
is that a particular suite of technologies will be funded; the aircraft is then designed
with these technologies in mind. Assuming the technology development occurs before
the actual conceptual design of the aircraft, the technology component impacts (k-
factors) will be known at the time of design selection. This means the aircraft sizing
step is performed with the uncertain result in mind.
Technology studies are numerous in aircraft design, and many techniques exist
to perform this kind of study [14, 45, 70, 85]. Thus, it would be beneficial to use a
similar formulation, if possible. To assess the possibility of using this formulation, a
comparison must be made to ensure that this method yields similar results to a more
directly constructed design uncertainty study.
3.1.3 Uncertainty Implementation Methodology
The act of freezing the design after conceptual design means the aircraft must be sized
before the results of uncertain values are determined in preliminary design. Hence it
is inappropriate to allow the aircraft sizing process knowledge of the results of the
uncertain values. Instead, the sizing should be performed with assumed values of
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the uncertainty variables, and the uncertainty incorporated during the performance
assessment step to determine the effect of the uncertainty on the already sized aircraft.
The process described in Section 3.1.2 does not follow this flow of information.
The aircraft sizing process will instead be able to respond to the values of uncer-
tainty variables. This means aircraft will alter to adapt to anticipated values of the
uncertainty variables. Furthermore, these guesses will constitute perfect information
about the results of these uncertainty variables – information which would not exist
during conceptual design. Resizing aircraft based on the uncertainty variables mean
that each “design” will produce multiple different aircraft. In other words, while the
design vector (𝑥) will be the same, the aircraft will be sized to different weights and
therefore will have many differences between each other (e.g. wing areas, thrusts,
tail sizes, weights). This is in direct contrast to the problem formulation in which
only a single vehicle proceeds into the preliminary design phase. Futher, the problem
formulation stated that uncertainty is only assessed once the vehicle configuration
has been frozen and has entered the preliminary design phase. Thus, the problem
forumlation conflicts with this implementation in two possible ways.
As mentioned, many methods exist which model uncertainty in the sizing analysis.
Specifically, technology studies exhibit this behavior frequently [45]. It would be
beneficial to make use of these methods now or in the future, if possible. However,
the differences in these two formulations also imply that the resulting aircraft may
not match. These differences could mean that a reliability analysis performed with
the uncertainty resulved during sizing will not give representative answers. This leads
to Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 1 To emulate the aircraft conceptual and preliminary design
process, uncertainty must be implemented after the sizing of the aircraft
is complete. Modeling uncertainty during sizing will yield incorrect results
for aircraft conceptual design under uncertainty.
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Logically, implementing uncertainty after the sizing analysis will produce a model
which gives the desired result of emulating the conceptual and preliminary design
processes as described in Section 2.1.1. Due to the potential benefits of using uncer-
tainty implementation before sizing, it will be beneficial to quantify any discrepancies
between the two formulations. To this end, Experiment 1 in Section 4.1 will be con-
structed to test the similarities or differences between these two uncertainty modeling
processes.
To represent this process mathematically, Equation (3) from Section 2.1.3.3 is
reformulated as Equation (12) to account for probabilistic uncertainty.
𝑔𝑖 (𝑥, ℎ, 𝑢,𝑚) ≥ 0 := (𝑦𝑖 (𝑥, ℎ, 𝑢, 0)− 𝑦𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑖) ≥ 0 (12)
Where 𝑦𝑖(𝑥, ℎ, 𝑢, 0) is a performance metric evaluated for a specific design, 𝑥, an
uncertainty scenario, 𝑢, and no mitigation. 𝑦𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑖 is the performance limit associated
with performance metric 𝑦𝑖, as seen earlier. The terms 𝑦𝑖 and 𝑦𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑖 inside the paren-
theses will reverse for any constraints which limit the upper bound of a performance
metric (e.g. takeoff field length).
In this part of the discussion, mitigation actions are not yet considered. However,
as will be seen in Section 3.3.2, Equation (12) is just a specific form of the more
generalized Equation (13) with the level of mitigation set to zero (𝑚 = 0).
An outcome of a design is compliant if it satisfies all performance constraints
(when no mitigation action is applied), as shown in Equation (13).
(𝑔𝑖 (𝑥, ℎ, 𝑢, 0) ≥ 0)∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐺 (13)
Where 𝐺 is the set of performance metrics and their requirements, (𝑔1, 𝑔2, . . . , 𝑔𝑛).
The set of outcomes in which a vehicle is found to be compliant with all perfor-
mance constraints (𝐴) is defined in Equation (14).
(𝑥, ℎ, 𝑢) ∈ 𝐴 := (𝑔𝑖 (𝑥, ℎ, 𝑢, 0) ≥ 0)∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐺 (14)
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Conversely, the set of outcomes in which a vehicle is not compliant with one or
more performance constraints (𝐴) is defined as all combinations of 𝑥 and 𝑢 which do
not fall in 𝐴, specifically show in Equation (15).
(𝑥, ℎ, 𝑢) ∈ 𝐴 := (𝑥, ℎ, 𝑢) /∈ 𝐴 (15)
An indicator function (1𝐴 (𝑥, ℎ, 𝑢)) can be defined as in Equation (16) which in-
dicates whether a specific combination of settings of design variables and uncertainty
variables is included in A, the set of compliant cases
1𝐴 (𝑥, ℎ, 𝑢) :=
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩ 1 if (𝑥, ℎ, 𝑢) ∈ 𝐴0 if (𝑥, ℎ, 𝑢) /∈ 𝐴 (16)
The probability that a specific design, 𝑥, will be compliant with all performance
constraints without the need for mitigation actions (𝑃 (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 | 𝑥, ℎ)) can be
found by using Equation (17). For a design, the integral of the indicator function
from Equation (16) is taken over the combinations of uncertainty variables. This
result is divided by the total combinations of uncertainty variables.
𝑃 (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 | 𝑥, ℎ) =
∫︀
𝑢∈𝑈 1𝐴 (𝑥, ℎ, 𝑢) 𝑑𝑢∫︀
𝑢∈𝑈 1𝑑𝑢
(17)
Now, a mathematical formulation has been proposed which will allow a designer
to determine the probability of compliance for a given design. Next, the method will
be extended to allow for the selection of uncertainty margins to enable finer control
over the reliability of the design.
3.2 Modeling Uncertainty Margins
The concept of uncertainty margins was introduced in Section 2.1.1 as a method by
which the deterministic design process attempted to account for uncertainty. These
uncertainty margins affect the overall performance of the aircraft by forcing the ve-
hicle to size to a different condition. In this manner, uncertainty margins will still
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be required within a reliability framework because, due to the nature of the sequence
of design stages discussed in Section 3.1, the vehicle sizing analysis itself is still de-
terministic in nature. Section 2.1.1 pointed out that these margins are traditionally
determined through some form of heuristic method, be it design experts or previous
historically successful values. It would be preferable to instead quantitatively select
an uncertainty margin based on a desired probability of compliance. This leads to
Research Question 2.
Research Question 2 Is it possible to select a desired probability of com-
pliance and then quantitatively determine a level of margin which will yield
that probability of compliance?
The concept of including a margin in a reliability-based analysis seems counter-
intuitive. One of the primary complaints about the deterministic treatment of uncer-
tainty through margins is that said margins will be either optimistic and insufficient
for scenarios which could arise. Alternatively, deterministic marings may be overly
pessimistic, which will contribute to a more costly design than necessary to ensure the
desired level of reliability. However, a margin of some nature may be necessary just
to meet basic reliability goals. For example, if the uncertainty requirement was set at
90 percent, then 90 percent of the simulations from sampling the random combina-
tions of uncertainty variables have to be feasible or satisfy all the constraints. Since
the nominal values of the uncertainty variables are set at the center of the input
distribution, there is a 50-50 chance of either an improvement or degradation from
the random variable being selected; thus, achieving the 90 percent feasibility would
be virtually impossible. Therefore, a uncertainty margin needs to be introduced as a
control variable to remedy this situation. Essentially this uncertainty margin sizes the
aircraft for weight which translates to a larger size to account for uncertainty effects.
Because uncertainty margins have a large impact on most aircraft design objective
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function candidates, an optimizer will seek to minimize these variables while main-
taining the desired level of reliability. In other words, an optimization routine can
be used to determine the appropriate margin for a given design, under the assumed
uncertainty distributions.
In theory, if uncertainty margins behave similarly to other design variables, such an
implementation should be feasible. To lend evidence toward this assumption, similar
implementations were examined further. The concept of using an uncertainty quan-
tification method to set some kind of margin is not without precedent. In 1992 Zhu
used reliability methods to determine safety factors for composite aircraft structures
and compared them to the traditional 1.5 structural factor of safety [98]. Bristow
also combined uncertainty quantification methods with safety target setting [15].
Nam successfully implemented performance target setting in an aircraft design
under uncertainty [62]. This performance target setting is conceptually very similar
to the idea of uncertainty margins, aside from one key distinction. For performance
target setting a constant “push-off” factor is implemented on the performance con-
straint imposed on the vehicle. This push-off can take the form of an additive or
multiplicative factor on the performance constraint of the vehicle, but it will remain
a constant level throughout the design space. This idea was shown conceptually
in Figure 10 of Section 2.1.1. Motivated by the successful implementation of tar-
get setting on an uncertain aircraft design process, it seems reasonable to infer that
uncertainty margins can be treated in a similar way.
Uncertainty margins are used to size an aircraft during conceptual design in order
for it to be responsive to uncertain conditions. Further, these margins are not forgot-
ten after the aircraft is sized and then frozen; they are treated as actual tools within
later design stages. During preliminary design, the Chief Engineer will “allocate” this
margin to deal with undesirable changes in the aircraft which arise when previously
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unknown or uncertain information is refined by more detailed analysis. Thus, the ef-
fect of the margin will remain as a part of the aircraft while the excess “dead weight”
implied by the margin is removed.
Empty weight margin can serve as a conceptually-direct example. If an empty
weight margin of 2,000 pounds has been applied to the aircraft during conceptual
design, the aircraft will be slightly oversized with respect to the empty weight. The
Chief Engineer knows that the empty weight estimate, his design target, contains
this “extra” 2,000 pounds above what the conceptual design tools predicted. During
these later stages of design, more detailed analyses are performed. After performing
detailed structural analyses, each of the individual components of the aircraft could
come in at, under, or over their target weight. If the wing is over its target weight,
the Chief Engineer knows that there is a repository of weight already baked into the
design for just such an occasion. The Chief Engineer can then allocate a portion of
this empty weight margin to the wing structures group to keep the entire aircraft at
its target weight, despite a component being overweight.
The direct use of uncertainty margins in this manner is straight-forward when
considering a single margin and a directly-related uncertainty variable. The concept is
demonstrated visually in Figure 24. In this chart, a theoretical (exaggerated) weight
breakdown of an aircraft is shown. The y-axis shows the build-up of these weight
categories as a percentage of the overall design maximum takeoff weight. Building
from the bottom is payload weight in blue, the aircraft empty weight in red, an empty
weight uncertainty margin in purple, and the remaining weight available in green. The
black line corresponds to the resulting change in design mission range and is related
to the secondary y-axis on the right.
The first column in Figure 24 corresponds to the sizing condition of the aircraft.
A large margin (exaggerated to ten percent of MTOW) is included in the weight
breakdown because the conceptual design codes are assumed to be very imprecise.
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Figure 24: Uncertainty Margin Adapting to Uncertainty Scenarios
The second column shows a “Perfect Margin” scenario in which the final empty weight
during preliminary design perfectly matches the predicted empty weight plus the
uncertainty margin imposed. This scenario is ideal from a design perspective as
the performance of the vehicle will exactly match the anticipated performance. The
third column shows the “Accurate Code” scenario in which the conceptual design
tool made an accurate prediction of the final empty weight. In this case, all margin
from the conceptual sizing remains available for use. Based on the description above,
this margin may be maintained throughout all stages of design for other unforeseen
circumstances, but it was unnecessary to do so because the weight never increased.
The fourth column shows a “Light” scenario under which the final aircraft was actually
lighter than predicted by the analysis code. In this scenario, the preliminary design
team would actually have extra margin available to respond to future problems which
never arise. The final column shows a “Heavy” scenario in which the code prediction
plus the uncertainty margin were insufficient to account for the amazingly high weight
seen in the later stages of design. Under this scenario the empty weight margin would
be unable to keep up with the growth of the vehicle, and the aircraft’s design mission
range would suffer.
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This pound-for-pound offset implementation does not hold when considering mul-
tiple margin variables and uncertainty variables simultaneously. Under the imple-
mentation as it is described, the aircraft will react to uncertain scenarios to maintain
constraint compliance only if the vehicle as designed has remaining uncertainty margin
which corresponds to the particular uncertainty variable which was under predicted.
This behavior implies that a design team would not use a particular uncertainty
margin (e.g. drag margin) to maintain the aircraft’s compliance with a performance
constraint (e.g. design range) if the aircraft were significantly over its target weight.
That kind of overly particular decision making would likely get the engineer in charge
fired.
It is far more reasonable to assume that all uncertainty margins will be used to
their full effect to maintain performance constraint compliance under all uncertainty
scenarios. Devising a scheme by which the design team would respond to each un-
certainty scenario to maintain aircraft performance would be very cumbersome; a
combinatorial examination of uncertainty scenarios for each uncertainty variable and
each possible combination of those scenarios and variables would need to be performed
to determine the reaction of each uncertainty margin. This exhaustive examination
would need to be performed separately for any different combination of uncertainty
margin settings. In the end, this process would be incredibly tedious at best and may
contain numerous errors at worst.
A far simpler assumption can be made to model uncertainty margins being used
to maximum effect to maintain compliance. Instead of a complicated if-then deter-
mination of margin responses, uncertainty margins will instead be removed in their
entirety when assessing an uncertainty scenario. The concept is demonstrated visually
in Figure 25.
In this chart, a theoretical (exaggerated) weight breakdown of an aircraft is shown.
The y-axis shows the build-up of these weight categories as a percentage of the overall
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Figure 25: Uncertainty Margin Removed when Assessing Uncertainty Scenarios
design maximum takeoff weight. Building from the bottom is payload weight in blue,
the aircraft empty weight in red, an empty weight uncertainty margin in purple, and
the remaining weight available for fuel in green. The black line corresponds to the
resulting change in design mission range and is related to the secondary y-axis on the
right.
Just as with Figure 24, the first column in Figure 25 corresponds to the sizing
condition of the aircraft. A large margin (exaggerated to ten percent of MTOW) is
included in the weight breakdown because the conceptual design codes are assumed
to be very imprecise. The second column shows a “Perfect Margin” scenario in which
the final empty weight during preliminary design perfectly matches the predicted
empty weight plus the uncertainty margin imposed. This scenario is ideal from a
design perspective as the performance of the vehicle will exactly match the anticipated
performance. The behavior of Figures 24 and 25 begin to differ at this stage.
The third column shows the “Accurate Code” scenario in which the conceptual
design tool made an accurate prediction of the final empty weight. Since the uncer-
tainty margin was removed during the assessment of the uncertainty scenario, there is
excess weight available of which the design team can take advantage. Should the fuel
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tanks contain sufficient capacity, this remaining weight can be filled with additional
fuel to maintain the maximum takeoff weight of the aircraft. This additional fuel
increases the design mission range of the aircraft. Further, it would allow the un-
needed empty weight margin to be used instead to account for detrimental conditions
in other uncertainty variables like a very fuel inefficient engine.
The fourth column shows a “Light” scenario under which the final aircraft was
actually lighter than predicted by the analysis code. In this scenario, the remaining
available weight is filled in with fuel up to the point where the aircraft has no remain-
ing space available in the fuel tanks. The design mission range is increased by the
addition of fuel to the aircraft and by the forced reduction in weight. This resulting
vehicle could also react to detrimental conditions in other uncertainty variables.
The final column shows a “Heavy” scenario in which the code prediction plus the
uncertainty margin were insufficient to account for the exceptionally high weight seen
in the later stages of design. Just as with Figure 24, under this scenario the empty
weight margin would be unable to keep up with the growth of the vehicle, and the
aircraft’s design mission range would suffer. However, since other uncertainty margins
would be treated similarly to this empty weight margin (i.e. they are removed during
uncertainty scenario assessment), these other uncertainty margins may be sufficient
to recover the range shortfall.
Including uncertainty margins during the vehicle sizing should be feasible based
on previous studies with similar variables. By including these margins during sizing,
the designer will have more control over the performance of the aircraft and, there-
fore, the probability of compliance of the aircraft under uncertainty. Removing the
margin before uncertainty assessment offers the distinct advantage that all margins
can be used to treat all performance shortfalls, regardless of the offending uncertainty
variables, and it does so in a conceptually straight-forward way. The integration of
these concepts is formalized in Hypothesis 2.
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Hypothesis 2 By including an uncertainty margin during the sizing pro-
cess and removing it (but not its effect) before the uncertainty analysis,
the impact of margin on the probability of compliance can be seen. Using
an optimizer, it will be straight-forward to determine an appropriate level
of margin to achieve a desired probability of compliance.
As a corollary to Hypothesis 2, it should be very possible to extend this method to
include multiple designs. Additionally, there is no restriction imposed that would limit
other design variables from being introduced into an optimizer solving for margin(s).
Thus, an optimization should be feasible which will allow for simultaneous setting
of both design variables and uncertainty margins to match a performance goal or a
target level of probability of compliance.
It should be noted that this treatment of margins is specific to the uncertainty
margins used in this problem. Should other margin types (e.g. performance tar-
gets) be used, then this formulation of removing the margin post-sizing may not be
the appropriate formulation. Care should be exercised when further developing this
methodology or any other methodologies to treat other types of design margins in a
reliability analysis.
The mathematical formulation for determining the probability of compliance has
been extended to include not only traditional design variables but also uncertainty
margins. This will allow for additional control over the probability of compliance for
an individual design or the ability to select the best margin for a particular design
setting. Next, the designer needs information about the probability of recovery of the
failed uncertainty scenarios for that design. This will necessitate the application of
mitigation actions to the failed scenarios.
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3.3 Modeling Mitigation Actions
From the title of the thesis and many sections before now, it is evident that the formu-
lation of mitigation actions and their implementation will be key to the methodology.
Without them, the quantification of design recovery is not attainable. Mitigation
plans are currently implemented reactively. As discussed by Sutter, the concept of
twisting the wing to alleviate the loads on the 747 was conceived only after a struc-
tural problem was discovered [86]. As a concept, this does not aid the goal of bringing
knowledge forward into the conceptual design process. However, this does not mean
that a manufacturer has never considered possible mitigation actions before. It is
likely that a manufacturer has previously established “acceptable” mitigation actions
- actions which the manufacturer would prefer not to take but would to recover a
design when necessary.
Further, engineers could theorize possible design problems and develop mitigation
actions which could be used to address the corresponding performance shortfalls. Just
as with reactive recovery during a traditional design process, mitigation actions are
formulated to fix specific missed constraints. In order to accomplish this, a process
akin to Safety Analysis may be employed. At the most basic level, engineers perform-
ing a Safety Analysis will assess different possible accidents that could occur. These
accidents are examined to help determine the manners in which such accidents could
occur. For each of these different possible problems which could cause an accident,
the engineers will determine different possible ways to prevent these specific accidents.
Engineers can develop mitigation actions in a similar manner to Safety Analysis.
In order to do so, different possible constraint violations are examined. These vio-
lations will be based off the performance constraints imposed on the aircraft design
and may be based on regulations (e.g. minimum rate of climb at altitude), access to
airports (e.g. maximum wing span), or based on the economics of the aircraft (e.g.
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maximum range at a specified payload). Once these possible violations are deter-
mined, mitigation actions must be formulated to address these shortfalls. To do so,
engineers enumerate the remaining available degrees of freedom in the preliminary
design stage. These degrees of freedom are examined to determine which of them can
fix the possible performance constraint violations. This step is very important to the
overall process herein because without knowledge of the possible mitigation actions
which could be taken it is impossible to predict what any unknown actions would
do. In order to determine the probability of recovery, a designer needs to define and
model possible mitigation actions.
Once these possible mitigation actions are defined, they will need to be assessed.
The methodology will need to apply mitigation actions only when they are required.
When they are necessary, an assessment will need to be made as to which mitigation
actions to employ and by how much to mitigate. Once these mitigation actions are
used, their effects on the vehicle needs to be determined.
Research Question 3 How should mitigation be represented in a prob-
abilistic conceptual design model?
3.3.1 Defining Mitigation Actions
In order to determine the probability of recovery, engineers need to define and model
possible mitigation actions. The outcomes of uncertainty variables are discovered
after design freeze. Mitigation actions are only implemented in response to perfor-
mance constraint violations which arise after the outcomes of uncertainty variables
are determined. Thus, mitigation actions are only imposed after the design has been
frozen. Because of the stage of design in which mitigation actions are implemented,
they cannot be large configuration changes. Instead, they must be small changes to
fix small constraint violations which can be implemented after a configuration freeze.
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Additionally, the late-stage nature of these changes will likely cause detrimental ef-
fects which will adversely impact other performance constraints.
Mitigation actions are inherently non-standard design actions. Their application
is not codified in a traditional design textbook or course material, nor is it easily found
in literature. What can be found is a set of choice examples that clearly illustrate
the concepts of mitigation.
Mitigation actions which would be limited to the early phases of design are of
little interest here. Since the formulation of the problem specifies that the results of
uncertainty are only discovered after the freeze of the aircraft design, any changes
which are typically early, large scale decisions like changing the wing planform area
will not be considered. Only actions which can be implemented late in the design
process after the “design freeze” are of interest.
Mitigation actions are only of interest if they are capable of fixing a problem which
could be encountered during preliminary design. Arbitrary changes to the aircraft
which do not affect the constraints are not relevant. For instance, since this thesis
is focusing on performance constraints, actions which change other metrics like the
internal layout of the vehicle or the handling characteristics will not be considered as
they do not affect constraints which are being measured.
These mitigation actions are often changes which are non-ideal options. Indeed,
their effects could have been executed more efficiently during conceptual design had
their need been anticipated. For example, an engine throttle push is, generally, less
effective than an engine which was designed to meet the desired thrust condition.
Likewise, an aircraft whose wing and pylons were built to handle a specific thrust
engine will need to be “beefed up” to handle a higher thrust engine. Mitigation
actions will have some form of detrimental penalty on the aircraft, shown conceptually
in Figure 26. In this conceptual diagram, a mitigation action is shown on the x-axis
which has a direct impact on the overall load of the aircraft (i.e. the maximum takeoff
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weight). The structural weight of the aircraft is shown on the y-axis. The green dot
shows the original design condition to which the vehicle was sized. The red line shows
the change in the aircraft as a response to this mitigation action being imposed. Small
changes to the maximum takeoff weight are not expected to have a large impact on
the structural weight of the vehicle because the aircraft was likely designed with
some conservatism. Larger changes to the maximum takeoff weight are expected to
increasingly impact the structural weight as more and more reinforcement is required.
Eventually, the structural weight penalty will grow so large that the aircraft cannot
sustain the changes as indicated by the light blue Recovery Limit line. As a point of
comparison, the purple line shows the structural weight of the aircraft if the vehicle
were brought back into conceptual design and resized instead of applying mitigation
actions.
Figure 26: Penalty Associated with a Mitigation Action
The mitigation action will have some direct impact on one or more parameters
defining the vehicle with the intent of improving the vehicle performance. In addi-
tion to this direct benefit to the vehicle, there is expected to be other detrimental
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impacts from the application of mitigation actions. These detrimental impacts will
be dependent on the changes being made to the vehicle to bring the aircraft back into
compliance with performance constraints and may be different for each mitigation
action. In the case where multiple mitigation actions are applied, it is expected that
all detriments from each mitigation action will be felt on the aircraft.
For the purpose of this work, if the mitigation penalties affect different aspects
of the vehicle, both will be applied. However, if the mitigation penalties affect the
same parameter, it will be assumed that their impacts are additive. This is shown
conceptually in Figure 27. Two different mitigation actions are shown on the x- and
y-axes. In addition to their benefit to the vehicle’s performance, these mitigation
actions enact the same penalty on the aircraft and are conceptually similar to the
penalty shown in Figure 26. The penalty associated with any level of mitigation
action as well as any combination of the two is shown by the black contour lines.
When the contour lines grow closer together, the function value is changing more
rapidly.
Figure 27: Mitigation Action Penalties are Additive
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Mitigation actions should be formulated from a manufacturer’s design philoso-
phies, expert judgment from seasoned designers, and basic aerospace engineering
concepts. These actions should be constructed in such a way that they are late
stage changes. Each action should be designed to remedy an encountered problem.
Finally, the implementation of these mitigation actions should capture any realistic
detrimental effects on the aircraft.
3.3.2 Representing Mitigation in a Conceptual Model
After the list of possible mitigation actions is developed, the mitigation actions need
to be used to quantitatively evaluate the recoverability of the design. Reformulating
the constraints from Equation (3) for probabilistic problems and including mitigation
actions yields the form seen in Equation (18).
𝑔𝑖 (𝑥, ℎ, 𝑢,𝑚) ≥ 0 := (𝑦𝑖 (𝑥, ℎ, 𝑢,𝑚)− 𝑦𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑖) ≥ 0 (18)
Where 𝑦𝑖(𝑥, ℎ, 𝑢,𝑚) is a performance metric evaluated for a specific design, 𝑥, an
uncertainty scenario, 𝑢, and a mitigation level, 𝑚. 𝑦𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑖 is still the performance limit
associated with performance metric 𝑦𝑖, as seen earlier.
In the sequence of events being modeled, a mitigation action is only implemented
to fix a particular uncertainty condition. Since mitigation actions are an attempt to
recover the design’s performance rather than face potentially dire consequences due
to missing design targets, any acceptable mitigation action would be implemented
in that scenario if it would recover the design’s shortfall and not violate any other
constraints. Thus, an outcome of a design can be recovered through mitigation if
there exists any mitigation action in the available set of mitigation actions (𝑚 ∈ 𝑀)
such that all constraints are met simultaneously, satisfying Equation (19).
∃𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 : (𝑔𝑖 (𝑥, ℎ, 𝑢,𝑚) ≥ 0)∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐺 (19)
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The set of outcomes in which a vehicle can be made compliant with all perfor-
mance constraints through the application of mitigation actions (𝐴𝑀) is defined as
in Equation (20).
(𝑥, ℎ, 𝑢) ∈ 𝐴𝑀 := ∃𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 : (𝑔𝑖 (𝑥, ℎ, 𝑢,𝑚) ≥ 0)∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐺 (20)
The set of outcomes (𝐴𝑀) in which a vehicle will not be compliant with one or
more performance constraints regardless of the mitigation action selected (𝐴𝑀) is
defined in Equation (21).
(𝑥, ℎ, 𝑢) ∈ 𝐴𝑀 := @𝑚 ∈ 𝑀 : (𝑥, ℎ, 𝑢,𝑚) ∈ 𝐴𝑀 (21)
An indicator function (1𝐴𝑀 (𝑥, ℎ, 𝑢)) which designates whether a design and uncer-
tainty scenario can be recovered is defined in Equation (22). This indicator determines
whether a specific combination of settings of design variables and uncertainty vari-
ables has any level of mitigation (𝑚 ∈ 𝑀) which places it within 𝐴𝑀 , the set of cases
which are compliant through mitigation.
1𝐴𝑀 (𝑥, ℎ, 𝑢) :=
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩ 1 if (𝑥, ℎ, 𝑢) ∈ 𝐴𝑀0 if (𝑥, ℎ, 𝑢) /∈ 𝐴𝑀 (22)
The Probability of Recovery (𝑃 (𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 | 𝑥, ℎ)) is defined in Equation (23) as
the probability that a specific design, 𝑥, can be made to be compliant with all per-
formance metrics through mitigation actions given that uncertainty scenarios are
encountered under which the design is non-compliant with one or more performance
metrics.
𝑃 (𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 | 𝑥, ℎ) =
∫︀
𝑢∈𝐴 1𝐴𝑀 (𝑥, ℎ, 𝑢) 𝑑𝑢∫︀
𝑢∈𝐴 (1) 𝑑𝑢
(23)
Even for a given design, different outcomes from the uncertainty space will ne-
cessitate different levels of mitigation actions. To accurately assess how much of the
uncertainty space can be mitigated for a given design, each failed point in the uncer-
tainty space must be assessed to find the appropriate level of mitigation actions to
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address any missed performance constraints. This process emulates the behavior of
the chief engineer in that he or she will fix the outcome that is encountered.
Both the probability of compliance and the probability of recovery through mit-
igation actions must be considered to determine the overall probability of success
of a given design. Some scenarios are compliant without further actions by the
preliminary design team. These scenarios were represented by the calculation of
𝑃 (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 | 𝑥, ℎ) in Equation (17). Some of the non-compliant scenarios may be
brought back into compliance with the constraints through the application of mitiga-
tion actions, represented by 𝑃 (𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 | 𝑥, ℎ) from Equation (23). Therefore, the
overall probability of success, 𝑃 (𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 | 𝑥, ℎ), is calculated as in Equation (24).
𝑃 (𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 | 𝑥, ℎ) =𝑃 (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 | 𝑥, ℎ)
+ 𝑃 (𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 | 𝑥, ℎ) (1− 𝑃 (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 | 𝑥, ℎ))
(24)
The expected value of the design objective (E[𝑓(𝑥, ℎ)]) is calculated by summing
the design objective values for all compliant scenarios with the design objective of
all recovered scenarios and divided by the total number of successful scenarios as in
Equation (25). Non-recoverable scenarios are not considered in this analysis because
their performance is undefined. The design will be penalized for non-recoverable
scenarios through the metric of the overall probability of success (𝑃 (𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 | 𝑥, ℎ)).
E[𝑓(𝑥)] =
∫︀
𝑢∈𝐴 𝑓 (𝑥, ℎ, 𝑢, 0) 𝑑𝑢+
∫︀
𝑢∈𝐴𝑀






Since in a real process only one uncertainty scenario would be encountered, the
ability for mitigation actions to be applied to each uncertainty scenario indepen-
dently must be considered. When a scenario causes the aircraft to fail to meet one
performance constraint, an appropriate mitigation action will be selected, assuming
one exists to fix the violations caused by that scenario. Under a different scenario,
a different set of constraint violations may occur. In this case, a completely sepa-
rate mitigation action may be needed. Between multiple constraints and mitigation
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actions, it seems reasonable that there may be no overlap between the available miti-
gation spaces for all uncertainty scenarios. This concept is demonstrated theoretically
in Figures 28 and 29.
The left side of Figure 28 shows an uncertainty space constructed using two in-
dependent uncertainty variables, 𝑢1 and 𝑢2. Multiple performance constraints are
Figure 28: Uncertainty and Mitigation Spaces - Scenario 1
imposed on the aircraft and assessed independently for each uncertainty condition.
Whenever all constraints are met, the uncertainty scenario is colored in blue. When-
ever the design would fail to meet one or more constraints under that uncertainty
scenario, the scenario is colored in red to indicate that it is not compliant. The green
and dark blue lines crossing the uncertainty space are the boundary where each of
the two constraints becomes active. Within the set of uncertainty scenarios a par-
ticular scenario has been selected for further investigation, indicated by the targeted
dot on the left. As can be seen, this scenario is violating both the green and blue
constraints. The right side of Figure 28 shows the available mitigation space for the
design under this uncertainty condition. On this side of the plot, two possible mit-
igation actions are considered, 𝑚1 and 𝑚2, each with a range of applicability. The
dot at origin in the lower left corner of this chart indicates that no mitigation action
has yet been applied to the vehicle. Colored regions in this space indicate that the
aircraft cannot be made compliant by an applied mitigation action with this level of
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mitigation due to one or more constraints. Just like the uncertainty space, when no
mitigation is applied the dot is in both the blue and green colored regions, indicating
that the aircraft is violating both of these constraints. A third, orange constraint
can be seen; this will limit the range of mitigation actions which can be applied. An
available region within the mitigation space is shown in by the white region where no
constraint will be violated. According to Equation (20), only one feasible mitigation
action which makes the scenario compliant is required to recover a design. Thus, this
available space indicates that a possible mitigation action setting exists to recover
this uncertainty scenario.
The left side of Figure 29 shows the same uncertainty space as with Figure 28.
In this figure, a different uncertainty scenario is selected for further investigation,
Figure 29: Uncertainty and Mitigation Spaces - Scenario 2
indicated by the red target. For this scenario, only the green constraint has been
violated at this time, though the blue constraint is very close to being active. On
the right side of the figure, the mitigation space formed between 𝑚1 and 𝑚2 is once
again explored. The constraints affect this mitigation space differently than in the
previous figure, even though the values which would violate the constraints have not
changed. This change occurs because the uncertainty scenario under consideration is
different, namely 𝑢1 has decreased while 𝑢2 has increased, changing the performance
of the aircraft. Investigating the mitigation space on the right of Figure 29, it can
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be seen that at the origin on the lower left, only the green constraint is active while
the blue constraint is not quite activated. This matches with the observed behavior
of the constraints in the uncertainty space on the left. Under this different scenario,
a small white region is still available within the uncertainty space, indicating that a
set of mitigation actions exist which will bring the design into compliance.
Examining Figures 28 and 29 further can yield some additional insights. The
available mitigation region in Figure 29 is very small. This potentially indicates
that under more stringent scenarios, the design team may not be able to recover the
performance violations through mitigation actions. Thus, the design being consid-
ered is likely not infinitely recoverable with only this set of mitigation actions (i.e.
𝑃 (𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 | 𝑥, ℎ) < 1).
Additionally, the mitigation actions necessary to recover Scenario 1 and Scenario
2 clearly have no overlap when comparing Figures 28 and 29. This indicates that
there will be no mitigation setting which will recover both scenarios simultaneously.
This is acceptable in a real world situation because both scenarios could not be
encountered simultaneously for the same design; thus, only one mitigation action
setting would need to be applied. However, the realization could complicate the
analyses of uncertainty scenarios and mitigation actions. Indeed, if this condition were
tested to be true in a representative example, it would indicate that investigating the
mitigation space would need to be handled independently for each failed uncertainty
scenario.
An alternate possibility would be to attempt to select a single “overall best” level
of possible mitigation actions for a given design under all failed uncertainty scenarios.
This setting would be the level of mitigation which brings the largest portion of the
uncertainty space into compliance. It is theorized that this level of mitigation would
yield a lesser probability of success than optimizing mitigation for each uncertainty
scenario separately; however, it may reasonably provide a lower bound on the “true”
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probability of success. Additionally, this restructuring of the problem would remove
the need for a MCS approach to assess the reliability, allowing for more sophisticated
and faster reliability measures to be employed.
It should be noted that restructuring the problem this way may not buy any time
savings unless constraint boundary approximation methods are employed. Approx-
imately the same number of function calls would be needed to optimize the overall
best mitigation option because a full MCS reliability measure would be needed at
each optimization step. In the original formulation, an optimization would be per-
formed on each MCS instead, leading to the same number of constraint analyses. The
exception to this rule would be a surrogate model executed through a code similar
to MATLAB, which has the capability to conduct an entire array of analyses much
more efficiently than evaluating scenarios individually.
If there were no penalties to the mitigation actions, and all mitigation actions
only improved the design, then the maximum level of mitigation could be applied and
analyzed. Under these conditions, this maximum level of mitigation would succeed for
all uncertainty scenarios which have any possibility of recovery. Unfortunately, both
of these conditions are unreasonable. Just like with design variables, some mitigation
actions will invariably be opposed to some constraints. As an example, consider the
case of a mitigation action to improve the aircraft range. One possible way to recover
if this range is violated would be to add additional fuel to the aircraft. Even ignoring
any design penalty associated from this extra load, the takeoff weight of the aircraft
would need to increase by the amount of fuel added. This increase in weight would
cause the aircraft to need a longer field length for takeoff, potentially violating this
other constraint as the mitigation action was applied.
Additionally, the need for a penalty function associated with some or all mitiga-
tion actions cannot be ignored. The concept is based on the logic that in a real world
design process late-stage changes to the design would be imperfect solutions when
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compared to the alternative of originally setting up the design appropriately. Even if
constraints are not in direct opposition to the mitigation action itself, the incorpora-
tion of penalties associated with mitigation actions (e.g. additional structural weight
for increased loads) means that application of mitigation actions could cause another
constraint to become active. Further, the penalty may restrict the application of the
mitigation action by itself because the penalty associated with applying increasing
mitigation may be more detrimental to the aircraft performance than the mitigation
action could offset.
Based on the thought experiments presented here, Hypothesis 3 can be theorized.
Hypothesis 3 It will be necessary to perform a mitigation assessment
for each failed uncertainty outcome to get an accurate determination of
the probability of recovery.
The experiment in Section 4.2 will examine the differences between optimizing for
each failed uncertainty outcome individually and optimization of the single “overall
best” level of mitigation. The experiment will compare the probability of recovery
(𝑃 (𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 | 𝑥, ℎ)) of the resulting aircraft for different design conditions.
3.4 Selection of a Reliability Method
Reliability-Based Design Optimization literature contains a wide variety of methods
to calculate reliability of a system, detailed in Section 2.4. Since this methodology
is dependent on the reliability of a design as well as characterizing its failure region,
one of these reliability frameworks will be employed unless a new one is needed. This
thought is summarized in the following research question.
Research Question 4 What reliability assessment method should be
used to model the aircraft Conceptual and preliminary design process with
mitigation actions?
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If Hypothesis 3 is supported in the experiments, then the ability to assess mitiga-
tion actions, not standard probability of compliance assessment, will be the driving
factor in selecting a reliability method. As stated in Section 3.3.2, mitigation will
need to be implemented differently for each possible uncertainty outcome. Thus, a
method must be selected which will allow for the querying of the uncertainty space,
rather than a simple likelihood of meeting all constraints. Of the reliability calculation
methods reviewed, only Monte Carlo Simulation fits this description.
It is important to note that if Hypothesis 3 is found to be false, it may be possible
to use a more efficient method. However, to test this, the related experiment(s)
must be established in such a way as to allow for an exact measurement of the
recoverability of a design. This setup can then be used as a comparison point or a
“truth model.” Once this is established, the results of more sophisticated methods
can be emulated by establishing constraints on the MCS model to give results similar
to the desired method. This can be compared to the truth model to evaluate the
amount of information that would be lost by employing such a method. Thus a MCS
model must be employed regardless of the results of Experiment 2; it will either be
used as a comparison point or as a integral part of the required overall methodology.
3.5 Modeling the Design Process
Methods for handling uncertainty assessment, uncertainty margin selection, and re-
covery through mitigation actions have been defined. By integrating all of the for-
mulations discussed to this point, a method can be developed by which mitigation
actions are incorporated into the uncertain aircraft conceptual design process. This
new method will be called Aircraft Recovery through Mitigation & Optimization
under Uncertainty for Reliability (ARMOUR) and will be described step-by-step in
Chapter 5. ARMOUR will allow for quantification of the effectiveness of mitigation
actions and supply that information to a decision maker. The designer will be able
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to make better decisions about which designs to select, considering both vehicle per-
formance and two reliability measures: the probability of compliance and the overall
probability of success.
The core uncertainty quantification and management algorithm of ARMOUR is
shown pictorially in Figure 30. The algorithm takes in some setting of the design
variables (𝑥) and uncertainty margins (ℎ). This is fed into a Vehicle Sizing algorithm
along with a desired design range. After the vehicle is sized, this vehicle is fixed and
proceeds on to a Reliability Analysis. The Reliability Analysis takes in the fixed vehi-
cle, distributions on the uncertainty variables (𝑢), and performance constraints (𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑞)
to assess the reliability of the system. Outputs from the Reliability Analysis include
the expected performance of the vehicle (e.g. expected economic range block fuel),
the probability that the design will be compliant with all constraints simultaneously
(𝑃 (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 | 𝑥, ℎ)), and the set of uncertainty conditions for which the design
fails one or more performance constraints (𝑈𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑). The failed uncertainty conditions
for that design are fed into the Mitigation Analysis, along with the performance con-
straints and the available mitigation actions (𝑚). From this Mitigation Analysis, a
probability of recovery (𝑃 (𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 | 𝑥, ℎ)) will be estimated for that design – the
probability that a design can be made compliant through mitigation actions if it fails
to meet one or more performance constraints. These probabilities are added together
to determine the overall probability of success (𝑃 (𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 | 𝑥, ℎ)) for the design. All
this information is given to a decision-making algorithm –ostensibly, an optimizer–
which can adjust the design variables and uncertainty margins to select a preferred
aircraft based off of expected performance characteristics and reliability goals. Once
the optimum has been found, the design settings and statistical performance of the
selected design are recorded.
Once a design (𝑥) has been selected, the design is fed into a deterministic aircraft
sizing tool, designated as “Vehicle Sizing.” Design assumptions and a design range
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Figure 30: Approach for Conceptual Design under Uncertainty with Mitigation
requirement are also input into the sizing tool. The sizing tool will take this design
information and perform a sizing iteration to balance the fuel requirements of the
aircraft for that design range with the available fuel. After iterating, the analysis will
return a sized vehicle, complemented by detailed aircraft geometry and weights.
The sized vehicle is then “frozen” in terms of the “outer mold line” and overall
size, meaning that the Maximum Takeoff Gross Weight (𝑀𝑇𝑂𝑊 ) and the major
geometric parameters such as areas, spans, etc. will not change. This fixed vehicle
is input into the Reliability Assessment. During this analysis, the uncertainty vari-
ables are sampled for different possible scenarios via some sampling method. For
each uncertainty scenario, the performance analysis code is executed to evaluate the
vehicle’s performance metrics. The performance metrics are compared to any ap-
plicable constraints, and the vehicle is determined to be either compliant with all
constraints or non-compliant. The compliance of the design under this uncertainty
scenario is recorded for each sample, and totaled (𝑢 ∈ 𝐴). Once sampling is complete,
the number of compliant cases is divided by the total number of uncertainty scenarios
considered to determine the probability of compliance (𝑃 (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 | 𝑥, ℎ)) before
mitigation actions are applied. For each compliant case, appropriate design objective
metric(s) will be returned to the top level optimizer.
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𝑃 (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 | 𝑥, ℎ) =
∫︀
𝑢∈𝑈 1𝐴 (𝑥, ℎ, 𝑢) 𝑑𝑢∫︀
𝑢∈𝑈 1𝑑𝑢
(17)
The failed uncertainty scenarios (𝑢 /∈ 𝐴) are then fed into the mitigation analysis.
An optimizer is used to find any available settings of mitigation actions which can
bring a failed scenario back into compliance with all constraints. If a feasible space
is found, the scenario is added to the set of cases which are recoverable (𝑢 ∈ 𝐴𝑀),
then a minimum acceptable level of mitigation actions is located. At this minimum
level of mitigation for the scenario, the design objective metric is recorded for each
successfully recovered scenario for use in the expected design objective calculation. If
no level of mitigation can be found which brings the scenario into compliance with
all constraints, then the scenario is counted as a failure and will not be included in
the recoverable designs (𝑢 /∈ 𝐴𝑀).
The probability that a specific design, 𝑥, can be made recovered to be compliant
with all performance metrics through mitigation actions given that the design is non-
compliant with one or more performance metrics (𝑃 (𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 | 𝑥, ℎ)) is calculated
via Equation (23).
𝑃 (𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 | 𝑥, ℎ) =
∫︀
𝑢∈𝐴 1𝐴𝑀 (𝑥, ℎ, 𝑢) 𝑑𝑢∫︀
𝑢∈𝐴 (1) 𝑑𝑢
(23)
For every uncertainty scenario where the vehicle is found to be non-compliant,
an internal mitigation assessment will determine whether a level of mitigation ex-
ists, 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑛, which will bring the vehicle back into compliance with all performance
constraints. If such a level of mitigation can be found, then the scenario is consid-
ered recoverable. Also, if E[𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑛] is not accounted for during the global optimization,
Δ𝐸𝑊 need not necessarily be minimized; thus, the “optimizer” merely needs to make
the case compliant.
The overall probability that a design will be successful considering the possibility of
mitigation (𝑃 (𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 | 𝑥, ℎ)) is shown in Equation (24) to be equal to the probability
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that the design was compliant without mitigation actions plus the probability that
the design can be recovered through mitigation actions given that the design was
non-compliant multiplied by the probability that the design was non-compliant.
𝑃 (𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 | 𝑥, ℎ) =𝑃 (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 | 𝑥, ℎ)
+ 𝑃 (𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 | 𝑥, ℎ) (1− 𝑃 (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 | 𝑥, ℎ))
(24)
The expected value of the design objective (E[𝑓(𝑥)]) is calculated by summing
the design objective values for all compliant scenarios with the design objective of
all recovered scenarios and divided by the total number of successful scenarios as in
Equation (25). Non-recoverable scenarios are not considered in this analysis because
their performance is undefined. The design will be penalized for non-recoverable
scenarios through the metric of the overall probability of success (𝑃 (𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 | 𝑥, ℎ)).
E[𝑓(𝑥)] =
∫︀
𝑢∈𝐴 𝑓 (𝑥, ℎ, 𝑢, 0) 𝑑𝑢+
∫︀
𝑢∈𝐴𝑀






The probability of success (𝑃 (𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 | 𝑥, ℎ)) along with expected value of the
design objective (E[𝑓 ]) is then provided to the designer and his or her optimization
algorithm for each design (𝑥). An optimizer can then continue to select a new design
vector until it has found a design that yields the best value of the objective function
for a required level of probability of compliance and probability of success.
The inclusion of mitigation actions in the modeling of the conceptual and prelim-
inary design process under uncertainty enables the calculation the overall probability
of success (𝑃 (𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 | 𝑥, ℎ)) of a vehicle. This probability of success includes tra-
ditional reliability –the likelihood that a design will be compliant on its own– and
the probability that a design can be recovered through late stage aircraft alterations
dubbed “mitigation actions.” This information is incorporated into a design assess-
ment along with a traditional Reliability-Based Design Optimization objective and
set of constraints. Through an optimizer of the designer’s choosing, a trade-off can
be quantified which allows the decision maker the ability to compare the cost (in
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terms of traditional design objectives) of increasing overall probability of success of a
design.
3.6 Chapter Summary
The beginnings of a methodology have been proposed with the intent of modeling
the reliability of an aircraft design process while accounting for uncertainty which
is reduced after the conceptual design freeze, the impact of uncertainty margins on
this uncertainty, and mitigation actions to recover the design under failed uncer-
tainty scenarios. The sequence of modeling design uncertainty has been established
as modeling the uncertainty variables during performance analysis after vehicle sizing
is completed. A method for including uncertainty margins in the modeling setup
has been proposed with the goal of allowing uncertainty margins to be set in order
to control the probability of compliance of a design. Mitigation actions have been
incorporated into the methodology to allow for the assessment of the recoverability
of failed uncertainty scenarios and to calculate the overall probability of recovery and
probability of success of a given design. A sampling method will be used for reliability
estimation to allow for the querying of individual uncertainty scenarios in order to
accurately determine the probability of recovery. These individual methods are tested
in Chapter 4. Based on the conclusions from that chapter, a step-by-step method-
ology is formulated in Chapter 5 which integrates all of these steps into an overall
methodology and incorporates an optimizer. This formulation will allow a designer to
select aircraft design points during the conceptual design stage with knowledge of the
likelihood that a design will be compliant with all constraints as well as the likelihood




In this chapter, two canonical problems are constructed. The canonical problems are
exercised in order to test Hypothesis 1 and 3. Because the two hypotheses address
different parts of the overall methodology, the two canonical problems are developed
independently.
These experiments were formulated to address the hypotheses devised in Chap-
ter 3. Each experiment is intended to address a hypothesis, which will be repeated
during the appropriate section. By evaluating the results of these experiments, the
validity of the hypotheses can be tested. The experiments are designed to test the im-
plementation of uncertainty for reliability assessment, the implementation of margins
as design variables, and recovery through mitigation actions.
Where possible, a canonical problem will be constructed using design equations
available in the collegiate-level literature [2, 75, 78]. Many equations will be necessary
to model all the parts of aircraft sizing, uncertainty quantification, and mitigation
which are needed for the formulation established in Chapter 3. Instead of a single,
large canonical testing apparatus, smaller formulations will be employed to test in-
dividual portions of the thesis. The variables used in the experiment will be listed,
including applicable ranges and how they will be varied in the experiment. These
are designed to allow for maximum transparency into the workings of the proposed
method. Since all equations and their arrangement will be described in detail, recon-
struction and enhancement of this model by future researchers should be straight-
forward.
First, a canonical problem to test Hypothesis 1 is demonstrated. This hypothesis
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deals with the modeling of uncertainty variables in order to emulate conceptual design
uncertainty. To test Hypothesis 1 a sizing algorithm is needed which includes equa-
tions for Operating Empty Weight (OEW) as a function of Maximum Takeoff Weight
(MTOW), mission fuel use equations, and fuel balance equations. Both conceptual
design sizing equations and preliminary design performance analysis equations must
be implemented in order to emulate the process at hand. Additionally, at least one
uncertainty variable is needed, accompanied by affected performance metrics. The
resulting canonical problem is exercised to provide the data required to make a de-
termination of the validity of Hypothesis 1.
A second canonical problem is constructed to test Hypothesis 3. This hypothesis
focuses on the different mitigation actions necessary to account for different uncertain
scenarios. To evaluate the validity of of this hypothesis, performance assessment
equations are necessary for each metric of interest. These equations are inherently
independent of the sizing algorithm. They must take into account any uncertainty
variables as well as any mitigation variables with their associated penalties. Thus,
equations are required which account for at least two responses and a mitigation
action. Based on the equations selected, two uncertainty variables are used. After
accounting for the impact of all variables on the responses, the derived canonical
problem is exercised. The resulting data is used to conclude whether Hypothesis 3 is
accurate.
These simple test beds will inherently be less inclusive than the final implemen-
tation. Their advantage will be in their simplicity and therefore transparency. By
using them to test the formulation proposed in Section 3.5, the mechanics of the for-
mulation can be seen directly and will be easy to track for anyone versed in aircraft
design.
This information is used to determine the correct implementation of the method-
ology described in Chapter 5. The precise method arising from the conclusions from
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these tests is discussed later in Chapter 6.
4.1 Uncertainty Implementation Testing
The examination of the stages of design in Section 2.1.1, the tools used by aircraft
designers in Section 2.1.3, and the types of uncertainty experience in aircraft design
Section 2.2 led to Research Question 1.
Research Question 1 How should aircraft design with uncertainty be
modeled for reliability analysis, accounting for the stages of design?
After Research Question 1 was posed, a thought experiment was discussed in Sec-
tion 3.1. Within that section, the impact of modeling design uncertainty in different
ways was discussed. The implications were considered for modeling under either com-
peting options: sizing uncertainty and performance uncertainty. The logical argument
led to the conclusion that uncertainty needed to be modeled during the performance
analysis stage (after sizing), as indicated in Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 1 To emulate the aircraft conceptual and preliminary design
process, uncertainty must be implemented after the sizing of the aircraft
is complete. Modeling uncertainty during sizing will yield incorrect results
for aircraft conceptual design under uncertainty.
However, since many methods already exist which model uncertainty during sizing,
a comparison should be made to the processes used by these existing methods to see
if their application to this problem would yield incorrect results and to quantify any
error.
An experiment is designed to test if the trends of the responses in relation to the
uncertainty variables are the same for both methods of uncertainty implementation.
Uncertainty variables are varied in a controlled way so that the trends between dif-
ferent implementations can be compared directly. The amount to which they differ
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will be quantified. If the trends do not compare favorably, the results between the
two versions will not be consistent, and the extensively researched implementation of
uncertainty during the sizing analysis cannot be used. However, Hypothesis 1 will
be refuted if both of the following conditions are met: the two uncertainty imple-
mentation methods produce similar trends with respect to the constraints, and the
probability of compliance between them is found to be comparable.
4.1.1 Process to be Modeled
To answer the question of how design uncertainty should be modeled, one needs to
examine the aircraft design process, paying particular attention to when decisions
are made and when knowledge is acquired. The aircraft design process described
in Section 2.1 breaks the aircraft design into different stages, specifically conceptual
design, preliminary design, and detailed design. Conceptual design is when the overall
gross parameters of the aircraft are decided. Many parameters are being changed
and by relatively large amounts, so the analysis tools used in this stage need to be
fast and widely-applicable. Because of these constraints on the design tools, they
often have relatively low accuracy, implying high uncertainty. By the end of the
conceptual design stage, gross aircraft parameters like wing geometry, engine thrust,
and maximum takeoff weight have been selected. In later design stages these settings
are frozen and are used as inputs into more detailed tools.
During preliminary design, refinements to the aircraft are made without changing
the gross geometric parameters. Additionally, more detailed analyses are used during
this stage. Quantities which were unknown or approximated can now be refined
through detailed analyses, and their values can be discovered. Thus, the performance
of the vehicle will be better understood.
By acquiring this additional information, it may become apparent that the vehicle
will fail to meet one or more of the performance requirements. If none are failed, the
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design will proceed to later stages and manufacturing. However, if a performance
requirement is not met, the chief engineer will attempt to address the shortfall and
recover performance through any available mitigation actions.
In order to assess the implementation necessary, it will be helpful to examine the
process which is being modeled. A graphic of the process to be modeled is shown
conceptually in Figure 31. The process sequentially proceeds through conceptual de-
sign and preliminary design before transitioning to later stages. In the conceptual
design stage, a design point is selected and a sizing analysis performed. Following this
stage of design, the design is “frozen,” meaning that overall geometric parameters and
maximum loads are expected to remain the same, barring extreme difficulties. The
vehicle then progresses into preliminary design. In this stage, more detailed analyses
are used and more information obtained about the aircraft, leading to refined infor-
mation. This refined information improves the predictive capabilities of performance
assessments. These performance assessments will help the design team learn whether
the vehicle is still in compliance with all necessary performance constraints. If the
design is not compliant, the design team will attempt to mitigate the design to bring
it back into compliance. Following this, the aircraft development will then proceed
to later stages of design.
Figure 31: Process to be Modeled
This process has some important characteristics. Conceptual design occurs first.
Because conceptual design occurs so early in the design process and simplified tools are
often used to make quick decisions, the final quantities of some variables is unknown
at this stage. The uncertainty surrounding these quantities will eventually be reduced
but at a later date. While this uncertainty is still in effect, the aircraft design must be
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selected. Once selected, the aircraft will be sized to its final gross weight and physical
dimensions. Following this, many of the aircraft parameters will be frozen by the end
of the conceptual design stage.
During preliminary design, refinements to the aircraft are made without changing
the gross geometric parameters that were previously frozen. More detailed analyses
are used during this stage. Quantities which were unknown or approximated are now
refined through detailed analyses and their values can now be better determined. As
these values change, the performance of the vehicle will be better understood and will
likely change to some extent.
It is possible that at this stage the changes in previously uncertain parameters
will cause the vehicle performance to fall out of compliance with the performance
constraints. If this is the case, the chief engineer will notice any performance shortfalls
and react to them using all available tools at his or her disposal. Mitigation actions
are an attempt to quantify some of these tools to be able to assess their effectiveness
a priori.
4.1.2 Simplified Implementation
Hypothesis 1 can be tested using a canonical problem constructed with aircraft siz-
ing equations from undergraduate aerospace literature. Since this process will occur
identically for each design, only a single aircraft design will be considered for obser-
vational simplicity. Additionally, only aircraft weights will be evaluated. Thus, only
one uncertain parameter will be examined: empty weight uncertainty (𝑢𝐸𝑊 ). These
simplifications will allow for the process to be evaluated both numerically and sym-
bolically, allowing the reasons for any differences to be investigated more thoroughly.
At the most basic level, the process of sizing an aircraft involves the following
steps [78]. First a maximum takeoff weight (MTOW or 𝑊0) of the vehicle is guessed.




) of the vehicle based on the class of vehicle, the design variables (𝑥), and
the maximum takeoff weight. This empty weight is used along with other vehicle
weights to determine the resulting vehicle MTOW. These other weights often include
the weight of the crew (𝑊𝐶), the payload including passengers (𝑊𝑃𝐿), and the fuel
(𝑊𝐹 ). The maximum takeoff weight guess is updated based on this new estimate,
usually using some relaxation factor (0 < 𝛼 < 1). An iteration is performed until the
input and output maximum takeoff weights are the same. Once the final MTOW is
determined, the empty weight ratio can be used to calculate the final empty weight
of the resulting vehicle. Rewriting this description as a step-by-step set of directions
yields the process below.
1. Guess a takeoff weight (𝑊𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑠)
2. Calculate the empty weight ratio (𝑊𝐸/𝑊0)
𝑊𝐸
𝑊0
= 𝑓 (𝑥) (26)








4. Update the takeoff weight guess (𝑊𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑠)
𝑊𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑠 = 𝛼 *𝑊0 + (1− 𝛼) *𝑊𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑠 (28)
5. Iterate steps 2-4 until converged





To proceed with an assessment, an assumed equation will be necessary in place
of Equation (26) for step 2 of the process. A representative empty weight equation
was pulled from Raymer’s undergraduate Aircraft Design book [75]. This equation
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requires some assumed aircraft parameters. The necessary parameters are shown with
their assumed values for a large twin-aisle passenger jet in Table 1. Crew weight is
assumed to be negligible for this quick study.
Table 1: Large Twin-Aisle Aircraft Assumptions
Parameter Variable Value
Aspect Ratio AR 8.81
Thrust-to-Weight T/W 0.3017
Wing Loading W/S 130.6
Maximum Mach Number 𝑀𝑚𝑎𝑥 0.90
Payload Weight (lbs) 𝑊𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 63,210
Fuel Weight Ratio 𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙/𝑊0 0.4372
Using these assumed values, Equation (26) from Step two can be updated. The
resulting equation for the empty weight ratio can now be calculated as Equation (30).





0.32 + 0.92 *𝑊−0.130
)︀
[75] (30)
The process described above is obviously a greatly simplified version of the air-
craft sizing process. However, it has sufficient granularity to demonstrate the impact
of deciding when to implement uncertain parameters in the design process. The fol-
lowing sections will employ this process to implement uncertainty either before or
after the aircraft has been sized. These results will be compared to each other and
logically compared to the assumed process to be modeled in order to demonstrate
when uncertainty should be modeled for this work.
4.1.2.1 Uncertainty Implemented as Sizing Uncertainty
If the results of aircraft uncertainty can be known before sizing, the aircraft can be
sized with this information. This process is demonstrated visually in Figure 32. The
process shown is constructed based off of Figure 31; however, the uncertainty infor-
mation is applied during the Sizing analysis in conceptual design. This means that
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the aircraft dimensions and overall weights will respond to the uncertainty scenario
encountered. This assumption is frequently used for future technology funding studies
where the aircraft will not enter conceptual design for quite some time.
Figure 32: Uncertainty Implemented as Sizing Uncertainty
This would be equivalent to implementing the uncertainty scenarios into the sizing
mode of a traditional aircraft design tool. To model this in the simplified process
above, the equation for step two, Equation (26), will be modified by including the
uncertainty factor, as shown in Equation (31).





0.32 + 0.92 *𝑊−0.130
)︀
* (1 + 𝑢𝐸𝑊 ) (31)
This will result in the aircraft size being affected by the uncertainty parameters.
Additionally, it should be noted that this is the implied method being used to model
uncertainty if the uncertainty parameters are input directly into a standard aircraft
sizing tool. By incorporating the uncertainty factor before the vehicle is sized, the
maximum takeoff weight (MTOW or 𝑊0) and all resulting parameters (including fuel
weight, thrust, and wing area) will adjust to this new value. This means that an
increase in empty weight will have effects on most other parts of the aircraft rather
than only a direct effect on empty weight. Additionally, the impact of the empty
weight factor will be amplified in the iteration loop, leading to further increases in
empty weight beyond the specified error.
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4.1.2.2 Uncertainty Implemented as Performance Uncertainty
If the values of uncertain parameters are not discovered until after sizing is com-
pleted, sizing is not impacted by the uncertainty scenario. This process is illustrated
in Figure 33. Again, this process is based off the one shown in Figure 31; however,
uncertainty is implemented into the process during the Refined Information stage
of preliminary design. Because sizing has been finished before the uncertainty is
assessed, this process follows a goal of the design process to be modeled in this the-
sis: only one design moves forward from conceptual design, regardless of uncertainty
condition.
Figure 33: Uncertainty Implemented after Aircraft is Sized
Judging based on Figure 33, the process in Section 4.1.2 will need to be modified
by including an uncertainty factor during step 6. This will modify the process above
as shown in Equation (32).




*𝑊0* (1 + 𝑢𝐸𝑊 ) (32)
By incorporating the uncertainty factor after the vehicle has been sized, only the
empty weight changes, while the rest of the vehicle remains fixed. This is consistent
with the assumptions of the process to be modeled in Section 2.1. Specifically, the
sizing of the aircraft will be completed and the design frozen before uncertainty is
implemented.
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4.1.3 Uncertainty Implementation Results
Assessing both sets of equations allows from the previous sections allows for a com-
parison between sizing uncertainty and performance uncertainty. Again, it was de-
termined via logical argument in Section 3.1.3 that performance uncertainty will
accurately imitate the design process at the core of this thesis. Since many methods
exist which implement sizing uncertainty, it is hoped (but not expected) that this
process will yield similar results to allow pre-existing methods to be used.
Figure 34 shows that when uncertainty is implemented after sizing, the Maximum
Takeoff Weight of the aircraft does not change. This is consistent with the earlier
assumption that the design will be frozen prior to uncertainty being implemented.
In other words, the uncertain parameters should not have any impact on MTOW.
However, when uncertainty is implemented before the sizing iteration is completed,
the uncertain parameter has a large impact on the MTOW of the vehicle, violating
prior assumptions. This unwanted effect on the gross weight of the vehicle will be felt
in the other assessments. In fact by changing MTOW, the process of implementing
uncertainty before sizing is complete has resulted in different aircraft. Because the
goal of this study is to assess how an individual aircraft, progressing through the
stages of the design process, is affected by the inherent uncertainty in the early stages
of design, this result of different vehicles is completely contradictory to the posed
problem statement.
For this example, the aircraft design assumption was set at the centroid of the
uncertainty space. When implementing sizing uncertainty, the vehicle is sized for the
design range in response to the uncertainty condition. Thus, the vehicle will always
be compliant with range, regardless of the uncertainty scenario. However, when using
performance uncertainty, the vehicle is only compliant with the range requirement 50
percent of the time. It is important to remember that the performance uncertainty
is logically correct, as justified leading up to Hypothesis 1. The fact that sizing
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Figure 34: Change in Maximum Takeoff Weight vs. Empty Weight Factor
uncertainty already differs in behavior from performance uncertainty likely means
that sizing uncertainty cannot be used for the type of design uncertainty this thesis
intends to model.
Figure 35 shows the impact on the Empty Weight of the vehicle by implementing
an empty weight factor either before sizing or after sizing. It is very clear to see that
the two resulting trends are markedly different. By implementing the empty weight
factor before the vehicle is sized, the resulting feedback loop has a dramatic impact
on the size of the vehicle. This is due to the sizing loop creating a completely different
aircraft than the baseline vehicle. Again, this is inconsistent with the assumption from
Section 3.1 that the design will be frozen before the uncertain scenario is realized.
To make a quick estimate of the impact that this difference could have on the
vehicle performance, consider the case of landing approach speed. This parameter is
proportional to the square root of the landing weight of the vehicle. As the landing
weight increases, so does the approach speed. Given that the empty weight is a
significant portion of the landing weight of a vehicle, it can be assumed that this
change in empty weight will have a large effect on the approach speed. For the sake
of a quick analysis, assume that the empty weight accounts for eighty percent of
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Figure 35: Change in Empty Weight vs. Empty Weight Factor
landing weight and that the other twenty percent will remain constant, regardless of
uncertainty condition. The variability of the sizing uncertainty will cause between a
9.4 percent decrease in approach speed and a 12.5 percent increase. If wing loading
were instead used as a design variable, then the wing area would adjust based on the
maximum takeoff weight seen in Figure 34. This would actually invert the trend of
approach speed with respect to empty weight factor, i.e. lower empty weight factors
would actually increase the approach speed of the aircraft, albeit by a tiny amount
( 0.7%). On the other hand, performance uncertainty would have a small variation
on the approach speed of +/-2 percent. Because performance uncertainty is only
implemented after sizing, this behavior will be the same regardless of whether wing
area or wing loading were used as a design variable.
Once again, the trends of fuel available with respect to the empty weight factor
are very different depending on when uncertainty is implemented in Figure 36. When
the uncertainty is implemented before sizing, the fuel capacity grows alongside the
unintended growth in MTOW. This occurs because the aircraft it being sized to meet
a given range. Thus, no matter what empty weight factor is implemented, the aircraft
will continue to meet its design range. Conversely, if the uncertainty is implemented
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after sizing is complete, the additional empty weight from the uncertainty factor will
eat into the available fuel. This will cause the aircraft to fail to meet range as the
empty weight factor increases.
Figure 36: Change in Fuel Available vs. Empty Weight Factor
This established model allows for more that just trend comparison. If an assumed
distribution on the empty weight factor is input into the model, the variability of the
responses under the two different scenarios can be evaluated. Figure 37 shows the
resulting empty weight distributions based off a normally distributed empty weight
factor. This figure is the same as Figure 35 except for the addition of the uncertainty
distributions. The green distribution along the x-axis shows the input empty weight
factor, indicating the frequency under which each of these weights is assumed to occur.
Along the y-axis are two additional distributions corresponding to the resulting output
distributions of the vehicle empty weight as a percentage of the baseline vehicle empty
weight.
It can be seen from the blue distribution in Figure 37 that including the empty
weight factor during the sizing loop causes a run-away effect on the resulting empty
weight of the vehicle. This is due to the feedback loop inherent in the sizing analysis,
and will cause the resulting aircraft to be resized to ensure it meets range. However,
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Figure 37: Distributions of Empty Weight Change vs. Empty Weight Factor
this is a false benefit! As discussed in the example of Company Z, the empty weight
factor cannot be known at the stage where these decisions are being made. In fact,
the true final empty weight of the vehicle is unknown until well after the design is
frozen at the end of conceptual design and more detailed analyses can take place.
Effectively, placing the empty weight at this stage allows the aircraft to have the
exact amount of weight margin required, even though such information would not
exist. Thus, the resulting blue uncertainty distribution is demonstrably wrong, and
using it will give the designer a false sense of security.
The red distribution, which corresponds to implementing the uncertainty during
performance, yields a empty weight which varies within about plus or minus five
percent of the baseline empty weight. This is consistent with the input empty weight
distribution. Other calculations based on this treatment can actually be trusted,
unlike the trends resulting from implementing the uncertainty distribution during
sizing.
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4.1.4 Conclusions Related to Hypothesis 1
The results derived from this canonical indicate that when modeling the uncertainty
inherent in a conceptual design, uncertainty must be implemented only after the
vehicle has left the sizing loop. This will result in a single, sized aircraft proceeding
through later stages of design. The changes in the aircraft due to uncertain factors are
appropriately scaled. Further, performance responses to the changes arising from the
uncertainty variables will be logically consistent with aircraft performance metrics.
If instead the uncertainty were to be implemented before sizing is complete, as with
sizing uncertainty, the resulting responses will be associated with different physical
designs. In addition to this logical inconsistency with the posed problem statement,
implementing uncertainty before sizing is complete may cause excessive penalties on
responses relating to the empty weight of the vehicle (e.g. approach speed). There will
also be large penalties on responses which are affected by the maximum takeoff weight
of the vehicle like takeoff field length and rate of climb. Additionally concerning is
that uncertainty factors would have no impact on the resulting range of the vehicle,
which would be very nonsensical.
An important caveat to consider is that this thesis is only making statements
about the implementation of the uncertainty during the design process itself. Other
types of studies (e.g. technology forecasting) will have different sources of uncertainty,
different stages in the design process during which uncertainty is reduced, and corre-
spondingly may have different needs with regards to the process needed to accurately
assess those uncertainties. No claims are being made about these other processes
aside from specifically conceptual design uncertainty, which is then reduced not only
after conceptual design freeze but also before metal is cut.
112
4.2 Testing the Need for Multiple Mitigation Assessments
The background information within Sections 2.1.2 and 2.2.2 indicated that there was
a need to model mitigation actions within a probabilistic aircraft design process.
Reviewing Section 2.4.3 indicated that no such method exists within the current
literature, leading to Research Question 3.
Research Question 3 How should mitigation be represented in a prob-
abilistic conceptual design model?
The thought experiments in Section 3.3.2 led to Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 It will be necessary to perform a mitigation assessment
for each failed uncertainty outcome to get an accurate determination of
the probability of recovery.
To test this Hypothesis 3, a simplified example problem will be constructed. This
simplified problem must be able to assess the performance of a single aircraft under
multiple uncertainty conditions. In order to do this, the problem must take into ac-
count some performance constraints, and these constraints must be functions of the
selected uncertainty variables. Furthermore, it must be possible to see the perfor-
mance impact on the aircraft due to applying one or more mitigation actions.
In this example, two performance metrics will be considered: the aircraft range
at a design payload and the landing approach speed (𝑉𝐴𝑝𝑝). Range will be assessed
using the Breguet range equation [75]. The approach speed will be estimated using the
aircraft stall speed and appropriate scalar. These equations will form the backbone
of the current analysis.
Two uncertainty variables will be implemented: an empty weight factor (𝑈𝑊 ) and
a cruise drag factor (𝑈𝐷). These should allow for sufficient variation while keeping
the problem simple. The empty weight factor is expected to affect both range and
approach speed performance equations. The drag factor is expected to only impact
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the Breguet range equation. Any possible impacts from the drag factor on the low
speed aerodynamics of the aircraft (and therefore on approach speed) are expected
to be negligible.
Only a single mitigation action will be considered: a post-sizing fuel increase with
an associated penalty. This mitigation action is intended to improve the aircraft range
in the case where this constraint is violated. The addition of extra fuel to the aircraft
will directly affect the aircraft’s maximum takeoff weight (MTOW) beyond the initial
size to which the vehicle was designed. An associated penalty will be imposed on
the vehicle empty weight to account for the added structure necessary to carry the
extra load. This penalty is expected to increase faster as the additional fuel weight
increases; eventually the penalty will restrict the mitigation action’s effectiveness at
recovering range. Further, this it is expected that the penalty on this mitigation
action will have an adverse effect on the aircraft’s approach speed performance.
4.2.1 Constraints Imposed
The two performance metrics used in this example problem are the final approach
speed of the vehicle during landing (𝑉𝐴𝑝𝑝) and the aircraft’s range for a flight at a
fixed payload condition (𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒).
For the purposes of regulation, the approach speed (𝑉𝐴𝑝𝑝) of a vehicle, the speed
just before landing, is calculated as 1.3 times the stall speed of the airplane [75]. The










Using this Equation (33) for the stall speed, the approach speed of the aircraft
can be calculated using Equation (33).










This equation shows that stall speed is a function of the landing weight of the
vehicle, its wing area, the local air density, and maximum lift coefficient of the vehicle.
For the purposes of this example, it is assumed that the local air density (𝜌) is
constant. Additionally, the wing area (𝑆) and maximum lift coefficient (𝐶𝐿𝑚𝑎𝑥) will
have been set during conceptual design and thus will not change in this example.
Only the landing weight (𝑊𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔) will be affected during this experiment.
The Breguet range equation demonstrated in Equation (35) calculates the distance




















, optimizing altitude as the weight of the vehicle changes. The fuel
consumption (𝐶𝑡) of the engine is assumed to be constant throughout the cruise
segment. The equation is also dependent on the ratio of the initial cruise weight to





, indicating how much fuel is consumed during flight.
The mathematics used to generate the following charts distract from the purpose
of the discussion and have been omitted. Instead, the discussion here will focus on
the main effects and the logic behind the expected behavior. If a detailed exam-
ination of the underlying mathematics is desired, the detailed equations employed
(Equation (54) through Equation (127)) are located in Appendix A. Two uncertainty
variables will be considered in this example: empty weight uncertainty (𝑈𝐸𝑊 ) and
drag uncertainty (𝑈𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑔). While the mathematical details are not discussed here, it
will be necessary to at least consider the impacts that these uncertainty variables will
have on the considered performance metrics.
An uncertainty scenario with high empty weight will result in a decrease in the
amount of the vehicle which can be used for fuel. This reduced fuel load at takeoff
will reduce the fuel fraction available to be used during cruise. As can be seen in
Equation (35), reducing the fuel fraction in cruise will result in a decrease in the
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vehicle range, degrading its performance. A high empty weight will also increase the
landing weight of the vehicle. This increase in landing weight will have a direct impact
on Equation (34) and will increase the approach speed of the aircraft, degrading its
performance.
Constraints are imposed on both range and the approach speed of the vehicle.
These constraints will need to be active for this demonstration because without active
constraints all uncertainty scenarios will be considered compliant and will not need
any mitigation actions. Since the constraints must be set such that each will be active
for at least some part of the uncertainty space, the required levels of performance will
be very close to the performance of the aircraft at the centroid of the uncertainty space
(𝑈𝐸𝑊 = 0, 𝑈𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑔 = 0). For this demonstration, the centroid will also be considered
to be the design condition of the aircraft. Correspondingly, this vehicle will have a
somewhat low probability of compliance, yielding more space to explore for potential
mitigation actions. This would be undesirable in a real world scenario, but it is ideal
for this test.
All performance characteristics will be normalized about the performance at this
centroid. Thus, constraint values close to unity will be selected. Based off some
initial testing of the behavior of these equations, constraints were derived. A range
constraint of not less than 90 percent of the design range will be imposed on the
uncertainty space. Additionally, approach speed will not be allowed to exceed 104
percent of the design approach speed. One mitigation action will be available to
recover the aircraft if it should fail to meet the range constraint: a post-sizing fuel
addition.
The mitigation action will be a post-sizing fuel addition. This additional fuel will
be intended to increase the fuel weight fraction during cruise seen in Equation (35) to
increase the resulting range of the vehicle and hopefully bring it back into compliance
with the range requirement. This additional fuel will have a detrimental effect on
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the aircraft. The extra fuel will increase the maximum takeoff weight beyond the
weight for which the aircraft was designed, and additional structural weight may be
necessary to account for this added load. Thus, an empty weight penalty will be
imposed on this mitigation action. This additional empty weight will have a direct
impact on the landing weight of the vehicle, degrading the approach speed while the
mitigation action attempts to improve range.
Figure 38 shows the uncertainty space associated with these equations, represent-
ing a single design. The x-axis shows the empty weight uncertainty variable (𝑈𝑊 )
versus the drag uncertainty variable (𝑈𝐷) on the y-axis. Constraints were imposed
on aircraft design range (%𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒) and approach speed (%𝑉 𝑎𝑝𝑝). The vehicle will
violate the range constraint within the blue region. The vehicle will violate the ap-
proach speed constraint whenever the uncertainty condition is within the red region.
In the purple region, both constraints are violated.
Figure 38: Uncertainty Space for Hypothesis 3 Test
At this stage, no mitigation actions have been imposed. Thus, Figure 38 shows
the probability of compliance of the aircraft and as of yet says nothing about the
ability to recover the vehicle if it should fail any constraint(s).
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4.2.2 Mitigation Assessment Results
Figure 39 shows both the uncertainty and mitigation spaces of the design. On the
left, two uncertainty variables –weight and drag– are plotted against each other. The
range constraint is violated by any uncertainty scenario on the blue region while the
approach speed constraint is violated in the red region. For this set of charts, a specific
uncertainty scenario is evaluated at high drag, shown by the circle. The right chart
shows the mitigation space available for the design under this uncertain scenario. The
mitigation action imposed on the aircraft increases along the y-axis (with the x-axis
being a dummy variable). No mitigation action has yet been imposed.
(a) Uncertainty Space (b) Mitigation Space
Figure 39: Uncertainty and Mitigation Spaces
Looking at the mitigation space on the right of Figure 39, it is apparent that low
values of mitigation action will cause the design range constraint to be violated. This
fits with the knowledge that the same constraint is violated in the uncertainty space
on the left. The position of the constraints within the mitigation space shows that
any increase 𝑀𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 over about 30 percent of what is available will be sufficient to
recover the vehicle and allow it to meet all constraints. Next, the impact of selecting
that level of mitigation action is investigated.
Figure 40 shows the implementation of a level of mitigation action determined
from Figure 39. Implementing this level of mitigation action in the mitigation space
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on the right shows that the vehicle should now be compliant with all constraints under
the previously selected uncertainty condition. Indeed, after imposing the mitigation
action, shown by the circle on the right, an investigation of the uncertainty space
on the left demonstrates that both constraints have moved due to the impact of
the imposed level of mitigation. The range constraint in blue has been alleviated,
allowing for the uncertainty scenario in question to be brought back into compliance.
The approach speed constraint in red now covers additional uncertainty scenarios, but
since the selected uncertainty scenario was not affected, this condition is considered
recoverable through the available mitigation actions.
(a) Uncertainty Space (b) Mitigation Space
Figure 40: Uncertainty and Mitigation Spaces with Mitigation Applied
It should be noted from Figure 40 that the mitigation action applied also raised
the approach speed of the vehicle, degrading the performance with respect to the
𝑉𝑎𝑝𝑝 constraint. This is demonstrated by the 𝑉𝑎𝑝𝑝 constraint line moving to encom-
pass more of the uncertainty space. This negative effect was expected based on the
equations in Appendix A and the earlier discussion. Since the constraint has not be-
come active for this uncertainty scenario, it is of little direct consequence at this time.
However, the behavior should be noted because it will be a concern when considering
the mitigation action to apply in other uncertainty scenarios.
This example has shown that the individual uncertainty scenario considered can
be recovered through mitigation actions. However, this is insufficient to determine the
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overall probability of recovery for the entire design. Indeed, each of the uncertainty
scenarios which fails to the constraints must be examined to evaluate the probability
of recovery. To build up to that, it will be helpful to show the resulting mitigation
space when considering a few other uncertainty scenarios.
A different uncertainty scenario is selected for Figure 41. In this case, it can be
seen on the left side of the chart that the empty weight (𝑈𝐸𝑊 ) has increased from
the design condition but the drag (𝑈𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑔) remains at the design condition. This time
range is slightly activated about as much as in the original uncertainty scenario. The
approach speed constraint is also very close to be activated. On the right side of
the chart, the mitigation space can be observed. Once again, range is violated but
a small amount of mitigation will recover the design, corresponding to about the
same amount of mitigation as in the original scenario. However, unlike the original
scenario, the approach speed constraint will become active if too much mitigation
is applied, meaning that the scenario will not be recovered. Selecting the specific
mitigation action necessary will recover the design and move the constraints in the
uncertainty space, but this behavior is not shown for brevity.
(a) Scenario 2 Uncertainty Space (b) Scenario 2 Mitigation Space
Figure 41: Uncertainty and Mitigation Spaces for Scenario 2
Yet another uncertainty scenario is selected for Figure 42. In this scenario an
empty weight (𝑈𝐸𝑊 ) and drag condition (𝑈𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑔) were selected in between the previous
scenarios. For this condition, the range constraint is once again violated, this time
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by a large amount. The approach speed constraint is close to being activated, but
not so much so as in Scenario 2. Examining the mitigation space on the right side
of the chart reveals that a high level of mitigation is required to recover performance
for this uncertainty scenario. Further, the approach speed constraint will activate if
too much mitigation is applied, so care must be taken to apply the correct level of
mitigation. Selecting this level of mitigation will recover the design and move the
constraints in the uncertainty space.
(a) Scenario 3 Uncertainty Space (b) Scenario 3 Mitigation Space
Figure 42: Uncertainty and Mitigation Spaces for Scenario 3
From the three different scenarios in Figures 40 to 42, distinct behaviors can be
seen which are relevant to this work. Even for the same design, different minimum
levels of a single mitigation action may need to be applied to recover the vehicle’s
performance, depending on the uncertainty scenario. Furthermore, a maximum level
of mitigation action can be imposed. This prevents the trivial optimization of simply
applying the maximum accepted range of the mitigation action to test for recovery.
As mentioned before, to accurately determine the probabilities of recovery and
overall success, all the uncertainty conditions must investigated. Doing so allows for
the creation of Figure 43, which illustrates whether scenarios were compliant, recov-
ered, or completely failed. The points shown in blue are those which are compliant
with all constraints without any need for mitigation action. These uncertainty scenar-
ios contribute to the probability of compliance (𝑃 (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 | 𝑥, ℎ)) of the design.
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For all the other uncertainty conditions, the mitigation space was investigated inde-
pendently for each uncertainty scenario to determine if a mitigation action existed
which would bring the vehicle back into compliance with the imposed constraints. If
a mitigation action could be found which improved the vehicle performance enough
to meet all constraints, the uncertainty scenario was then colored green. These green
uncertainty scenarios contribute to the probability of recovery (𝑃 (𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 | 𝑥, ℎ)) of
the design. If, while investigating an uncertainty scenario, a mitigation action could
not be found which could bring the vehicle’s performance into compliance with all
of the constraints simultaneously, then this scenario is considered to be failed and is
colored in red. These failed conditions indicate an uncertainty scenario in which not
only does the vehicle fall out of compliance due to the lack of knowledge present in
conceptual design but also that the full set of possible mitigation actions considered
to fix a vehicle during preliminary design were insufficient to recover that design’s
performance to an acceptable level.
Figure 43: Uncertainty Space Showing Failed, Recovered, and Compliant Scenarios
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This simplified problem already shows the necessity for multiple mitigation action
settings to determine the probability of recovery. This observation lends weight to
Hypothesis 3. Potential interactions like the ones observed here will only increase
with the addition of more uncertainty variables, performance constraints, mitigation
actions, and penalties on the mitigation actions. Therefore, a method will be needed
which appropriately selects a level of mitigation action based not only on the design
variables but also on the uncertainty scenario under which constraints were violated.
As a corollary the support for Hypothesis 3 indicates that when considering re-
covery through mitigation action, some reliability assessment method must be used
which allows for querying of the specific scenarios within the uncertainty space. This
directly answers Research Question 4 for the proper implementation of this method-
ology.
4.3 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, two canonical problems were constructed in order to test Hypothesis 1
and 3. Each problem was developed to meet the needs of the individual hypothesis
being tested. It was then exercised in order to construct the data required to test
the hypothesis. The results of the canonical problems posed in this chapter lend evi-
dence to support Hypothesis 1 and 3. Thus, the implementation of the methodology
described in Chapter 5 can be finalized. The details of the resulting implementation




In this chapter, a step-by-step methodology is developed to implement the uncertainty
quantification and management algorithm established in Chapter 3. This method-
ology will bring together uncertainty, reliability requirements, and optimization as
commonly found in Reliability-Based Design Optimization (RBDO) methodologies.
The methodology will also include the ability to recover design with mitigation ac-
tions, and the ability to set appropriate margins to achieve reliability targets will
be integrated. Finally, the method will include appropriate treatment of the stages
of aircraft design, specifically ensuring that minimal information and analyses are
required from later design stages. The method which integrates all of these steps is
dubbed the Aircraft Recovery through Mitigation & Optimization under Uncertainty
for Reliability (ARMOUR).
Rather than formulating a completely new process, the ARMOUR methodology
will build on a commonly accepted aircraft design decision making process shown
in the center column of Figure 44, which forms the core of Integrated Product and
Process Design (IPPD). This design decision support process can then be augmented
to fit the particular needs of the example problem. Its steps assume very little about
the design, meaning the process is flexible. This makes it an ideal formulation on
which to build the ARMOUR methodology.
The ARMOUR methodology will be broken down into ten steps, as illustrated
in Figure 45. Each of these steps corresponds to a particular step of the IPPD
decision support process. First, the design team must establish the need for the
design as well as the need for the ARMOUR methodology. Next, the team defines
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Figure 44: IPPD Methodology at Georgia Tech [55]
Figure 45: Method Steps Mapped to IPPD Decision Process
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the requirements placed on the aircraft, including appropriate performance metrics.
Uncertainty information applicable to this design must then be elicited, and potential
mitigation actions must next be defined. Next, the team must select performance
and reliability objectives, after which an appropriate design space for the aircraft
needs to be established. An aircraft model may need to be created, or an existing
one may require modification to include all necessary variables. Surrogate models
are then constructed from these physics-based models. An uncertainty quantification
and management environment is constructed based on the discussion from Chapter 3.
Finally, this environment is executed to give information to the designers and help
to select an appropriate design. The specific processes for of each of these steps are
described in the following sections of this chapter.
5.1 Step 1: Establish the Need
It is assumed that management has decided that a new design or at least a design
study is required. A significant process including market research, financial assess-
ments, company design capability assessments, and other factors is often involved in
making this portion of the decision; this process is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Instead, the need that must be established at this juncture is whether or not the
ARMOUR method is required to assess the conceptual design of the new aircraft.
Figure 46 shows a flowchart of the questions which must be evaluated in order to
determine whether ARMOUR is appropriate.
First, for any reliability-based method to add value, some uncertainty must be
present in the design tools. If these tools are perfectly accurate, then any uncertainty
assessment method will be unnecessary and a deterministic assessment should instead
be used. It is likely that any design team which believes its conceptual design tools
to be significantly accurate is naively optimistic.
For ARMOUR to be appropriate, the design process should also be one which will
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Figure 46: Establishing the Need Flowchart
take significant development time. Specifically, there must be time in the develop-
ment schedule for some form of corrective action to occur if a performance constraint
violation occurs during later design. If instead the design is under a very short de-
velopment cycle (e.g. component design processes), or if the uncertain results remain
unknown until after the design is completely fixed, ARMOUR is not required. In
that case, a traditional Reliability-Based Design Optimization method discussed in
Section 2.4 would be sufficient.
Some part of the design is expected to be fixed or “frozen” before the uncertainty
is fully reduced. This means that the design team will not be able to readjust the full
set of design variables during the period in which uncertain results are realized. If a
full redesign is possible, even some penalty is associated with doing so, then Stochastic
Programming with Recourse discussed in Section 2.3.3 is a more appropriate method.
Finally, it is assumed that later detailed design decisions are too expensive to be
sufficiently assessed during the aircraft’s conceptual design. These detailed analyses
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are often relegated to later stages of the aircraft design process because of the amount
of time and personnel required to implement them. Instead, if the required tools are
relatively simple to execute and sufficient time exists to run these tools for a large set
of design points, then Multi-Stage Reliability-Based Design Optimization discussed
in Section 2.3.4 would be a better choice.
If all of these conditions are met, then Aircraft Recovery through Mitigation &
Optimization under Uncertainty for Reliability (ARMOUR) is recommended.
5.2 Step 2: Aircraft Requirements Definition
A design architecture should be selected for the aircraft. Additionally, a design mis-
sion must be selected for the conceptual aircraft sizing tools. Any additional perfor-
mance requirements should also be specified along with any constraints which will be
imposed on the vehicle. These constraints may take the form of federal guidelines,
airport compliance requirements, or point performance objectives. Alternately, these
may be internal constraints or desires relayed by potential customers.
5.3 Step 3: Elicit Uncertainty Information
One key aspect at this stage is to determine what uncertainty exists within the current
available models and what variables can be used to represent those uncertainties.
Since ARMOUR’s purpose is to design based on the effects of uncertainty, appropriate
variables must be selected to represent uncertain parameters in order to emulate
uncertainty in the aircraft design process. Aircraft design principles are examined to
determine which variables to use. It is expected that a new design will be subject to
a great deal of uncertainty.
Many sources of uncertainty exist during the conceptual design of a new aircraft.
It is possible that component weights will be misjudged during conceptual design be-
cause insufficient structural analyses are performed that cannot accurately determine
the final weights. The assumed vehicle drag characteristics may be inaccurate until
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the final wing, body, and tail have been developed and all extrusions are accounted
for. If the engine is still in development, the aircraft design company may not be
fully confident in the engine’s performance because the system will be provided by a
separate company which they have no direct control over.
These sources of uncertainty can be emulated through many different variables and
in different ways within an aircraft model. Obvious candidates to emulate uncertainty
include common model tuning parameters like aircraft component weights, vehicle
drag polars, engine fuel flow, and low speed lift capabilities.
Additionally, the amount of uncertainty will eventually need to be determined to
construct distributions around these variables. This information may not be easy
to obtain. In fact, there are entire fields devoted to this subject; one in particular
is Structured Expert Judgement. Early on it is most important to determine which
variables will be used to model the uncertainty. It is not strictly necessary to obtain
the true distributions. The ranges of the uncertainty variables are not required until
Step 8: Create Surrogate Models, and the distributions themselves are not needed
until the creation of the Uncertainty Quantification & Management Environment in
Step 8.
It is also important to consider whether the physics of the problem indicate that
the responses selected during Step 2 will be affected by the sources of uncertainty
designated herein. If it is determined that the source of uncertainty does not affect
any of the responses, then further assessment is warranted. Either an implied response
of interest was missed during Step 2 or the source of uncertainty is not relevant to
the current problem and should be excluded.
5.4 Step 4: Define Potential Mitigation Actions
Mitigation actions must be constructed such that they can be modeled and analyzed.
Acceptable mitigation actions which can be implemented during later design stages
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should be selected; if this is not the case, these actions will violate the requirement
that design is frozen. These mitigation actions should be designed to address possible
constraint violations in some manner. The constraints which may be violated can be
anticipated based on the aircraft performance responses and the uncertainty effects
being modeled.
It is important to remember that the mitigation actions modeled should repre-
sent actions which the company’s design philosophy will allow. These mitigation
actions will likely represent design changes which are not desirable except as a recov-
ery capability to maintain compliance with constraints. Appropriate limits must be
determined for the mitigation actions. These limits can be in the form of physical or
performance limits on the aircraft or ideological limits imposed by the design team
or company.
Secondary effects of the mitigation actions must also be considered at this stage.
It is reasonable to assume that any imposed mitigation actions will have some form
of detrimental effect on the aircraft. For example, any mitigation action which would
impose additional loads on the aircraft would likely increase the stresses on the struc-
ture. It would be reasonable to expect that an increase in stresses would require some
additional structure, increasing the weight and negatively impacting vehicle perfor-
mance. It is important to consider such secondary effects or penalties as they may
limit the range of applicability of the mitigation action and/or cause other constraints
to be violated, a condition which would be very detrimental if missed.
5.5 Step 5: Select Performance and Reliability Objectives
At this point the optimization objective should be determined. This parameter will
be dependent on the philosophies and desires of the company or designer making
the vehicle selection. Generally speaking, a company will want to maximize the
expected potential return on investment of the aircraft or, barring that, to minimize
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the expected operating cost of the aircraft and make the vehicle more competitive.
Many possible objective functions exist within the literature.
Reliability requirements should also be selected at this point. A minimum thresh-
old on the probability of compliance (𝑃 (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 | 𝑥, ℎ)) of the design should be
specified, as this measure indicates the likelihood that the design will meet all perfor-
mance constraints without any mitigation and is also functionally equivalent to the re-
liability measure from RBDO. A goal for the probability of success (𝑃 (𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 | 𝑥, ℎ))
should also be defined to indicate the total likelihood that a selected design will meet
all performance constraints when accounting for both uncertainty effects and possible
mitigation actions.
Additionally, reliability requirements can be imposed for individual constraints as
discussed in [60]. Implementing these individual reliabilities is straightforward for the
compliance stage of the analysis. If individual constraint reliability goals are desired
for the mitigation stage, then the mitigation action implementation may need to be
modified. This is discussed at a conceptual level in Section 3.5 but is not implemented
in this work.
5.6 Step 6: Establish Design Space
To emulate the many aspects of the problem established in Chapter 3, it is necessary to
model a wide variety of variables. Aircraft conceptual design variables are necessary to
select a design, since these are the only variables which will be available to a designer.
Included in these design variables are uncertainty margins: additional controls to
which a designer also has access. Ranges must be established for each of the design
variables listed in Step 2.
In order to simulate a new conceptual design of an aircraft, appropriate high-
level variables must be selected to change the vehicle’s configuration. These variables
should have enough influence on the performance of the design that their effects
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are not completely dominated by the effects of the uncertainty variables. Clearly, if
the uncertainty variables are dominant, the design process will be largely irrelevant
because it is unlikely that a design will exist which can meet a desired level of relia-
bility. Thus representative variables with a large impact on the design’s performance
are required.
5.7 Step 7: Create Aircraft Model
As described in Section 6.2, the physics-based aircraft assessment model has specific
needs that must be met to properly assess design uncertainty and recovery through
mitigation actions. These models are assumed to be aircraft analysis codes appro-
priate for the conceptual design stage of aircraft development and may have been
selected prior to identification of the ARMOUR method for use in this design. The
selected toolset must have the ability to model aircraft sizing and aircraft performance
as separate conditions. Furthermore, the selection of engine design parameters indi-
cates that an engine analysis tool is necessary. The detailed description of the engine
throttle push mitigation action in Section 6.4.3 also indicates a need for an engine
assessment capability beyond basic engine design.
As mentioned previously the aircraft analysis code must be capable of both sizing
the vehicle and conducting the performance analysis stages described in Section 2.1.3.
These stages must be executed in the order described in Hypothesis 1 for this assess-
ment to accurately model the process of aircraft design under uncertainty. The toolset
needs to model all desired design variables, accounting for at least gross aircraft-level
design variables, some engine-related design variables, some wing-related design vari-
ables, and some uncertainty margins during sizing. During performance analysis, the
tool must be capable of accepting a frozen aircraft and assessing the performance of
that aircraft without resizing while under the effect of different uncertainty variables.
Based on the response to Research Question 4 in Section 4.2.2, the tool must also be
132
capable of assessing uncertain scenarios individually. The selected analysis tools need
to account for all variables selected in Step 2, 3, 4, and 5. They must also be capable
of modeling the sequence of analyses described by Figure 48. The performance analy-
sis must also be capable of including the mitigation actions defined in Section 6.4. Of
course whatever model is developed needs to return the performance responses from
Section 6.2, so that the impact of all the design, uncertain, and mitigation variables
on the performance of the vehicle can be measured.
The toolset needs to model all desired design variables, accounting for at least gross
aircraft-level design variables, some engine-related design variables, some wing-related
design variables, and some uncertainty margins during sizing. During performance
analysis, the tool must be capable of accepting a frozen aircraft and assessing the
performance of that aircraft while under the effect of different uncertainty variables.
Based on the response to Research Question 4 in Section 4.2.2 the tool must also be
capable of assessing uncertain scenarios individually.
Figure 47 illustrates the process which needs to be modeled to generate data
useful to the ARMOUR method. First, the model takes in a Design Point: a specific
setting of design variables (𝑥) and uncertainty margins (ℎ) around which the aircraft
will be sized. The sizing process must compute an aircraft design that matches those
parameters and for which the various weight components of the aircraft balance. This
defined aircraft, known as a Fixed Vehicle, will now have its performance computed
and be input into later analyses.
The fixed vehicle output from the sizing module is frozen, meaning that its di-
mensions and overall maximum weights can no longer be intentionally changed by
the designer or conceptual design code. At this point the uncertainty margins (ℎ)
implemented during sizing are removed from the vehicle. The rationalization behind
this step is discussed in detail in Section 3.2.
Once the margins have been removed from the fixed vehicle, a specific uncertainty
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Figure 47: Model Performance Logic
scenario (𝑢) will be assessed. This uncertainty assessment means that the physical
dimensions of the frozen vehicle remain fixed, but the non-fixed performance results
change according to the specific values associated with the uncertainty scenario. 1 The
performance responses from the aircraft analysis are then recorded. These responses
will be functions of the design variables (𝑥), the margins (ℎ), and the uncertainty
scenario investigated (𝑢).
Next, the Design of Experiments provides a level for each of the mitigation actions
(𝑚). These mitigation action settings are implemented on the fixed vehicle model. A
fixed aircraft performance analysis is executed to evaluate the response behavior after
the mitigation actions have been implemented. Finally, the mitigated performance
responses are recorded. These responses are functions of all input parameters to the
model, including the mitigation actions and penalties.
1Recall that the reason for assessing the uncertainty scenario for the fixed vehicle is that this
process simulates a true design process. In the real world, at the point in time when the uncertain
design parameters become known, the company has already committed to the physical dimensions
of the aircraft.
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5.8 Step 8: Create Surrogate Models
The uncertainty quantification & management environment described in Step 9 re-
quires a large number of function calls to assess the probabilities of compliance and
success of an individual design. The reliability analysis alone requires so many func-
tion calls that multiple methods have been explored to reduce this number at the
expense of some accuracy, as discussed in Section 2.4. The addition of the Mitigation
Analysis step to assess the probability of recovery of a design will necessitate even
more function calls. Even with a fast aircraft analysis code which could evaluate a
design in one second, the compliance assessment of an individual design alone could
easily take over an hour, making optimization prohibitive. Adding in the mitigation
analysis will cause the number of evaluations to grow even larger because multiple
assessments will need to be made for each failed uncertainty scenario to determine
if mitigation actions can bring the aircraft back into compliance. At one second per
function call, the total analysis time to assess the compliance and recovery of a single
design could feasibly take over ten hours, eliminating the possibility of any reasonable
design optimization.
Due to the large number of function calls needed, using design codes directly will
be too time-consuming to obtain useful information for this proof of concept study.
Instead, surrogate models of these design tools will be developed. These surrogate
models will be input into the uncertainty quantification algorithm developed in Step
9 in place of the sizing and performance analyses. This will alleviate issues related
to the speed of the aircraft assessment capability. Surrogates will be created from
the data generated by executing the aircraft sizing and analysis tool. The surrogates
will emulate performance responses seen in the aircraft design tool as functions of the
full set of design, uncertainty, and mitigation variables over a very limited range of
application.
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In order to create the data needed for the surrogate models, a Design of Experi-
ments (DoE) must be constructed. This will be input into the deterministic aircraft
sizing and analysis code described in Step 7. For each case in the Design of Experi-
ments, the deterministic model must be executed and the aircraft performance must
be recorded. This performance data along with the DoE will be used as the dataset
to generate the surrogate models.
The type of DoE constructed will depend on the type of surrogate models gener-
ated. It is recommended that the reader consult Section 2.6 and relevant surrogate
modeling methods to determine an appropriate Design of Experiments for his or her
problem [9, 17, 21, 37, 45, 61, 81]. Furthermore, each type of surrogate model will
potentially necessitate different model generation techniques. It is suggested that the
reader investigate the literature on the particular surrogate modeling method desired
to determine how to generate that type of model.
5.9 Step 9: Create Uncertainty Quantification & Manage-
ment Environment
The uncertainty quantification and management environment created here is the crux
of the ARMOUR method, so this step is broken into multiple sections. This UQ&M
environment assembles the full set of data at the top level. It defines variable ranges,
constraints, and mitigation penalties. Probability of compliance and probability of
success goals may be defined by the user at this time. After the basics are established,
a global optimizer is executed to find an ideal design point, given the defined prob-
ability goals and the objective function. For each design assessed by the optimizer,
sub processes execute to assess the statistical metrics of probability of compliance,
probability of success, and the expected value of the objective function.
The overall algorithm will follow the flow of Figure 48. Before the main uncer-
tainty quantification and management algorithm from Figure 30 is implemented, a
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set of initial setup steps must be performed. First, all design variables (𝑥), uncer-
tainty margins (ℎ), uncertainty variables (𝑢), and mitigation variables (𝑚) must be
defined. The ranges for all of these variables are also defined at this stage, as de-
scribed in Section 6.6. Additionally, the target design range (𝑅𝐷𝑒𝑠) of the aircraft
is specified. All of these variables, excluding the design range, are structured into
a series of cases called a Design of Experiments (DoE) in Section 6.8. The Design
of Experiments will contain values for each of the different variables established in
the previous step for each case in the design. These values will inform the aircraft
and engine design analyses through the design variables, the uncertainty margins, an
uncertainty scenario, and a level of mitigation action to apply. A detailed aircraft
and engine code capable of both sizing and performance will execute the DoE cases
and determine the resulting aircraft’s performance in Section 6.7. Surrogate models
of these performance metrics were generated in Step 8 which creates a set of functions
relating the performance of the metric to the values of each of the different variables.
Figure 48: ARMOUR Methodology
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Once this initial setup is complete, the algorithm takes in a starting aircraft design
(Shown as ‘Initial 𝑥, ℎ’ in Figure 48). This initial design will contain settings for all
design variables (𝑥) and uncertainty margins (ℎ) established in Section 6.6. This
design point will be input into the aircraft Vehicle Sizing algorithm described in
Section 5.9.2. Using the design range (𝑅𝑑𝑒𝑠) as the sizing condition, the Vehicle Sizing
algorithm will create and output a sized Fixed Vehicle corresponding to the input
design variable and uncertainty margin settings. Aside from explicitly designated
changes due to uncertainty or mitigation variables, this vehicle’s design variables must
be frozen as-is within later analyses. This requirement has multiple consequences, and
they are discussed in Section 5.7.
The now Fixed Vehicle is input into the Reliability Analysis which will assess the
overall probability of compliance of the vehicle as detailed in Section 5.9.3. The Reli-
ability Analysis takes in the vehicle performance constraints (𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑞) and distributions
on the uncertainty variables (𝑢). The aircraft performance will then be evaluated for
each point in a set of uncertainty scenarios; the uncertainty scenarios will be generated
by using a sampling method to draw from the input distributions of the uncertainty
variables. The performance of the Fixed Vehicle under each uncertainty scenario is
then compared to the performance constraints; under each scenario the Fixed Vehicle
will either meet all constraints or fail to meet one or more constraints. This dataset
is then used to assess the probability of compliance (𝑃 (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 | 𝑥, ℎ)) of the
vehicle as well as the expected value of the objective function (E[𝑓(𝑥, ℎ)]). This data
will later be processed by the optimizer. The uncertainty scenarios which cause the
Fixed Vehicle to fail to meet one or more performance constraints are stored as failed
uncertainty scenarios (𝑈𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑) to be input into the Mitigation Analysis.
The Mitigation Analysis described in Section 5.9.4 determines the probability of
recovery (𝑃 (𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 | 𝑥, ℎ)) of the Fixed Vehicle. The failed uncertainty scenarios
(𝑈𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑) from the Reliability Analysis are input into the Mitigation Analysis along
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with the performance constraints (𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑞) and the possible mitigation actions (𝑚). This
Mitigation Analysis will assess the recovery of the Fixed Vehicle under each of the
failed uncertainty scenarios (𝑈𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑) by attempting to find any combination of mit-
igation actions which will bring the design back into compliance for that scenario,
indicated by Equation (19). By assessing all failed uncertainty scenarios, the proba-
bility of recovery (𝑃 (𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 | 𝑥, ℎ)) of the Fixed Vehicle can be calculated and is
output from the Mitigation Analysis.
The outputs of the Reliability Analysis and the Mitigation Analysis are brought
together to calculate the overall probability of success (𝑃 (𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 | 𝑥, ℎ)) of the de-
sign. This metric represents the likelihood that the aircraft design (𝑥 and ℎ) will
be compliant with all performance constraints (𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑞) given the distributions of the
uncertainty variables (𝑢) and the available mitigation actions (𝑚) that are available
should the unmitigated design fail to meet one or more constraints.
Finally, the probability of success (𝑃 (𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 | 𝑥, ℎ)) and the expected value
of the objective function (E[𝑓(𝑥, ℎ)]) are input into an optimizer described in Sec-
tion 5.9.5. This optimizer will attempt to select a design (𝑥, ℎ) in order to minimize
the expected value of the objective function such that the probability of success does
not fall below a specified threshold (𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙). Until an optimum is found each new
setting of design variables (𝑥) and uncertainty margins (ℎ) will be input into the Ve-
hicle Sizing to iterate through the UQ&M algorithm. Upon finding an optimum, the
design point (𝑥, ℎ) is recorded along with any relevant outputs from the algorithm.
5.9.1 Uncertainty Quantification Algorithm
This section provides more detail about the uncertainty quantification algorithm de-
scribed in Section 5.9. In order to select the optimum design, the overall algorithm
must contain component algorithms capable of calculating the expected value of the
objective function as well as the probability of success (𝑃 (𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 | 𝑥, ℎ)). The
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algorithm used to size the vehicle to the design conditions (𝑥, ℎ) is described in Sec-
tion 5.9.2. Later analyses evaluate the performance of this sized vehicle under differ-
ent conditions. The reliability analysis in Section 5.9.3 takes the fixed sized vehicle
and applies different uncertainty scenarios to it in order to calculate a probability
of compliance (𝑃 (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 | 𝑥, ℎ)) respect to the performance constraints as well
as the expected value of the objective function (E[𝑓(𝑥, ℎ)]). The reliability analysis
also collects the failed uncertainty scenarios (𝑈𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑) for later recovery tests. The
mitigation analysis evaluates the individual failed uncertainty scenarios (𝑢 ∈ 𝑈𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑)
further and attempts to find a combination of mitigation actions (𝑚) which will bring
the design back into compliance with the performance constraints for that failed un-
certainty scenario. The aggregate of these recovery attempts yields the probability of
recovery of the design (𝑃 (𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 | 𝑥, ℎ)). The information is collected and given
to an optimizer which will try to find the best combination of design variables (𝑥)
and uncertainty margins (ℎ) to minimize the expected value of the objective function
subject to a minimum level of probability of success (𝑃 (𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 | 𝑥, ℎ)).
5.9.2 Vehicle Sizing Algorithm
This section provides more detail about the vehicle sizing algorithm described in
Section 5.9. To assess a new design point, the vehicle must first be sized. The vehicle
sizing logic flow is shown in Figure 49. First a design point consisting of design
variable settings (𝑥) and uncertainty margins (ℎ) is given to the sizing analysis from
the optimizer. The range requirement for the design mission (𝑅𝐷𝑒𝑠) is also input into
the analysis so the vehicle can be designed and sized for later analysis.
The engine is first designed based on the design variable input vector (𝑥). This
engine is given to the aircraft design algorithm. Once the initial parameters are set,
a sizing mission is executed to evaluate the vehicle’s performance. In this analysis
the range requirement (𝑅𝐷𝑒𝑠) dictates the size of the vehicle, given the design point
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Figure 49: Vehicle Sizing Logic Flow
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specified by the DoE. Once the mission has been evaluated, the resulting fuel required
to complete the mission (𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑) is compared to the fuel capacity of the aircraft
(𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒). If there is insufficient fuel available, the vehicle will be scaled up.
Should there be too much fuel, the vehicle is downsized. This rescaled vehicle is
reanalyzed by the aircraft mission analysis and the required and available fuel amounts
are compared once again.
Once the fuel requirements match, the engine is scaled to meet the aircraft re-
quirements. Should the engine need to be scaled by more than a small amount, the
model will return to the engine design to create a new engine with the new required
thrust targets. Once the engine thrust output from the mission analysis matches the
thrust from the engine sizing, the vehicle is considered sized. The configuration is
frozen, and the output fixed vehicle is given to the performance analysis.
5.9.3 Reliability Analysis Algorithm
This section provides more detail about the reliability analysis algorithm described
in Section 5.9. After the vehicle has been sized, a reliability analysis is performed to
determine the probability of compliance of the aircraft as designed. The logic flow
of the reliability analysis is shown in Figure 50. The fixed vehicle which was output
from the vehicle sizing algorithm is input into the analysis. The distributions of the
uncertainty variables are brought into the analysis as a set of uncertainty scenarios
(𝑈). Performance constraint targets (𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑞) are also input into the analysis in order to
assess the aircraft’s ability to meet these targets.
As mentioned in Section 5.9, a sample uncertainty scenario (𝑢) is first drawn from
the set of all uncertainty scenarios (𝑈). The fixed aircraft’s performance is evaluated
under this uncertainty condition. If the aircraft’s performance under this uncertainty
scenario satisfies Equation (13) (i.e. it meets all constraints simultaneously), then the
aircraft is considered compliant under that scenario (𝑢).
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Figure 50: Reliability Analysis Logic Flow
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(𝑔𝑖 (𝑥, ℎ, 𝑢, 0) ≥ 0)∀𝑖 ∈ 𝐺 (13)
If, however, the aircraft performance does not meet the constraints, the vehicle
is considered non-compliant under that uncertainty condition, and the uncertainty
condition is added to the set of failed uncertainty scenarios (𝑢 ∈ 𝑈𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑). After this
determination has been made on the compliance of the vehicle under a particular set
of uncertainty conditions, the algorithm checks to see if all uncertainty scenarios (𝑈)
have been exhausted. If sampling is not complete, a new sample scenario (𝑢 ∈ 𝑈) is
drawn and the process is repeated.
Once all samples have been drawn, the expected value of the objective function
(E[𝑓(𝑥, ℎ)]) is evaluated via Equation (25). This value will be given to the optimizer.
E[𝑓(𝑥)] =
∫︀
𝑢∈𝐴 𝑓 (𝑥, ℎ, 𝑢, 0) 𝑑𝑢+
∫︀
𝑢∈𝐴𝑀






The probability of compliance of the design (𝑃 (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 | 𝑥, ℎ)) is calculated
using Equation (17). The probability of compliance will be used in the probability of
success (𝑃 (𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 | 𝑥, ℎ)) calculation later.
𝑃 (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 | 𝑥, ℎ) =
∫︀
𝑢∈𝑈 1𝐴 (𝑥, ℎ, 𝑢) 𝑑𝑢∫︀
𝑢∈𝑈 1𝑑𝑢
(17)
Finally, the failed uncertainty scenarios (𝑈𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑) are passed to the mitigation
analysis. These scenarios will be assessed using the available mitigation actions to
determine whether or not the design’s performance can be recovered under each sce-
nario (𝑢 ∈ 𝑈𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑).
5.9.4 Mitigation Analysis Algorithm
This section provides more detail about the mitigation analysis algorithm described in
Section 5.9. Once the Reliability Analysis is complete, the Mitigation Analysis shown
in Figure 51 assesses the probability of recovery (𝑃 (𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 | 𝑥, ℎ)) of the vehicle
through a set of potential mitigation actions (𝑀). The assessment takes as inputs a
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Fixed Vehicle, a set of failed uncertainty scenarios, a set of mitigation actions, and
the required performance constraints imposed on the aircraft. The Fixed Vehicle is an
output from the Sizing Analysis which was based on only the design variables (𝑥) and
associated uncertainty margins (ℎ). The set of failed uncertainty scenarios (𝑈𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑)
comes from the Reliability Assessment and only includes uncertainty scenarios un-
der which the proposed aircraft design would fail to meet one or more performance
constraints. The performance constraints (𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑞) are the same constraints imposed on
the aircraft during the Reliability Assessment. An allowable set of mitigation actions
(𝑀) are input to allow the Mitigation Analysis to try to recover the aircraft for failed
uncertainty scenarios.
After establishing all of the input values, a single scenario is drawn from the set of
failed uncertainty scenarios (𝑈𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑). For this particular uncertainty scenario, one or
more performance constraints was violated during the Reliability Assessment. A set
of samples2 are selected from the mitigation space to assess the possibility of recover-
ing performance and bringing the aircraft back into compliance with all constraints,
and a single sample is drawn from the mitigation space. For this sample, the perfor-
mance of the Fixed Vehicle is assessed under the previously sampled failed uncertainty
scenario. This assessment yields performance information which is compared to the
performance constraints on the aircraft. If the aircraft under the failed uncertainty
scenario now meets all constraints simultaneously once the sampled mitigation action
is applied, the scenario is considered recovered. If, however, the aircraft still fails to
meet one or more of the performance constraints, the uncertainty scenario is not yet
recovered. Should remaining samples exist from the mitigation space, the algorithm
will return to the mitigation sampling stage. Should no further mitigation action
samples exist, it is assumed that the sampled uncertainty scenario is not recoverable
through mitigation actions and is considered failed.
2Multiple alternative methods of sampling are discussed in Section 3.5.
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Figure 51: Mitigation Analysis Logic Flow
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Once the recoverability of the particular sampled uncertainty scenario is estab-
lished through either finding a set of mitigation actions that recover the design or
exhausting the mitigation action samples, the algorithm checks to see if additional
uncertainty scenarios exist. Should more failed uncertainty scenarios (𝑈𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑑) exist,
the algorithm will return to the loop that samples from these uncertainty scenarios to
assess the recoverability of another uncertainty scenario. Once all failed uncertainty
scenarios have been assessed, the probability of recovery (𝑃 (𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 | 𝑥, ℎ)) of the
selected design is calculated. The Mitigation Assessment’s probability of recovery is
then provided to the optimization algorithm.
5.9.5 Final Calculations and Optimizer
This section provides more detail about the optimizer described in Section 5.9. The
outputs of the Reliability Analysis and the Mitigation Analysis are brought together
to calculate the final probabilistic performance of the vehicle. The overall probabil-
ity of success (𝑃 (𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 | 𝑥, ℎ)) of the design is calculated via Equation (24) by
combining the probability of compliance (𝑃 (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 | 𝑥, ℎ)) from the reliability
analysis with the probability of recovery (𝑃 (𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 | 𝑥, ℎ)) from the mitigation
analysis. The resulting probability of success metric represents the likelihood that
the given aircraft design (𝑥 and ℎ) selected by the optimizer will be compliant with
all performance constraints (𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑞) given the distributions of the uncertainty variables
(𝑢) and the available mitigation actions (𝑚) that can be used should the unmitigated
design fail to meet one or more constraints.
𝑃 (𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 | 𝑥, ℎ) =𝑃 (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 | 𝑥, ℎ)
+ 𝑃 (𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 | 𝑥, ℎ) (1− 𝑃 (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 | 𝑥, ℎ))
(24)
The probability of success (𝑃 (𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 | 𝑥, ℎ)) metric is then input into the opti-
mizer. This metric will be used as a constraint within the global optimizer. Designs
which fall below a specified threshold (indicated as 𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙 in Figure 48 will not comply
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with the optimization objective.
As stated in Section 5.9, this optimizer will attempt to select a design (𝑥, ℎ)
in order to minimize the expected value of the objective function defined in Step
5. Again, the probability of success constraint will ensure that the probabilistic
performance does not fall below the specified threshold. The optimizer will input
new settings of design variables (𝑥) and uncertainty margins (ℎ) into the vehicle
sizing algorithm to attempt to minimize the expected value of the objective function
while maintaining a required level of success. Once the optimum is found, the design
point (𝑥, ℎ) is recorded.
5.10 Step 10: Execute UQ&M Environment
The output of executing the Uncertainty Quantification and Management environ-
ment created in Step 9 is an optimal design based on the designer’s preferences.
Should only one specific set of goals be desired, this design should be sufficient. How-
ever, it is likely that a designer or company will not yet know exactly what goals
to specify when setting up the problem. Thus, the UQ&M environment may need
to be executed multiple times under different reliability goals or objective function
weightings to yield a set of designs from which to select. If this is the case, many
multi-attribute decision making (MADM) techniques exist within the existing litera-
ture to make such a selection.
5.11 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, a specific step-by-step formulation of the methodology proposed in
Chapter 3 was developed. The details of the implementation were informed by the
results of the hypothesis testing from Chapter 4. Details about how to decide whether
the ARMOUR methodology is appropriate for the design problem under considera-
tion were discussed. Directions were given on how to define aircraft requirements,
uncertainty information, and mitigation actions. Suggestions were given on how to
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set appropriate objective metrics. Requirements on the designs space were given.
Guidelines on modifying existing aircraft models were given along with directions on
how to use these models to generate the necessary surrogate models. The uncertainty
quantification and management environment central to the ARMOUR method was
discussed in enough detail to allow an aircraft designer to implement the method
independently. Finally, the text describes how to use this environment to select an
appropriate design with which to move forward from conceptual design. In Chapter 6
this step-by-step version of the ARMOUR methodology will be implemented for a




This chapter describes the specific way in which the methodology developed in Chap-
ter 5 was implemented. First, the overall needs of the methodology are described.
These include the top-level optimizer, physics-based modeling, uncertainty analy-
sis, input variables (design, uncertainty margins, uncertainty, mitigation), mitigation
penalties, responses and constraints, and probability measures. The implementation
in this chapter is designed to be more directly analogous to the kind of implementa-
tion ARMOUR would see in practical applications. It will make use of a monolithic
aircraft design and analysis tool. Specific care will be taken to ensure that uncertainty
and mitigation are implemented as required by the hypotheses and experiment results.
Due to the multi-loop nature of this problem, surrogate models will be employed to
vastly increase the speed of this otherwise cumbersome analysis. An optimizer can
be used to explore the resulting trade space between the new metric, probability of
success, and traditional design objectives.
6.1 Step 1: Establish the Need
Company Z has decided to manufacture a new aircraft. Specifically, they are looking
at developing a large civil transport aircraft in the class of the A340-300 and the 777-
200ER. They have determined that significant enough uncertainty exists within their
conceptual level design tools that they are not confident enough to simply perform
a deterministic design analysis. They are more confident in their preliminary design
tools and expect that much of the uncertainty surrounding the design will be reduced
long before the design moves to pre-production; while changes will not be desirable
at that stage, they are possible if the need arises. However, the design will be frozen
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long before any of these preliminary design analyses take place. Furthermore, these
preliminary design analyses take a long time to execute and require significant design
specification before they can be performed, which prevents the conceptual design team
from employing these analyses before the design freeze. Thus, Company Z decides
that the Aircraft Recovery through Mitigation & Optimization under Uncertainty
for Reliability (ARMOUR) method is an appropriate method to help them make
decisions during conceptual design.
6.2 Step 2: Aircraft Requirements Definition
Company Z’s market research indicates that a specific design mission is required for
their new aircraft. The design mission selected is to transport three hundred and five
(305) passengers a distance of 7,530 nautical miles. This mission should account for
all Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requirements. Additionally, it is desired
that the vehicle meet other performance constraints to allow the aircraft to operate
out of a large number of airports.
In order to measure the reliability and recoverability of a design, performance
constraints need to be established. These performance constraints will be measured
with respect to a response from the aircraft model, so appropriate responses must
be selected. These responses should be indicative of performance constraints which
would be relevant to conceptual aircraft design. Furthermore, at least some of the
responses need to be dependent on the uncertainty variables modeled in Section 6.3.
If none of the responses of interest are affected by the uncertainty variables, then the
reliability assessment will be unnecessary; a deterministic performance assessment
would achieve the same answer.
To track fuel consumption, the block fuel required for an economic range mission
(𝐵𝐹𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛) will be considered. This metric will represent the fuel efficiency of the
resulting aircraft. Economic range block fuel will serve as a proxy for the operating
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cost of the aircraft - an important metric to consider when selling an aircraft. It is
desired to minimize this response. As such, no specific goal will be established for
the economic range block fuel.
The aircraft will be sized to meet the specified range (𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐸) of the design
mission. However, once an uncertainty scenario is considered, the vehicle may no
longer be capable of meeting the range requirement when carrying the design payload.
Thus, the range of the vehicle at the design payload must be enforced. This constraint
will be the same as the sizing requirement, so range for the design mission shall not
be less than 7,530 nautical miles.
The approach speed (𝑉𝐴𝑝𝑝) of the aircraft will be important from an airport access
perspective. This will dictate at which airports the aircraft can land, potentially
restricting the desired city pairs for prospective buyers. As such, a maximum approach
speed should be specified by the designer. For this problem, a constraint shall be
imposed on the aircraft such that the approach speed may not exceed 145 knots.
Takeoff field length (𝑇𝑂𝐹𝐿) also dictates whether an aircraft can operate from
a given airport. Obviously, the takeoff field length must be less than the available
field length present at any desired departure airports. For this study the takeoff field
length of the vehicle shall not exceed 11,000 feet.
Wing span (𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑛) will also dictate the airports at which the vehicle can operate.
The span will limit access to gates and may even prevent the aircraft from using
the runway at all. This limit will counter the aerodynamically desirable tendency to
increase the aspect ratio. For this study the wing span shall not be allowed to exceed
215 feet.
The rate of climb, a.k.a. the excess power, dictates the aircraft’s ability to change
altitude. There must be sufficient available climb rate at the design altitude to enable
the aircraft to maneuver in order for it to operate in this region effectively. A con-
straint is imposed such that the climb rate shall not be less than 300 feet per minute
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at an altitude of 35,000 feet.
The ARMOURmethod, like all reliability-based methods, specifies a required min-
imum level of probability to meet constraints. For this problem, probability of com-
pliance (𝑃 (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 | 𝑥, ℎ)) and probability of success (𝑃 (𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 | 𝑥, ℎ)) with
respect to all constraints listed in Table 2 will simultaneously be imposed. The levels
of reliability desired will be specified in Step 5.
Table 2: Performance Constraints and Traditional Objective
Metric Symbol Target Units
Approach Speed 𝑉𝐴𝑝𝑝 ≤ 145 knots
Takeoff Field Length 𝑇𝑂𝐹𝐿 ≤ 11,000 feet
Rate of Climb at 35,000 ft 𝑅𝑜𝐶 ≥ 300 feet per minute
Design Mission Range 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 ≥ 7,530 nautical miles
Wing Span 𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑛 ≤ 215 feet
Economic Mission Fuel (4000 nm) 𝐵𝐹𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛 minimize pounds
These metrics are standard aircraft performance measures. Approach speed is
a common measure of the landing capability of an aircraft and is regulated by the
FAA. As mentioned, takeoff field length will dictate the airports where the aircraft
can operate and the rate of climb is another regulation requirement. The range for
the design payload is a prime indicator of the markets for which the aircraft can be
sold. Economic mission fuel is not constrained as this will be the “traditional design
metric” used in the Pareto Frontier, along with the probability of success.
6.3 Step 3: Elicit Uncertainty Information
Uncertainty variables are necessary to emulate the true uncertainty inherent in the
design process. These variables are implemented only after design is complete; they
represent the aircraft drifting from its assumed performance condition during later de-
sign stages. Emulating a specific type of uncertainty can be accomplished in different
ways. For example, the component weight uncertainty can be modeled by imple-
menting a distribution about the weight of each component individually (e.g. wing
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weight, fuselage weight, empennage weight, landing gear weight, engine weight, etc.).
These component weights may each have their own associated uncertainty distribu-
tion, owing to the individual level of detail contained in their individual calculation
methods during conceptual design. These component weights may also be correlated
with each other if there exists a logical or historical reason that the error in one pre-
diction typically correlates with another error. Alternately, an assumed distribution
on the overall empty weight of the vehicle can be implemented which accounts for
the distribution of all individual errors and their correlations.
For the implementation within this body of work, only a handful of uncertainty
variables were selected. It is desired that these variables represent a large enough im-
pact on the performance of the vehicle to test this method. Thus, factors important
to the overall performance of the aircraft like the empty weight, cruise drag, engine
fuel flow, and Mach number at drag divergence were considered. As discussed, these
factors may be resolved into individual component uncertainties with separate and
potentially correlated distributions, or they may be characterized by a gross overall
distribution which emulates the combined effect of multiple components simultane-
ously. Table 3 contains the uncertainty variables used in these analyses.
Table 3: Uncertainty Variables
Variable Description Symbol Minimum Maximum
Empty Weight Error 𝑢𝐸𝑊 -1% 6%
Cruise Drag Error 𝑢𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑔 -1% 6%
Fuel Flow Error 𝑢𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐹 𝑙𝑜𝑤 -1% 6%
Mach Drag Divergence Error 𝑢𝑀𝐷𝐷 -5% 5%
The generation of a sampled set of uncertainty scenarios (𝑈) can be performed
outside of the uncertainty quantification algorithm described in Section 6.9. Using
Monte Carlo simulation (MCS) as a sampling method, an assumed distribution may
be modeled by generating an appropriate set of samples; as the full set of samples
grows larger, the desired distribution is approximated as discussed in Section 2.4.1.
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These samples are created using a pseudo random number generator available in al-
most any modern computer code. Since pseudo random number generators by default
create independent uniform distributions ranging from zero to one, a transformation
is necessary to modify the generated distributions into the desired ones. If correla-
tion between the distributions is desired, a Cholesky decomposition may be used to
modify the distributions appropriately.
Without an existing team of expert engineers or a set of separate conceptual and
preliminary design tools to compare, assumptions need to be made about the distri-
butions of uncertainty variables. For this work, all uncertainty variables were given
uniform distributions between their respective minimum and maximum values. This
was implemented because some uncertainty distribution must be assumed to per-
form the reliability analyses. If uncertainty quantification analysis were performed to
yield a better assumed distribution form, then those distributions could be employed
using appropriate transformations. Since the assumed random variables in this im-
plementation are all independent and uniformly distributed, only a simple scaling of
the computer-generated uniform distributions (𝑢𝑗𝑟𝑛𝑔) in Equation (37) is necessary to
create distributions which match the desired interval (𝑢𝑗). Once the set of scenarios
is established, it will be used by the fixed aircraft analysis as-is and need not be
regenerated.





It is important to consider how the uncertainty variables will affect the responses.
From Equation (34) it is apparent that final approach speed of the aircraft before
landing (𝑉𝐴𝑝𝑝) is dependent on the landing weight of the aircraft, the vehicle’s wing
area, the maximum lift coefficient of the aircraft, and the local air density. The local
air density is assumed to be a constant value based on the sea-level conditions of the
ICAO Standard Atmosphere and will not vary in this implementation. Wing area
is set by the sizing analysis and is expected to be frozen during later design stages,
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where uncertain values will be realized. The maximum lift coefficient may be modified
by adjusting the high-lift devices installed on the vehicle, but these devices are not
explicitly affected by any uncertainty variables. The landing weight of the vehicle is
primarily composed of the payload weight, crew weight, remaining fuel at landing, and
the operating empty weight of the vehicle. The payload and crew are fixed weights
for a commercial transport mission. The effect of any selected uncertainty variable on
the remaining fuel in the vehicle will be small. However, the operating empty weight
of the vehicle is directly affected by the empty weight uncertainty (𝑢𝐸𝑊 ) selected
in Section 6.3. Thus, as represented by Equation (38), approach speed (𝑉𝐴𝑝𝑝) is a
function of the design variables (𝑥), uncertainty margins (ℎ), and the empty weight
uncertainty.
𝑉𝐴𝑝𝑝 = 𝑓 (𝑥, ℎ, 𝑢𝐸𝑊 ) (38)
The takeoff field length (TOFL) of a vehicle is primarily determined by the takeoff
gross weight (TOGW), engine thrust, and the low speed aerodynamics of the vehicle.
Currently, the takeoff gross weight for all evaluation conditions is set by the maximum
takeoff weight (MTOW) established by the design mission during sizing. Under this
construct, TOGW will be a function of only design variables (x) and margins (h);
uncertainty variables (u) will have no impact on the TOGW of the vehicle. The thrust
performance of the engine is determined during design. All degradations possible
due to uncertainty in the current setup of the analysis impact only the fuel flow
characteristics of the engine. Thus, thrust is not affected by uncertainty. The low
speed aerodynamics also are not affected by uncertainty in the current problem.
Thus, TOFL is only a function of the sizing conditions of the aircraft, namely design
variables and margins, as shown in Equation (39).
𝑇𝑂𝐹𝐿 = 𝑓 (𝑥, ℎ) (39)
Equation (40) shows the expected functional relationship between the rate of climb
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(𝑅𝑜𝐶) and the input variables. The drag uncertainty variable (𝑢𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑔) is expected to
impact the rate of climb both directly and through the change in fuel consumed to
arrive at the top of climb condition. The Mach drag divergence variable (𝑢𝑀𝐷𝐷)
will have a similar impact to the drag changes. The fuel flow uncertainty variable
(𝑢𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐹 𝑙𝑜𝑤) will change the rate of climb only through the impact to the fuel consumed
to arrive at top of climb.
𝑅𝑜𝐶 = 𝑓 (𝑥, ℎ, 𝑢𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑔, 𝑢𝑀𝐷𝐷, 𝑢𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐹 𝑙𝑜𝑤) (40)
The vehicle wing span (𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑛) is not expected to be impacted by any of the
uncertainty variables. Thus, the wing span will only be a function of the design
variables (𝑥) and the uncertainty margins (ℎ), as shown in Equation (41). This
means that a constraint imposed upon wing span will be deterministic.
𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑛 = 𝑓 (𝑥, ℎ) (41)
The range of the vehicle for a design mission (𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐸) is expected to be impacted
by all of the uncertainty variables. Empty weight uncertainty (𝑢𝐸𝑊 ) will increase or
decrease the fuel available to fly the mission. Drag uncertainty (𝑢𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑔) will increase
or decrease the thrust required to maintain speed, which will change the fuel required
to maintain speed. The uncertainty on Mach drag divergence (𝑢𝑀𝐷𝐷) will also affect
the thrust requirements. The fuel flow uncertainty (𝑢𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐹 𝑙𝑜𝑤) will change the fuel
consumed per unit of thrust required; this will change the fuel economy of the vehi-
cle, reducing the range capability. Equation (42) shows the functional relationship
between design mission range (𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐸) and these variables.
𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 = 𝑓 (𝑥, ℎ, 𝑢𝐸𝑊 , 𝑢𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑔, 𝑢𝑀𝐷𝐷, 𝑢𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐹 𝑙𝑜𝑤) (42)
The block fuel for an economic range mission (𝐵𝐹𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛) will be impacted by all
uncertainty variables. Empty weight uncertainty (𝑢𝐸𝑊 ) will change the weight of
the aircraft during the mission. Drag uncertainty (𝑢𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑔) will increase or decrease
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the thrust required to maintain speed; this will change the fuel required to maintain
speed, changing the fuel consumption. The uncertainty on Mach drag divergence
(𝑢𝑀𝐷𝐷) will also affect the thrust requirements. The fuel flow uncertainty (𝑢𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐹 𝑙𝑜𝑤)
will change the fuel consumed per unit of thrust required, changing the fuel economy
of the vehicle. Equation (43) shows the functional relationship between the block fuel
for an economic range mission (𝐵𝐹𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛) and these variables.
𝐵𝐹𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛 = 𝑓 (𝑥, ℎ, 𝑢𝐸𝑊 , 𝑢𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑔, 𝑢𝑀𝐷𝐷, 𝑢𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐹 𝑙𝑜𝑤) (43)
6.4 Step 4: Define Potential Mitigation Actions
For this thesis, there is no direct access to an aircraft manufacturer’s design philoso-
phies, so basic aerospace engineering concepts will be used to construct a list of mit-
igation actions. The goal is to show how mitigation actions would be implemented,
rather than to provide guidance on the specific mitigation actions that should be used.
To accomplish this, it is not necessary to figure out exactly which mitigation actions
would be used by any specific company; rather, as long as representative mitigation
actions have been selected with the rules set forth in Section 3.3.2 in mind, they will
be able to demonstrate the process. Were an aircraft company to implement the ideas
of this thesis it would be more appropriate to employ their own design philosophy
and engineers to inform them which mitigation actions to investigate and how best
to model their benefits and possible penalties.
Mitigation actions are established under the assumption that they will be non-
ideal, late stage changes to a design. Sections 2.2.2 and 3.3.1 have discussed the
reasoning and need for penalties on possible mitigation actions to accurately portray
the negative side-effects of these actions.
6.4.1 Post-Sizing Fuel Addition
The first mitigation action modeled in this thesis is a post-sizing fuel addition in which
a “topping off” of the fuel tanks is considered to fix range constraint violations. Fuel
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will be added to the vehicle after the sizing loop is completed. This additional fuel
will cause the aircraft’s maximum takeoff weight (MTOW) to increase beyond the
design condition, adversely affecting the performance of the vehicle. This extra fuel
will, of course, allow the aircraft to fly further than it could at the design MTOW. The
fuel capacity will be increased by up to at most ten percent of the baseline vehicle’s
mission fuel weight – 28,000 lbs. The extra MTOW is expected to have an adverse
effect on any takeoff and climb constraints. This behavior should be captured by any
physics-based model.
This fuel increase will of course be limited by the capacity of the fuel tanks. In
other words the aircraft may not be able to be mitigated up to the full amount,
depending on the design of the vehicle – specifically the size of the fuel tanks. This
is expected to have an effect on the probability of recovery, since the fuel tank size
will dictate the maximum effectiveness of this mitigation action. This limit will
be imposed by allowing the aircraft performance assessment tool to calculate the
available fuel tank size of the vehicle, which scales with the wing geometry.
The increase in the maximum takeoff weight of the vehicle associated with adding
fuel will have adverse effects on the structure of the vehicle. Since the aircraft was
only designed to handle at most the design MTOW, it is expected that this increase in
load will force the structural weight of the vehicle to increase. This structural weight
increase will be enforced via an Operating Empty Weight (OEW) penalty. This
empty weight penalty (𝐸𝑊𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦) will be proportional to the change in maximum
takeoff weight requested for mitigation as shown in Equation (44). This new MTOW
will include both the additional fuel and the corresponding empty weight addition.
Equation (44)
𝑚𝑀𝑇𝑂𝑊 = 𝑀𝑇𝑂𝑊𝑛𝑒𝑤 −𝑀𝑇𝑂𝑊𝐷𝐸𝑆 (44)
A relationship was assumed between this additional maximum takeoff weight dur-
ing preliminary design and the empty weight penalty. This penalty function should
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behave in such a way that minimal penalty would be incurred for small changes to the
aircraft. After this initial burn-in period, the penalty should monotonically increase
as the aircraft deviates from its design condition. Furthermore, the rate of penalty
is expected to increase as the aircraft grows excessively. Thus, a quadratic equation
was settled upon, as shown in Equation (45).
𝐸𝑊𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦 (𝑚𝑀𝑇𝑂𝑊 ) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚
(︀
0, 0.0002608 *𝑚2𝑀𝑇𝑂𝑊 − 0.0063233 *𝑚𝑀𝑇𝑂𝑊
)︀
(45)
The empty weight penalty function in Equation (45) is plotted in blue against
the change in maximum takeoff weight in Figure 52. This blue line shows the empty
weight increasing at a greater and greater rate as the aircraft deviates from its design
weight. It is also possible to determine the actual fuel associated with an increase in
𝑀𝑇𝑂𝑊𝑀𝐴. To do so the empty weight penalty can simply be subtracted from the
change in maximum takeoff weight (𝑀𝑇𝑂𝑊𝑀𝐴 −𝐸𝑊𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦), yielding the remainder
as the change in fuel weight. By doing so, it is possible to determine the empty weight
penalty per pound of fuel added to the aircraft. This fuel weight increase is shown in
red.
Figure 52: Empty Weight Penalty per Pound of Maximum Takeoff Weight
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Because the empty weight penalty increases in intensity as MTOW grows larger,
the effectiveness of the mitigation action (the amount of fuel being added) decreases.
This relationship is shown in Figure 53. Here, the empty weight penalty 𝐸𝑊𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦
from Equation (45) is plotted on the y-axis. The x-axis is the actual fuel added to
the aircraft – the difference between the additional maximum takeoff weight and the
empty weight penalty. It is clear from this chart that the penalty imposed makes
adding more than about 900 pounds of fuel to the aircraft increasingly ineffective.
Figure 53: Derived Empty Weight Penalty per Pound of Fuel
6.4.2 Augmented High-Lift Device
The second mitigation action modeled in this thesis is to add a representative ad-
vanced high-lift device to the aircraft to counter approach speed constraint violations.
This high lift device is expected to increase the maximum lift coefficient of the vehicle
during landing. Based on Equation (34) from Section 4.2.1, this increase in the 𝐶𝐿𝑚𝑎𝑥
of the vehicle during landing will reduce the required approach speed.
This increase in lift will not come without a cost. The additional lift on the wing
constitutes an additional load during landing. The wing, the landing gear, and other
structural components may need to be reinforced to accommodate the impact of this
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mitigation action. Thus, the additional lift coefficient is expected to incur an empty
weight penalty. Again, the penalty will be based on the change in lift coefficient from
the design value as in Equation (46).
𝑚𝐶𝐿 = 𝐶𝐿𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑤 − 𝐶𝐿𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 (46)











The impact of Equation (46) on the aircraft is shown via Figure 54. In this
diagram the final landing lift coefficient is shown on the x-axis versus the change in
empty weight on the y-axis.
Figure 54: Landing Lift Augmentation Penalty
6.4.3 Engine Throttle Push
The final mitigation action modeled in this thesis is an engine throttle push to counter
potential Takeoff Field Length (𝑇𝑂𝐹𝐿) and Rate of Climb (𝑅𝑜𝐶) violations. An
engine throttle push is accomplished by uprating the engine thrust without changing
the size or general design of the engine, making it a good candidate for a mitigation
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action. This is accomplished by changing the engine controls such that the engine
is allowed to run at a hotter temperature. This higher temperature is the result of
adding additional fuel to the engine at maximum thrust. This increase in temperature
will have a detrimental impact on the engine life span which is not modeled in this
work.
As justification for the range of throttle push allowed for mitigation, engines in
service were examined. The Pratt & Whitney 4098 engine is a throttle push variant
of the PW4000 series [67]. This engine is of the same class as engines currently
in use on the 777 series of vehicles [41]. To determine the intensity of the throttle
push employed, the thrusts of the engine were compared to others in its family. The
PW4098 is capable of 99,040 pounds of thrust when the stationary engine is measured
at full power and sea-level conditions [22]. Since the next highest thrust of 91,790
pounds was achieved with the PW4090 variant, it is assumed that a throttle push of
roughly eight percent was achieved. Considering the high level of throttle push seen
with this engine, which is of the same class as those on the theoretical aircraft being
implemented, a throttle push of five percent seems reasonable.
Because the takeoff field length will not be affected by the uncertain parameters,
the constraint on TOFL is effectively deterministic. All designs (x and h) will either be
one hundred percent or zero percent in compliance with the TOFL constraint. Designs
which are zero percent compliant will be undesirable according to either a real design
team or to any optimizer taking the probability of compliance (𝑃 (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 | 𝑥, ℎ))
into account. Thus, the throttle push mitigation action is of little use in its normally
expected role.
The throttle push mitigation action will still recover scenarios where the vehicle
fails to meet rate of climb (𝑅𝑜𝐶). It can also combine with the fuel capacity mitigation
action to maintain compliance with TOFL under scenarios in which the aircraft needs
additional fuel to meet range.
163
6.4.4 Mitigation Action Summary
Table 4 shows a summary of the mitigation actions to be used in the remainder of this
work. Each of the three mitigation actions discussed above are shown. The constraint
each mitigation action addresses, its primary impact on the aircraft model, and the
applicable limit are also included.
Table 4: Mitigation Actions
Mitigation Action Metric Addressed Parameter Limit
Fuel Increase Design Mission Range MTOW 28,000 lbs
Advanced High Lift Device Approach Speed 𝐶𝐿𝑚𝑎𝑥 0.1
Throttle Push Takeoff Field Length Thrust 5%
It should be noted that the maximum takeoff weight is assessed significantly past
the boundary suggested by Figure 52. This boundary is based on the assumed Equa-
tion (45). In Section 7.5 this assumed equation will be changed, dictating a new
boundary. This will necessitate the additional variability needed in the MTOW vari-
able.
The functional relationship between approach speed (𝑉𝐴𝑝𝑝) and input variables
from Equation (38) is reformulated to account for mitigation actions in Equation (48).
The augmented high lift device mitigation action is designed to directly improve the
approach speed. Additionally, the logic behind the mpty weight variation impacting
the approach speed holds true whether in regards to uncertainty (i.e. 𝑢𝐸𝑊 ) or due to
a penalty on the mitigation actions (𝐸𝑊𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦).
𝑉𝐴𝑝𝑝 = 𝑓 (𝑥, ℎ, 𝑢𝐸𝑊 ,𝑚𝐶𝐿 , 𝐸𝑊𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦) (48)
The functional relationship between the takeoff field length (𝑇𝑂𝐹𝐿) and the in-
put variables from Equation (39) is reformulated to account for mitigation actions in
Equation (49). The additional maximum takeoff weight from the added fuel mitiga-
tion action (𝑚𝑀𝑇𝑂𝑊 ) will degrade the resulting takeoff field length. This means that
the mitigation action could cause constraint violations when used to recover range.
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The throttle push mitigation action (𝑚𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒) will have a direct beneficial effect on
the takeoff field length and may be used to recover scenarios when additional fuel is
required but the takeoff field length is close to its performance constraint.
𝑇𝑂𝐹𝐿 = 𝑓 (𝑥, ℎ,𝑚𝑀𝑇𝑂𝑊 ,𝑚𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒) (49)
The functional relationship between the rate of climb (𝑅𝑜𝐶) and the input vari-
ables from Equation (40) is reformulated to account for mitigation actions in Equa-
tion (50). The throttle push mitigation action will have a direct impact on the thrust
available at the top of climb condition, impacting the excess power available and,
therefore, the rate of climb achievable by the vehicle.
𝑅𝑜𝐶 = 𝑓 (𝑥, ℎ, 𝑢𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑔, 𝑢𝑀𝐷𝐷, 𝑢𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐹 𝑙𝑜𝑤,𝑚𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒) (50)
The range of the vehicle for a design mission (𝑅𝐴𝑁𝐺𝐸) from Equation (42) is
updated in Equation (51) to include the impacts of mitigation variables. The addition
of post-sizing fuel (𝑚𝑀𝑇𝑂𝑊 ) is intended to increase the vehicle’s range simply by
adding more fuel. Any empty weight penalty (𝐸𝑊𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦) on the aircraft will degrade
the vehicle’s range by requiring the aircraft to carry more weight throughout the
mission, leaving less usable fuel weight.
𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 = 𝑓 (𝑥, ℎ, 𝑢𝐸𝑊 , 𝑢𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑔, 𝑢𝑀𝐷𝐷, 𝑢𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐹 𝑙𝑜𝑤,𝑚𝑀𝑇𝑂𝑊 , 𝐸𝑊𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦) (51)
None of the mitigation actions themselves are expected to impact economic range
block fuel (𝐵𝐹𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛) significantly. However, the empty weight penalty (𝐸𝑊𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦)
imposed by these mitigation actions will cause the aircraft to carry more weight
throughout the mission, increasing the lift required to maintain altitude. The in-
crease in lift will increase the drag on the vehicle, increasing the required thrust.
This increase in thrust will require more fuel to be burned. This will alter the func-
tional relationship of economic range block fuel seen in Equation (43) to that seen in
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Equation (52).
𝐵𝐹𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛 = 𝑓 (𝑥, ℎ, 𝑢𝐸𝑊 , 𝑢𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑔, 𝑢𝑀𝐷𝐷, 𝑢𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐹 𝑙𝑜𝑤, 𝐸𝑊𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦) (52)
6.5 Step 5: Select Performance and Reliability Objectives
For this implementation, only performance objectives are used. However, since the
cost to operate the aircraft is a significant factor in the marketability of the vehicle,
a proxy for operating cost will be used - specifically, the block fuel needed for an
“economic range” mission of 4,000 nautical miles.
In an effort to explore different scenarios in this work, multiple settings will be
used for both the probability of compliance (𝑃 (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 | 𝑥, ℎ)) and probability
of success (≻) to generate different results. In general, the probability of compliance
requirement will range between greater than or equal to 75 percent and up to 100
percent. An enforced probably of compliance requirement will never be less than 70
percent in this study. The probability of success requirement will also vary between
greater than or equal to 75 percent and up to 100 percent for studies within this
work. The probability of success requirement will never be set below the probability
of compliance requirement, as this would be meaningless. No reliability requirements
for individual constraints have been imposed for this study.
6.6 Step 6: Establish Design Space
To emulate a reasonable design process, variables which affect different aspects of the
resulting aircraft are needed. In general, it would be beneficial to have some gross
aircraft-level design variables, some engine-related design variables, some wing-related
design variables, and some uncertainty margins. Table 5 lists the conceptual design
variables which have been selected for this study.
The implementation of many of these variables is straightforward. Most aircraft
design tools already have the ability to directly input variables like thrust-to-weight,
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Table 5: Conceptual Design Variables and Impacts
Variable Description Symbol Related Aspect(s)
Design SLS Thrust-to-Weight 𝑇/𝑊 Design, Engine
Design Wing Loading 𝑊/𝑆 Design, Wing
Wing Aspect Ratio 𝐴𝑅 Design, Wing
Engine Lapse Rate LapseRate Design, Engine
Engine Fan Pressure Ratio FPR Engine
Engine Overall Pressure Ratio OPR Engine
Empty Weight Margin ℎ𝐸𝑊 Margin
Drag Margin ℎ𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑔 Margin, Wing
Fuel Flow Margin ℎ𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐹 𝑙𝑜𝑤 Margin, Engine
wing loading, and aspect ratio into either a sizing or performance analysis. An engine
design tool should have the ability to receive thrusts, pressure ratios and lapse rates
either directly or through trivial variable transformations. By linking the two codes
together in a sizing loop, the engine and aircraft can be matched.
The uncertainty margins need to be implemented directly into the aircraft sizing
code. However, care must be taken with these variables. Depending on the analysis
mode, the same variables can behave as either uncertainty margins or as uncertainty
variables, as theorized in Section 3.1. This concept will be further tested in Sec-
tion 4.1. Based on the discussion from Hypothesis 2, these margins must be applied
to the aircraft during the sizing analysis, and their values removed before the perfor-
mance analysis. To successfully implement the uncertainty margins, the aircraft must
be sized with these margins in place. Thus, they will need to be set and input into
the aircraft analysis code during sizing. However, these variables must not impact
the uncertainty variables directly. This concept is further explained in Section 6.7.2.
Ranges were derived relative to the baseline aircraft. Wing loading and lapse
rate were varied by roughly plus or minus five percent of the baseline value. All
other non-margin variables were given a variation of about ten percent of the baseline
value. All ranges were rounded to only a few significant figures. The uncertainty
margin variables were allowed to vary between no margin (0%) up to six-percent
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(6%). Table 6 contains all design variables, their baseline values, and their associated
ranges.
Table 6: Conceptual Design Variables and Ranges
Variable Description Symbol Baseline Minimum Maximum
Design SLS Thrust-to-Weight 𝑇/𝑊 0.296 0.26 0.34
Design Wing Loading 𝑊/𝑆 133.34 126.0 140.0
Wing Aspect Ratio 𝐴𝑅 10 9.0 11.0
Engine Lapse Rate LapseRate 0.2014 0.18 0.22
Engine Fan Pressure Ratio FPR 1.50 1.425 1.575
Engine Overall Pressure Ratio OPR 42.58 38.32 46.84
Empty Weight Margin ℎ𝐸𝑊 3% 0% 6%
Drag Margin ℎ𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑔 3% 0% 6%
Fuel Flow Margin ℎ𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐹 𝑙𝑜𝑤 3% 0% 6%
6.7 Step 7: Create Aircraft Model
A tool or set of tools to model conceptual aircraft design must be selected in order to
demonstrate the ARMOUR methodology. Ideally, this tool should represent the kind
of capabilities that are present in industry-style tools to show ease of implementation
of this methodology as well as any potential challenges.
The ARMOUR method for aircraft conceptual design begins with a modeling
and simulation (M&S) environment for vehicle sizing and performance analysis. It
is assumed that aircraft companies will have their own set of legacy aircraft analy-
sis tools which they will use during conceptual design. Since these tools will vary
between companies and are unavailable for the current research, a tool with similar
constraints will instead be employed. The Flight Optimization System (FLOPS) is
a deterministic computer program created at the NASA Langley Research Center
designed for conceptual and preliminary design of aircraft. [59]
FLOPS can be executed in sizing mode to predict the aircraft size and fuel burn for
a prescribed design mission. In analysis mode, FLOPS will take in a fixed aircraft and
predict response metrics such as approach speed (𝑉𝐴𝑝𝑝), takeoff field length (𝑇𝑂𝐹𝐿),
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and range at design payload (𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒). These modes are consistent with the modeling
tools described in Section 2.1.3. As such, they can be arranged and utilized in either
way described in Section 3.1.3, and thus will be sufficient for the needs of this thesis.
An engine model was constructed in NASA’s Numerical Propulsion System Sim-
ulation (NPSS) tool [66]. This tool was selected because it can both design and
evaluate the performance of a turbofan engine. An engine model was first calibrated
to a GE90-94B engine model [22]. This engine is commonly used on the Boeing 777
[41]. The engine model was altered to show improvements representative of modern
engine advancements (i.e. slightly higher overall pressure ratio, slightly increased
component efficiencies) to generate the new engine baseline. NPSS only calculates
engine thermodynamics; thus, to calculate the physical dimensions and weight of
the engine, another analysis tool was required. Weight Analysis for Turbine Engines
(WATE) is one such engine turbomachinery calculation code [88]. It is heavily in-
tegrated with NPSS, allowing the outputs from NPSS to be directly read as inputs.
WATE is used to calculate the weights and dimensions of the engine. The resulting
engine performance, dimensions, and weight can be input into an aircraft sizing and
analysis tool like FLOPS.
6.7.1 Baseline Aircraft Model
The selection of a baseline vehicle will help to establish appropriate input variable
ranges, responses, and performance constraints for evaluation. For this implemen-
tation, a civil transport aircraft has been selected. The implementation herein will
model a 305 passenger civil transport similar to a Boeing 777-200ER [10, 41]. The
general behavior of this aircraft is well-established in the literature. This class of
vehicle is considered relevant because of its prevalence in the national airspace. Fur-
thermore, future environmental regulations and constant economic pressure will likely
cause a redesign of this vehicle in the future.
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However, this thesis is motivated by the concept of designing a new vehicle and the
associated uncertainty. Calibration to a known vehicle is insufficient because there
is little uncertainty associated with its performance. Instead, the baseline vehicle
concept is modified to emulate a new design baseline. This new design point will be
used as the baseline for all data generation from the physics-based model. Table 7
shows the baseline vehicle information which is used to calibrate the models compared
to a 777-200ER. The calibrated model is used as the reference or baseline point for
generating surrogate models.
Table 7: 300 Passenger Aircraft Baseline Compared to 777-200ER Model[10]
Metric Baseline 777-200ER Units
Capacity 301 301 Passengers
Maximum Take-Off Weight (MTOW) 561,697 656,000 pounds
Operating Weight Empty (OWE) 276,875 302,200 pounds
Maximum Zero Fuel Weight 340,085 430,000 pounds
Maximum Fuel Capacity 33,608 45,200 gallons (U.S.)
Maximum Fuel Capacity 224,754 302,270 pounds
Maximum Structural Payload 125,550 125,550 pounds
Design Mission Range 7,530 7,530 nautical miles
Payload (Passengers + Baggage) 63,210 63,210 pounds
Wing Span 196.3 199.9 feet
Sea Level Static Thrust per Engine 83,300 93,700 pounds of force
Cruise Mach 0.84 0.84 N/A
6.7.2 Detailed Modeling Changes
In order to determine the aircraft performance, the vehicle must first be sized. The
model sizing analysis is shown in Figure 55. First the model must take in a design
point from the Design of Experiments. This design point will contain a specific setting
of design variables (𝑥) and uncertainty margins (ℎ). Along with the range requirement
(𝑅𝐷𝑒𝑠), this information is all that will be needed to size the vehicle so that a fixed
vehicle can be input into later analyses.
The engine thermodynamic sizing step takes in this design point and designs
the engine using the Numerical Propulsion System Simulation (NPSS) code. Once
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Figure 55: Model Sizing Logic
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the thermodynamics of the engine have been determined, a structural analysis of
the engine is performed by the Weight Analysis of Turbine Engines (WATE). A
convergence check is performed to ensure that the two code outputs describe the
same engine and that assumptions made during the thermodynamic analysis were
supported by the turbomachinery analysis.
After a converged engine solution has been created, the aircraft mission analysis
can be performed by the FLight OPtimization System (FLOPS). In this analysis
the range requirement (𝑅𝐷𝑒𝑠) dictates the size of the vehicle, given the design point
specified by the DoE. The aircraft mission analysis will attempt to match the fuel
required for the design mission to the fuel available within the aircraft geometry. If
these two values do not match, the aircraft code will continue to resize the gross
weight and geometry of the vehicle until they are consistent.
After the aircraft converges to a given size, the engine is scaled to match. Since
the thrust-to-weight ratio (𝑇/𝑊 ) is specified as a design input, the engine thrust will
be scaled to a fixed ratio with respect to the final sized maximum takeoff gross weight
(𝑀𝑇𝑂𝑊 ). Should the engine be scaled more than a small amount, the model will
return to the engine thermodynamic analysis to reassess the new engine. If the engine
thrust output from the mission analysis matches the thrust from the engine sizing,
the vehicle is considered sized. This vehicle configuration is “fixed” in place from this
point forward. The fixed vehicle is then output to the performance analysis.
The performance analysis within the model is used to generate the responses
necessary to generate surrogate models. The process used to evaluate the vehicle
performance is shown in Figure 56. The vehicle output from the sizing module is
fixed, meaning that its dimensions and overall maximum weights no longer change.
Next, the margins (ℎ) implemented during sizing are removed from the vehicle. The
rationalization behind this step is discussed in detail in Section 3.2.
Once the margins have been removed from the fixed vehicle, a specific uncertainty
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Figure 56: Model Performance Logic
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scenario (𝑢) is brought in from the DoE. This uncertainty scenario is implemented,
altering the performance of the fixed vehicle from what was initially sized. A fixed
engine analysis is then performed using NPSS and WATE. Once the new engine
performance is determined, this information is given to the fixed aircraft analysis
FLOPS model and the performance responses from the aircraft analysis are recorded.
These responses will be functions of the design variables (𝑥), the uncertainty margins
(ℎ), and the uncertainty scenario investigated (𝑢).
Next, a level for each of the mitigation actions (𝑚) is read from the Design of
Experiments. This mitigation action setting is implemented in the fixed vehicle model.
A level of mitigation penalty (𝑝) also comes from the DoE, and this value is input
into the vehicle model. The engine is run again in an off-design mode to calculate
any changes in thrust and fuel flow performance that result. A fixed aircraft analysis
is then executed to evaluate the response behavior after the mitigation actions have
been implemented. Finally, the performance responses are recorded. These responses
are functions of all input parameters to the model, including the mitigation actions
and penalties.
6.8 Step 8: Create Surrogate Models
It was known a priori that at least one of the responses from the aircraft analysis
code could not be fit sufficiently using a response surface equation. Thus, an Artificial
Neural Network (ANN) described in Section 2.6.2 was selected as the surrogate model
type to represent the behavior of the responses. This type of surrogate model is good
at emulating responses which are non-linear with respect to the input variables. The
neural networks were generated using the Basic Regression Analysis for Integrated
Neural Networks (BRAINN) [42]. As such, a large space-filling design of experiments
was needed. A normalized Design of Experiments was constructed using the variables
and ranges defined in Sections 6.2 to 6.4. MATLAB’s lhsdesign function was used
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to generate a Latin Hypercube design with 20,000 cases for the 17 variables. 5,0000
random cases were generated to allow for goodness of fit testing of the surrogate
models. The normalized Design of Experiments was converted to the appropriate
ranges for each of the design, uncertainty, and mitigation variables in a Microsoft
Excel spreadsheet. This resulting DoE was fed into the deterministic aircraft analysis
code described in Step 7.
Surrogate models were then generated using this data. These surrogate models
are substituted into Figures 49 to 51 to replace all aircraft performance analyses with
the resulting equations. Goodness of fit metrics were generated for each surrogate
model and are included in Appendix B.
6.9 Step 9: Create Uncertainty Quantification & Manage-
ment Environment
The uncertainty quantification and management environment described in Section 5.9
has been developed and implemented in a MATLAB coding environment. The actual
code employed in these studies is included in Appendix C. As this environment con-
stitutes the core of the ARMOUR methodology, it synthesizes information from all
of the previous steps. The range of variability for the design variables and margins
were established as indicated by Table 5.
Uncertainty variables were initialized and their ranges limited as indicated by
Table 3. The uncertainty distributions elicited during Step 3 were then input into
the environment. Samples were drawn from these distributions for analysis. For this
study, a 4-by-10000 array of pseudo random numbers was generated in MATLAB.
Since the uncertainty distributions used in this study were independent uniform dis-
tributions, this array was scaled to fit the upper and lower bounds of the uncertainty
variables listed in Table 3. Other uncertainty distribution types including triangular,
truncated normal, and correlated uniform were implemented but not used in any of
the final analyses.
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The range of mitigation actions was established based on Table 4. Additionally,
a weight penalty function was constructed which penalized the aircraft for both the
post-sizing fuel addition mitigation action and the augmented high-lift device mitiga-
tion action. The individual penalties for each mitigation action from Equations (45)
and (47) were both assessed and added together to achieve the final penalty imposed
on the design.
Once these basics had been established, a global optimizer was initialized which
operated on the design variables and margins. For this study, a genetic algorithm
intrinsic to MATLAB (ga(x)) was be used as the global optimizer. It attempted to
find a design point which minimizes the expected block fuel for economic range as
specified during Step 5. Also, the global optimizer was be constrained to meet or
exceed all reliability objective established during step 5.
The aircraft performance was then evaluated via the surrogate models to assess
the probability of compliance (𝑃 (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 | 𝑥, ℎ)) of the fixed vehicle as well as
the expected block fuel needs for an economic range mission (E[𝐵𝐹𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛]). The sur-
rogate models developed in Step 8 were used in place of direct calls to the aircraft
analysis code to speed up the analysis. The design and margin settings selected by the
optimizer, along with the uncertainty distributions generated earlier, were then input
into the surrogate models. MATLAB’s element-wise math was used to evaluate all of
the uncertainty scenarios simultaneously for the given design point. The results from
the surrogate models were then compared to the performance constraints in Table 2
which were established in Step 2. Using Equation (17), a probability of compliance
was calculated for the given design. The set of uncertainty scenarios which constitute
the failed set (𝑢 ∈ 𝑈𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙) were selected via Equation (15). This set of uncertainty
scenarios were then given to the mitigation analysis.
The mitigation analysis took in the failed uncertainty scenarios (𝑢 ∈ 𝑈𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙) and
evaluated these scenarios for possible recovery through mitigation actions. A selected
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set of mitigation actions were created for evaluation. Multiple options were considered
for this mitigation evaluation, as detailed in Section 7.4. For most of the results in
Chapter 7, the “Hybrid (1D and Random)1” set of mitigation scenarios was employed.
With the set of mitigation scenarios defined, a for loop was established to evaluate
each mitigation scenario in turn. For each mitigation scenario, the performance re-
sponses were evaluated simultaneously for all failed uncertainty scenarios (𝑢 ∈ 𝑈𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙)
using MATLAB’s element-wise math. All performance metrics were compared to
their respective constraints for each uncertainty scenario. Whenever a mitigation
action caused an uncertainty scenario to comply with all constraints simultaneously,
this scenario was considered recovered as defined by Equation (19).
Whenever a scenario was recovered, the economic range mission block fuel for that
scenario was recorded. If no other mitigation action had yet recovered that scenario,
this block fuel would be preserved for use in the final objective constraint calculation
from Equation (25). This calculation has been modified into Equation (53) to consider
the specific needs of this implementation. If another set of mitigation actions were
successful in recovering the failed uncertainty scenario (𝑢 ∈ 𝑈𝐹𝑎𝑖𝑙), then the resulting
block fuel from these two scenarios was compared and the lower of the two values was
kept for use in the objective constraint calculation.
Once all samples were drawn, the overall probability of success was calculated us-
ing Equation (24). Also, the expected block fuel for the economic mission (E[𝐵𝐹 (𝑥)])
was evaluated via Equation (53). These values were then returned to the optimizer.
E[𝐵𝐹 (𝑥)] =
∫︀
𝑢∈𝐴 𝐵𝐹 (𝑥, ℎ, 𝑢, 0) 𝑑𝑢+
∫︀
𝑢∈𝐴𝑀






The expected block fuel required for the economic range mission (E[𝐵𝐹𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛]) was
used as the objective function of the optimizer. This optimizer attempted to select
a design (𝑥, ℎ) in order to minimize the expected block fuel. Again, the probability
1Defined in Section 7.4.3.
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of success constraint ensured that the probabilistic performance did not fall below
the specified threshold. The optimizer input new settings of design variables (𝑥) and
uncertainty margins (ℎ) into the vehicle sizing algorithm to attempt to minimize the
expected block fuel while maintaining a level of success. Once the optimum was
found, the design point (𝑥, ℎ) was recorded and reported back to the user along with
the final objective value and the full set of reliability measures.
6.10 Step 10: Execute UQ&M Environment
Executing the Uncertainty Quantification and Management environment is as simple
as running a MATLAB script and waiting for the code to finish. The resulting
design(s) will meet or exceed the reliability targets specified in Step 5, within a
tolerance established in the optimizer created during Step 9. For the studies located
in Section 7.7, the UQ&M environment was modified to take in an array of reliability
targets and return a set of designs which met each target in sequence. This allowed
for the construction of a set of designs, each with different reliability targets and
expected block fuels, from which a designer could select the aircraft deemed most
appropriate for further development.
6.11 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, an implementation of the step-by-step ARMOUR methodology de-
scribed in Chapter 5 was adapted to fit the specific needs of the design of a large
civil transport aircraft. Variables, constraints, and mitigation actions were discussed
along with applicable ranges. The design objectives were selected to constrain the
resulting optimized solution. Existing physics-based design tools formed the founda-
tion of this analysis. An uncertainty quantification and management environment was
constructed in MATLAB using surrogates of the aircraft sizing and performance anal-
yses. This environment will be exercised in Chapter 7 to glean additional information




Now that the methodology developed in Chapter 5 has been instantiated using the
specific implementation from Chapter 6, a number of studies can be performed to
glean insight into an aircraft design process which considers design uncertainty with
recovery through mitigation actions. The first two studies in Sections 7.2 and 7.3
investigate the impact of uncertainty margins on the two of the reliability measures
used in this work, probability of compliance and probability of recovery. Section 7.5
explores the impact of penalties imposed on mitigation actions on the probability of
recovery for designs. The design and margin space is explored in Section 7.6. The
results of the design space exploration are compared to a set of optimized Pareto
frontiers in Section 7.7.
7.1 Margin Implementation Testing
Section 3.2 discussed a desire to quantitatively set margins to achieve a probability
of compliance in Research Question 2.
Research Question 2 Is it possible to select a desired probability of com-
pliance and then quantitatively determine a level of margin which will yield
that probability of compliance?
Previous uncertainty quantification methods have implemented performance tar-
get setting, which is conceptually similar to uncertainty margins. Thus, it was as-
sumed that uncertainty margins could be implemented in a probabilistic framework.
This implementation would determine the probability of compliance based on a set-
ting of uncertainty margins. Further, this framework should allow for the selection of
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uncertainty margins based on a particular desired level of probability of compliance.
This concept was formalized in Hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 2 By including an uncertainty margin during the sizing pro-
cess and removing it (but not its effect) before the uncertainty analysis,
the impact of margin on the probability of compliance can be seen. Using
an optimizer, it will be straight-forward to determine an appropriate level
of margin to achieve a desired probability of compliance.
A partial form of the final implementation established in Chapter 6 is used to
test the impact of assessing uncertainty margins in an uncertainty quantification
environment. Using this partial implementation, a baseline vehicle was assessed to
determine its expected performance and probability of compliance. This baseline
vector and its performance is tabulated in Table 8.















Once the baseline performance is established, the levels of margins were adjusted,
leaving all other design variables constant. Uncertainty margins input sweeping from
no margin up to seven percent margin over the code-predicted values. All three mar-
gins were kept at equal levels, as they were changed. Figure 57 shows the probability
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of compliance for the baseline design at different settings of uncertainty margins.
Along the x-axis is the margin value assigned to all three uncertainty margins. The
blue line corresponds to the resulting probability of compliance on the y-axis, resulting
from the reliability assessment.
Figure 57: Baseline Compliance versus Margin
Using an optimizer to adjust all three uncertainty margins simultaneously indi-
cates that to achieve an 80 percent probability of compliance (𝑃 (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 | 𝑥, ℎ))
with equal margin values, uncertainty margins should be set at 3.336 percent. This
will result in roughly 550 lbs increase in the expected economic range block fuel
(𝐸[𝐵𝐹𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛]).
This conclusion already meets the minimum goals necessary to support Hypoth-
esis 2. However, much more can be accomplished by including margins in the uncer-
tainty quantification environment.
Using the established margin, an optimizer was used to select the best determin-
istic design, as might be done in a standard conceptual design study. The optimizer
was allowed to select any combination of design variables with the goal of achieving
a minimum deterministic economic range block fuel for that design. Analyzing this
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new design through the uncertainty quantification environment showed that the new
deterministic design had improved the expected economic range block fuel by 8,360
lbs, but the probability of compliance had dropped to 48.4 percent.
Using this new deterministic design, the optimizer was again used, allowing un-
certainty margins only to change. This optimizer was given access to the reliability
analysis and asked to minimize expected block fuel while achieving a probability of
compliance of 80 percent. This new “Opt Margin” design based on the deterministic
optimization design was able to meet the probability of compliance goal by increasing
uncertainty margins, but it increased the expected economic block fuel by 2,200 lbs.
As a final point of comparison, the optimizer was allowed to vary both design vari-
ables and uncertainty margins. The optimizer attempted to find the lowest expected
block fuel while still being restricted to a resulting design with 80 percent probability
of compliance. This final “Full Optimization” design achieved the lowest expected
block fuel while still meeting the probability of compliance goal. A summary of these
results and the corresponding design vectors is contained within Table 9.
Table 9: Margin Optimization Test Results
Parameter Baseline Deterministic Opt Margin Full Optimization
TWR 0.2962 0.2686 0.2686 0.2638
WSR 133.34 137.71 137.71 135.09
AR 10.0 10.79 10.79 11.00
LapseRate 0.2014 0.206 0.206 0.2089
FPR 1.50 1.5198 1.5198 1.5625
OPR 42.58 46.635 46.635 46.838
ℎ𝐸𝑊 0.030 0.034 0.0446 0.0225
ℎ𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑔 1.030 1.034 1.0427 1.0447
ℎ𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐹 𝑙𝑜𝑤 1.030 1.034 1.0457 1.0428
Compliance 71.5% 48.4% 80.0% 81.3%
𝐵𝐹𝐷𝑒𝑡 227,834 214,892 223,527 215,870
𝐸[𝐵𝐹𝐷𝑒𝑠] 223,478 207,704 210,212 205,714
𝐸[𝐵𝐹𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛] 115,526 107,721 109,389 106,727
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7.2 Relationship between Margin and Compliance
It would be easy to assume that, in general, increasing uncertainty margins would lead
to an increased chance that the resulting design would be compliant with all imposed
constraints. Using the methodology as implemented in Chapter 6, this idea can be
investigated to test how true it may be. To test this concept, margins will be varied
for individual designs to investigate the impact on the probability of compliance.
Further, a design space exploration will be performed to investigate whether overall
trends exist for the entire design space.
7.2.1 Investigating Individual Designs
Table 10 demonstrates the individual designs investigated in Figures 58 and 59. These
designs differ from each other, greatly for some design variables, but they demonstrate
similar levels of performance when viewed from a high level. Of particular note is
that the designs have very different levels of uncertainty margin for all three variables
(ℎ𝐸𝑊 , ℎ𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑔, and ℎ𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐹 𝑙𝑜𝑤). Despite these differences, the designs have a similar
probabilities of compliance and expected block fuel performance.
Table 10: Designs to Investigate Margin vs. Compliance













The trend of probability of compliance with respect to individual margin changes
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were investigated for each design individually. Each design investigated was based
off either Design 1 or Design 2 from Table 10. A sweep of each uncertainty margin
(ℎ𝐸𝑊 , ℎ𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑔, and ℎ𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐹 𝑙𝑜𝑤) was constructed, varying each margin from as low as
no change from the deterministic code prediction up to a 10% increase over the
deterministic prediction. These resulting designs were input into the the aircraft
assessment implementation developed in Chapter 6 without any optimization in order
to evaluate the performance of each individual design. The probability of compliance
for each resulting design was recorded.
Figure 58 shows the impact of changing individual margins for Design 1. Using
this design as a baseline, only one margin variable is changed at a time while all
other variables are left at the setting from Table 10. Each assessment performs a
sizing analysis to determine the new dimensions of the resulting aircraft. Following
this, the frozen aircraft is assessed for a large number of uncertainty scenarios to
accurately determine the probability of success. The three different lines all represent
a set of designs, each with a different margin being changed. These margins are
swept from no margin (1.0) to ten percent margin (1.1) on the x-axis. The y-axis
shows the corresponding probability of compliance for the resulting aircraft. For
each line, the baseline setting of the margin for Design 1 are shown by the symbol
corresponding symbol. It should be apparent that all three symbols correspond to the
same probability of compliance as Design 1 in Table 10. The empty weight margin
(ℎ𝐸𝑊 ) is shown in blue. Increasing values of this margin cause the probability of
compliance to monotonically increase from 81.7 percent compliance to full compliance
with all constraints. The red line shows the impact of varying the drag margin (ℎ𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑔).
Again, increasing values of this margin cause a monotonic increase in the probability
of compliance, this time from about 35 percent to 99 percent. The green line shows
similar trends for the engine fuel flow margin (ℎ𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐹 𝑙𝑜𝑤). Increasing values of this
margin also show a monotonic increase from a very low 13 percent up to 95 percent.
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Figure 58: Probability of Compliance vs. Margin for Design 1
For Design 1, increasing margins lead to an overall increase in the probability of
compliance. The primary active constraint for this design was range, so the result
that increasing margin will improve the probability of compliance would be expected.
Figure 59 shows the behavior of varying uncertainty margins for Design 2 from
Table 10. Just as in Figure 58, a sweep was performed for each margin separately,
varying values from no margin to ten percent margin along the x-axis. The corre-
sponding probability of compliance for each design is shown on the y-axis. The three
margins, empty weight margin (ℎ𝐸𝑊 ), drag margin (ℎ𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑔), and engine fuel flow mar-
gin (ℎ𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐹 𝑙𝑜𝑤), are shown in blue, red, and green, respectively. Their baseline values
from Design 2 are indicated by their respective symbol, and also all correspond to De-
sign 2’s probability of compliance of 83.7 percent. For low values of margins, it once
again appears that increasing margin leads to increased probability of compliance;
however, this trend does not continue indefinitely. For both empty weight margin
and drag margin, a point is reached at which the probability of compliance no longer
improves. Instead, the probability of compliance drops instantaneously to zero. For
empty weight margin (ℎ𝐸𝑊 ) this occurs at about seven percent margin. For drag
185
(ℎ𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑔) this precipitous drop occurs at nine percent margin.
Figure 59: Probability of Compliance vs. Margin for Design 2
Looking at detailed results of the analysis, it can be seen that a wing span con-
straint is becoming active. The reason that compliance drops instantaneously rather
than being a smooth slope as with the rise of compliance for lower margin values is
that span is fixed after the sizing loop. Because span is fixed before any knowledge
is gained about the uncertainty variables, it cannot be affected by changes in their
values. Thus, there is no uncertainty associated with the aircraft’s compliance with
that constraint. The probability of compliance simply drops to zero after the aircraft
reaches a certain size. Because the aircraft is sized with these margins imposed, as the
margins increase so does the maximum takeoff weight and size of the vehicle. Since
the wing loading (WSR) is being held constant for a design, the wing area increases
as margins increase. This increased wing area leads to an increased in wing span.
A conclusion which could be drawn already from these two examples is that higher
levels of margin do not always equate to a higher probability of compliance with per-
formance constraints. In this manner the relationship between margins and perfor-
mance metrics mimics that of any other design variable.
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7.2.2 Design Space Exploration
Rather than continuing to look at many individual designs separately, it will be more
helpful to try to examine a large portion of the design space. To enable this visual-
ization, an exploration of all design variables and uncertainty margins was performed
via Monte Carlo Simulation, generating 50,000 different designs. For each resulting
design, the process described in Chapter 6 was executed to determine the probability
of compliance for the design.
Examining the data from this large exploration of designs simultaneously proved
difficult. Instead, designs were binned based on their three margin values. The designs
were separated into a total of 125 bins – 5 for each independent margin dimension
(ℎ𝐸𝑊 , ℎ𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑔, and ℎ𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐹 𝑙𝑜𝑤). With the bins established and the designs sorted, an
average was taken of the probabilities of compliance seen across the designs within
each bin. This average compliance was then plotted against each of the uncertainty
margins.
Figure 60 shows the results for one of these uncertainty margin bins. This chart
plots the average probability of compliance on the y-axis versus the empty weight
margin (ℎ𝐸𝑊 ) on the x-axis, varying between no margin and ten percent margin.
The chart only shows roughly 2,000 of the 50,000 designs – the ones which have both
a drag margin between zero and two percent as well as a fuel flow margin between
zero and two percent. Each dot represents a bin of roughly 400 different designs
which all have about the same values individually for each of the three uncertainty
margins. For each bin, the probability of compliance was averaged across all designs.
This average probability of compliance for each bin is plotted as a dot on the chart,
located horizontally at its empty weight margin bin. A curve is fit through these data
points to aid the viewer’s eye in seeing trends. The result is an ability to see the
average behavior of probability of compliance versus the empty weight margin for a
particular bin of drag and fuel flow margins.
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Figure 60: Average Compliance vs. Empty Weight Margin
Examining each combination of these plots individually would take significant time
and energy. In an attempt to look at the entire space simultaneously, individual plots
like Figure 60 are shown as a large grid of plots in Figure 61. This resulting plot gives
the ability to examine the average compliance versus all three margins simultaneously.
Just as with the Figure 60, each subplot of Figure 61 represents a subset of about
2,000 of the 50,000 designs which correspond to a combination of drag margin (ℎ𝐸𝑊 )
and fuel flow margin (ℎ𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐹 𝑙𝑜𝑤). The first plot in the top left only contains designs
which have both a drag margin between zero and two percent as well as a fuel flow
margin between zero and two percent, just like Figure 60. Moving to the right, each
plot shows a different 2,000 designs which have progressively two percent higher drag
than the one to its left. The designs in subplot all the way to the right on the top
has a drag margin between eight and ten percent and a fuel flow margin between zero
and two percent. Going down, each progressive subplot has 2,000 different designs
with about two percent more drag margin than the plot above it. Thus, the subplot
on the bottom right has a fuel flow margin between eight percent and ten percent as
well as a drag margin between eight percent and ten percent. Each individual plot
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is identical in implementation to Figure 60. In it, each dot represents the average
behavior of about 400 designs, each of which have the same empty weight margin,
drag margin, and fuel flow margin. The empty weight margin is plotted on the x-axis
versus the average probability of compliance for this set of designs on the y-axis.
Figure 61: Average Compliance vs. Uncertainty Margins
Examining Figure 61 leads to the following generalizations. When all margins are
small, increasing any margin tends to improve the average probability of compliance
of the design space. However, there appears to be a limit to this behavior which causes
margins to lose effectiveness. Indeed, when any margin or combination of margins
are at a high value, further increasing margin tends to degrade the probability of
compliance of the design space. Neither of these statements are surprising considering
the contrast in single design examples shown in Section 7.2.1. However, the knowledge
that those trends would generally hold for the design space could not be deduced from
merely two designs.
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7.3 Relationship between Margin and Recovery
It will also be beneficial to examine whether there exists a relationship between the
probability of recovery and uncertainty margins. As with the probability of compli-
ance, it will be helpful to examine the design space. Since the requirements were
similar, the same 50,000 point Monte Carlo simulation of designs was used to con-
struct this evaluation. The probability of recovery was estimated using 250 random
search mitigation actions for each design.
The designs were once again binned based on their margins. The designs were
separated into a total of 125 bins – 5 for each independent margin dimension (ℎ𝐸𝑊 ,
ℎ𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑔, and ℎ𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐹 𝑙𝑜𝑤), corresponding to two percent increments. With the bins estab-
lished and the designs sorted, an average was taken of the probabilities of recovery
seen across the designs within each bin. This average recovery is plotted against each
of the uncertainty margins.
To examine the average probability of recovery versus all three uncertainty margins
for the entire design space, Figure 62 was created. This resulting plot gives the ability
to examine the average recovery versus all three margins simultaneously. Just as with
the Figure 61, each subplot of Figure 62 represents a subset of about 2,000 of the
50,000 designs which correspond to a combination of drag margin (ℎ𝐸𝑊 ) and fuel flow
margin (ℎ𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐹 𝑙𝑜𝑤). The first plot in the top left only contains designs which have both
a drag margin between zero and two percent as well as a fuel flow margin between
zero and two percent. Moving to the right, each plot shows a different 2,000 designs
which have progressively two percent higher drag than the one to its left. The designs
in subplot all the way to the right on the top has a drag margin between eight percent
and ten percent and a fuel flow margin between zero and two percent. Going down,
each progressive subplot has 2,000 different designs with about two percent more drag
margin than the plot above it. Thus, the subplot on the bottom right has a fuel flow
margin between eight percent and ten percent as well as a drag margin between eight
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percent and ten percent. Each individual plot is identical in implementation. In a
plot, each dot represents the average probability of recovery behavior of about 400
designs, each of which have the same empty weight margin, drag margin, and fuel
flow margin. The empty weight margin is plotted on the x-axis versus the average
probability of recovery for this set of designs on the y-axis.
Figure 62: Average Recovery vs. Uncertainty Margins
Examining Figure 62 reveals similar trends to those shown when investigating the
average probability of compliance. It appears the increasing margins improve the
probability of recovery when margins are low, and that they degrade the probability
of recovery when margins are high. However, it is possible that this effect is at least
in part due to the effect of these trends existing in the compliance space.
To determine how much of the effects seen in Figure 62 are a result of the proba-
bility of compliance, all designs with a probability compliance of less than 50 percent
were removed. This left about 11,000 designs remaining of the original 50,000. This
data was binned like before and is plotted in Figure 63. Each data point is still
the result of the designs which fit into a bin corresponding to a combination of drag
margin (ℎ𝐸𝑊 ) and fuel flow margin (ℎ𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐹 𝑙𝑜𝑤). The first plot in the top left only
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contains designs which have both a drag fuel flow margins between zero and two
percent. Moving to the right, each plot shows a different set of designs which have
progressively two percent higher drag than the one to its left. Going down, each pro-
gressive subplot contains different designs with about two percent more drag margin
than the plot above it. In addition to the dimensions present before, a “hot body”
color scale has been included which indicates the number of cases which occur in each
bin going from yellow to red to black. The darker the data point, the more designs
which exist in that margin bin which met the 50 percent probability of compliance
limit. Each dot represents as few as 1 design in yellow and as many as 200 different
designs in black. Each dot still represents the average probability of recovery of the
remaining designs, each of which have the same empty weight margin, drag margin,
and fuel flow margin as well as a probability of compliance greater than 50 percent.
The empty weight margin is plotted on the x-axis versus the average probability of
recovery for this set of designs on the y-axis.
Figure 63: Average Recovery vs. Uncertainty Margins > 50% 𝑃 (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 | 𝑥, ℎ)
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Figure 63 illustrates that, in general, increasing margins remain effective at im-
proving the probability of recovery at higher values of margin than before. This
indicates that IF the increase in a margin does not cause the design to decrease in
compliance due to a constraint becoming active, the average probability of recovery
will increase with increasing margin.
There still appears to be a drop off to this trend at very high margins. How-
ever, the trends become volatile due to the lack of observable designs which met the
probability of compliance limit in those regions. The lack of data makes it difficult
to make concrete conclusions about the trend of probability of recovery with respect
to uncertainty margins for extremely high values of those uncertainty margins. This
may not be of particular concern, since the results Section 7.2.1 indicated that the
probability of compliance is generally low in this region. Coupled with the fact that
excessive margins lead to larger, higher-weight aircraft, this implies that this region
is likely not of particular interest to a designer, anyways.
7.4 Method for Mitigation Space Exploration
Now that Hypothesis 3 has been supported, it will be helpful to investigate what
method should be used to determine the appropriate level of mitigation for each
failed uncertainty scenario. This assessment will need to accurately determine the
probability of recovery for a given design by investigating the mitigation options for
different uncertainty scenarios.
Recall that this part of the analysis occurs very late within the methodology.
Because this entire analysis will need to be called separately for each uncertainty sce-
nario, the number of function calls to the constraint evaluations at this level has a very
large impact on the total number of function calls required. Thus, even an efficient
optimizer implemented here could balloon the required analysis time to a prohibitive
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level, rendering the entire methodology impractical. Rather than simply implement-
ing an optimizer to find a solution separately for each uncertainty scenario, it would
be beneficial to examine the requirements of the mitigation space and determine if
an optimizer is even required.
The primary concern at this level is to determine the probability of recovery. Thus,
it may not be necessary to minimize the level of mitigation applied. Indeed, all that
is required is a determination of whether a combination of mitigation actions exists
that can bring a failed uncertain scenario back into compliance.
It is unhelpful and somewhat nonsensical to try to define a “level of mitigation
action” at the design level. Each successful recovery through mitigation actions may
have a specific “level” associated with it; however, this is specific to not only the design
but also to the specific uncertainty scenario under investigation. Since a breadth of
uncertainty scenarios are assessed for each design, there will also be a breadth of
mitigation levels associated with the given design. For some designs it may even be
possible to have multiple active constraints, changing with the uncertainty scenarios,
which will lead to completely different mitigation actions being used to recover the
vehicle. Additionally, the mitigation actions are only used after a design has failed
due to a specific uncertainty scenario.
Some information which is helpful to a designer is the likelihood of whether a
given design can be recovered if it does fail. During the Conceptual Design phase, the
aircraft gross design parameters are being selected. The mitigation actions will be
used if and only if the inherent uncertainty in the design process causes the aircraft
to fail to meet its goals. Whether the mitigation action will even be needed will not
be known until the scenario specific to this aircraft is known, which will occur well
after the Conceptual Design phase is completed.
Instead, by examining all possible scenarios, some insight can be gained into the
probabilities of events occurring for each design. This information of this broad
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behavior across the uncertainty space will be helpful in deciding which design to
select. The results of any specific scenario are less useful at this stage when compared
to this more general information.
Planning for specific failures is less useful than knowing how likely it is that a
design will comply with all performance constraints and how likely it is that the
design can be recovered through the available mitigation actions.
Additionally, detailed knowledge of the “mitigation level” may be dangerous in
the wrong hands. The concept of a mitigation action is to fix a design if and only
if it is going to fail. Mitigation actions are by their very nature less desirable than
simply changing the selected design point. Indeed, if they were more efficient than a
design variable, they should be used as such.
Having this knowledge before it is necessary and without appropriate context may
lead to an attempt to pre-mitigate a design, which is not intended. Implementing
a mitigation action during Conceptual Design would simply be another way of re-
designing the vehicle. Since mitigation actions are expected to be less efficient than
selecting a new design point, this would degrade the design, potentially unnecessarily.
This may also have some unintended consequences, since it is not the process which
the proposed method models.
Instead, this information is intended to inform the design team. While this method
is bringing probabilistic information forward from the Preliminary Design stage, it
cannot change the fact that the decisions being made are during Conceptual Design.
Indeed, the team need not make Preliminary Design decisions at this stage. Instead,
whether or not to mitigate can wait until more information is known later on in the
design process.
Additionally, the minimum amount of mitigation action will always be very near
zero. For any design which has some non-zero and non-unity probability of com-
pliance, there will be some uncertain scenarios under which the design will fail to
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meet some constraints and some other scenarios under which the design does meet
all constraints. At the boundary between these regions, scenarios will exist where
the design just barely fails to meet a design constraint. In this situation, the design
will be so near to meeting the constraints that the amount of mitigation action will
be trivial. Thus, quantifying a minimum amount of mitigation would be trivial and
unhelpful information for the designer.
To determine the actual recovery of a design, a “truth model” was established. In
this mode, 10,000 random search mitigation points were used to acquire a very accu-
rate estimate of the design’s probability of recovery. All other recovery estimates will
be compared to this “truth model” in order to determine their accuracy at estimating
the probability of recovery.
7.4.1 Recovery via Random Search
Another viable method to find the probability for investigating the mitigation space
would be to use a random search. This method has already been shown to be signifi-
cantly faster and about as accurate as employing an optimizer. If a random search is
to be used for selecting mitigation actions, a number of search cases must be selected.
To decrease the required run time, a minimum number of search points will be de-
sired. Conversely, a large number of points may be necessary in order to correctly
estimate the probability of recovery. In order to determine the appropriate number of
cases which balance these two competing goals, a series of tests will be formulated to
evaluate both the accuracy of the recovery estimate and the execution time required.
A large number of uncertainty scenarios will be used to ensure that the uncertainty
space was fully explored. To ensure that the different number of mitigation search
points can be compared fairly, the same uncertainty scenarios will be used for each
design. This is accomplished by giving MATLAB’s random number generator the
same seed immediately before the uncertainty scenarios are generated. Following the
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generation of all scenarios, the random number generator is reset to a seed based on
the computer’s internal clock.
The impact of the number of random mitigation search points on the probability
of recovery estimate was first investigated using individual designs. Designs were
randomly selected after screening for those which had both some non-zero probability
of compliance and some non-zero probability of recovery. Table 11 shows two example
designs which will be initially evaluated to help determine an appropriate number of
random search mitigation cases.
Table 11: Designs to Assess Mitigation Accuracy










𝑃 (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒) 64.59% 50.29%
𝑃 (𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠) 72.81% 75.86%
𝑃 (𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦) 8.22% 25.56%
To evaluate how many random search points are necessary to accurately estimate
the probability of recovery, the methodology was executed independently multiple
times. Each evaluation would be executed with a different number of random search
cases. These evaluations would be compared against each other to determine the
best combination of accuracy and speed. Since the number of random search cases
required was unknown, a large range was established between as few as five (5) and as
many as one thousand (1,000) random search cases. Since a random search operates
on the same principle as a Monte Carlo simulation described in Section 2.4.1, the
amount of error in the recovery estimate was expected to decrease with the square
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root of the number of cases. Thus, running numbers of cases in linear increments
seemed inappropriate. To cover the gambit of cases, a hand-made log-like scale was
implemented. The number of random cases executed for the following run of the
methodology would either double (e.g. from 5 to 10) or multiply by two-and-a-half
(e.g. from 100 to 250) from the number of cases random search mitigation cases
previously executed.
Table 12: Number of Random Search Mitigation Cases to Execute
Mitigation Search Method Run 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Random Cases 5 10 25 50 100 250 500 1000
Using this set of runs, the methodology was executed to determine the estimated
probability of recovery under each set of mitigation search cases. Figure 64 shows
the rate of convergence of the recovery estimate towards the probability of recovery
predicted by the truth model for Design 1 from Table 11. On the y-axis is the
predicted probability of recovery for a particular execution. On the x-axis is the
number of random mitigation search cases used to acquire the estimate. The blue
line shows the trend of the recovery estimate compared to the red dotted line which
was the recovery found in the truth model. This figure shows that the probability of
recovery converges to within half a percent of the actual value by 50 random search
mitigation cases.
Figure 65 shows the results of this set of random mitigation search executions on
Design 2. The number of random mitigation search cases from Table 12 is shown on
the x-axis versus the resulting probability of recovery estimate on the y-axis. The blue
line represents the recovery estimate for Design 2 while the red dotted line shows the
recovery seen in the truth model. This figure shows that the probability of recovery
converges to within half a percent of the actual value by 100 random search mitigation
cases.
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Figure 64: Recovery Estimate vs. Number of Mitigation Search Cases - Design 1
Figure 65: Recovery Estimate vs. Number of Mitigation Search Cases - Design 2
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Examining the rate of convergence of the probability of recovery estimate for in-
dividual designs will quickly become tedious. Instead, it would be helpful to examine
the design space. Statistics can be generated based on the number of random search
cases to determine an appropriate number of mitigation cases to use for further anal-
yses. A common way of graphically displaying statistical data about distributions is
a box-and-whisker plot or box plot. The left side of Figure 66 shows multiple box
plots. These box plots give an idea of the overall statistics of the distribution in a
quickly readible manner.
In order to compare the different mitigation space exploration techniques, later
charts contrast multiple sets of box plots. Large numbers of box plots on a single chart
quickly become challenging to interpret; thus, the traditional box plots are simplified
in order to compare across these sets. This simplification is shown in Figure 66. The
left and right sides of the diagram contain the exact same informaiton about the set
of five distributions. The left side shows five standard box plots. A line connects their
median values of these five distributions. On the right, the boxes indicating the high
quantile, median, and low quantile have been removed. Instead, a marker is used to
indicate the location of the median. The whiskers remain, which allows the reader to
determine the location of the quantiles along with the ends of the distribution. To
visually connect the dataset, a lightly-colored region is used which connects the ends
of the different distributions.
A large number of designs were generated using randomly-selected values of all
design variables and design margins. Of these cases, a set of designs were selected
by filtering out all cases which had a zero probability of recovery. Of the remaining
cases, a set of one thousand designs were randomly selected to be used in this analysis.
These designs were assessed using a random search throughout the mitigation space to
determine their probability of recovery. Each design was run at each of the conditions
described in Table 12. For each run, the estimated probability of recovery for a
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Figure 66: Simplified Box Plots Explanation
design was compared to the probability of recovery seen in the truth model. The
differences between the recovery from the truth model and the recovery estimate
for each design was calculated and designated the “Recovery Estimate Error.” To
determine an aggregate measure of the number of random search mitigation cases
required, statistical measures of this recovery estimate error were generated based
on the entire set of designs. Figure 67 plots the results of this set of runs. The x-
axis shows the number of random search mitigation points plotted on a logarithmic
scale. For each run, a distribution was created and plotted using a simplified box plot
described in Figure 66. The blue diamonds represent the median of each distribution.
A line is drawn connecting these median values to show the trend of the estimate error
with increasing number of cases. The blue vertical lines connect the inner quantiles of
the distribution and the edges of each distribution, excluding outliers. A blue region
higlights the change in the width of the distributions. The red line shows the run time
required to evaluate 1,000 designs, with the time plotted (in hours) on the secondary
y-axis.
Examination of this data shows that increasing the number of random search cases
continuously decreases the recovery estimate error. However, this decrease in error
comes at a cost of increasing run time required. The ARMOUR method needs an
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Figure 67: Recovery Estimate Error vs. Number of Random Mitigation Search Cases
accurate estimate of the probability of recovery in order to help the designer select
the best aircraft. However, the ARMOUR method uses an optimization algorithm to
determine the best design; thus, it is safe to assume that many designs will need to be
examined. Thus, an undesirable tradeoff exists between the accuracy of the recovery
estimate and the time required to perform this assessment. With the performance
of this method in mind, other possible techniques will be examined to explore the
mitigaiton space in the hopes of finding a more suitiable tradeoff between accuracy
and execution time.
7.4.2 Recovery via Single Mitigation Actions
It is conceivable that a company constructing an aircraft would be prefer to limit the
design team to implementing only one mitigation action during preliminary design.
It is feasible to evaluate how the design space would be effected by such a decision.
This is, of course, a completely valid assessment method. The difference between this
and allowing the MA setting to be any combination of options will largely come down
to corporate policy.
In this case, the mitigation space will restricted to a series of one-dimensional
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searches. As such, fewer points should be necessary to estimate the probability of
recovery. Additionally, since the mitigation space is restricted, it is expected that the
recovery probability will be reduced for at least some of the design space.
A set of one dimensional sweeps will be executed to estimate the probability of
recovery. Each one dimensional sweep will evaluate one dimension of the possible
mitigation actions. As in Section 7.4.1, a series of tests will be executed, evaluating
the resolution necessary to accurately estimate the probability of recovery. Table 13
shows the number of one-dimensional search cases used for each run of the method.
The total number of cases executed is also included for comparison to the number of
cases used in the random search implementation.
Table 13: Number of 1D Search Mitigation Cases to Execute
Mitigation Search Method Run 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Random Cases 5 10 25 50 100 250 500 1000
1D Search
Per Dimension 2 5 10 20 50 100
Total Cases 9 18 33 63 153 303
Figure 68 shows the recovery estimate error this one-dimensional search in red
compared to the previous random search algorithm in blue. The x-axis shows the
number of mitigation cases executed on a logarithmic scale. The data points show the
median recovery estimate error for that number of mitigation cases for each method.
For each run, a distribution was created and plotted using a simplified box plot
described in Figure 66. The symbols represent the median of each distribution and are
connected to show the trend of the median error. The vertical lines connect the inner
quantiles of the distribution and the edges of each distribution, excluding outliers.
The blue region higlights the distributions from the random search exploration. The
red region designates the distribtions from the one-dimensional search method.
From Figure 68 it is evident that the recovery estimate of the one-dimensional mit-
igation assessment is much more accurate than a random search for similar numbers of
cases when the number of mitigation cases is low. Further, the one-dimensional search
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Figure 68: Recovery Estimate Error vs. Number of 1D Mitigation Cases
performs better for all percentiles except the extreme top end of the distributions.
This is likely due to the fact that the single dimension mitigation search is guaran-
teed to explore its very constrained mitigation space evenly, while the random search
method may not explore all regions equally. It is expected that the one-dimensional
search method should perform worse when investigating designs which have multiple
active constraints, which will be explored shortly.
Comparing the run time associated with the one-dimensional search to the random
search data yields somewhat unsurprising results. Figure 69 compares these execution
times on the y-axis versus the number of mitigation cases on the x-axis. The random
search implementation is shown in blue while the one-dimensional search is shown
in red. As the two lines lie on top of one another, the execution time depends
primarily upon the number of mitigation cases, and is roughly the same for both
implementations. The slight difference seen in execution time is believed to be a
result of the user’s actions in other programs at the time of execution.
From this data alone, an assumption could be made at this point that running
a series of one-dimensional sweep of single mitigation actions may be more efficient
and/or more accurate than running a random search throughout the mitigation space.
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Figure 69: Run Time vs. Number of 1D Mitigation Cases
The evidence shows that this is generally true; however, assuming that this will always
be true may be a significant misstep. Specifically, this method is expected to do
poorly in any regions of the design space where multiple recoverable constraints are
violated. In aircraft conceptual design, multiple constraints are frequently active or
nearly active for the selected vehicle, so this multiple-constraint region is an area
which is expected to be useful to a design study.
To examine this possibility, a subset of the previously executed cases were exam-
ined. The selected cases had a non-zero probability of compliance. Additionally, these
cases had non-unity probabilities of compliance for the two most easily recoverable
constraints: approach speed and rate of climb. Examining this small set of cases in
the same manner as before yields Figure 70. The recovery estimates are compared to
the recoveries seen in the “truth model” established earlier. This recovery estimate
error is plotted on the y-axis versus the number of mitigation cases executed on the
x-axis. Again, random search is plotted in blue while the one-dimensional mitigation
search is plotted in red. The median recovery error for this set of cases is shown by
the symbol at the middle of the vertical lines. The vertical lines themselves represent
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the distribution of this error when viewed across the design space.
Figure 70: Recovery Estimate Error for Cases with Multiple Constraint Violations
As expected, it is clear from this figure that the random search algorithm has
more trouble than in the rest of the design space, as evidenced by the magnitude of
the y-axis; however, it does converge steadily with more cases. Conversely, the one-
dimensional mitigation search method shows significant probability of recovery error.
Furthermore, the estimate does not improve significantly with increased numbers of
cases.
It appears that a one-dimensional mitigation search is both more efficient than a
random search and yields similar results for the majority of the design space. Unfor-
tunately, the method does fail to account for actual recoverable space when multiple
constraints are active. Again, a one-dimensional search may be insightful in situations
where the design team is uncomfortable implementing multiple mitigation actions si-
multaneously. In such a case, this option would be especially beneficial for both speed
and pragmatic reasons.
It is also possible that a method could be devised which switches between one-
dimensional and random searches as required by the design space. This concept is
appealing for time-saving reasons and could be worth future consideration.
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7.4.3 Recovery via Hybrid Mitigation Method
The random search appears very good at recovering difficult designs. Conversely, 1D
search appears to be very quick and performs more consistently with fewer numbers
of mitigation cases. Unfortunately, the one-dimensional search algorithm is very bad
at recovering difficult designs. In hope of obtaining the advantages of both methods
simultaneously, a hybrid method was posed. This method uses the one-dimensional
search algorithm augmented by a scattering of random search points. Table 14 shows
the number of cases executed for each run of the hybrid methodology, including a
breakdown of the number of one-dimensional search cases and the number of random
search cases for each run.
Table 14: Number of Hybrid Search Mitigation Cases to Execute
Mitigation Search Method Run 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Random Cases 5 10 25 50 100 250 500 1000
1D Search
Per Dimension 2 5 10 20 50 100
Total Cases 9 18 33 63 153 303
Hybrid
Per Dimension 2 5 10 20
Random Cases 20 50 100 200
Total Cases 26 65 130 260
Figure 71 shows how the hybrid methodology performs against the other mitiga-
tion implementations for the “difficult” cases discussed in Section 7.4.2. Again, the
number of mitigation cases is plotted on the x-axis on a logarithmic scale. The recov-
ery estimate error is shown on the y-axis. The random search and one-dimensional
search results from Figure 68 are shown in blue and red, respectively. The green points
and lines show the result of the new hybrid implementation. The symbols once again
show the median error. The vertical lines show the distribution from quantile to ex-
treme. Each set of distributions is contained within a region of corresponding color.
In general, the hybrid method shows the same expected recovery estimate error
as the one-dimensional method. This is a good sign that the hybrid method shows
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Figure 71: Recovery Estimate Error vs. Number of Hybrid (1D and Random) Miti-
gation Cases
some promise. The run time of the hybrid methodology should be explored. Further,
it is necessary to investigate the Achilles’ heel of the one-dimensional mitigation
implementation: cases with multiple active constraints.
The time requirements for each of the non-optimization methods is plotted in
Figure 72. The x-axis shows the total number of mitigation points assessed for a given
method. The y-axis shows the required time needed to execute the set of designs in
hours. The three lines show variation in the amount of time needed to assess the same
number of mitigation cases; however, it is believed that this variability is due to the
use of different machines to perform the calculations and not any inherent advantage
of one method over the other.
Figure 73 shows how the hybrid methodology performs against the other mitiga-
tion implementations for the “difficult” cases discussed in Section 7.4.2. Again, the
number of mitigation cases is plotted on the x-axis on a logarithmic scale. The recov-
ery estimate error is shown on the y-axis. The random search and one-dimensional
search results from Figure 70 are shown in blue and red, respectively. Green shows the
result of the new hybrid implementation. The symbols once again show the median
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Figure 72: Run Time vs. Number of Hybrid (1D and Random) Mitigation Cases
error. The vertical lines illustrate the shape of each distribution and are contained in
a colored region.
This hybridized method combining one-dimensional mitigation searches and a
random search through the mitigation space appears to be superior to both methods.
The hybrid method is at least as accurate as either of the other competing methods
at estimating the probability of recovery for the general design space. Further, the
hybrid method appears to perform better than either of the other methods when
considering designs which violate multiple constraints. Finally, it accomplishes this
level of performance without any notable penalty on the run time required to execute
the analysis.
Further examination of the implementation is unhelpful at this stage. The example
problem employed has a number of limitations: vastly different recovery capabilities
for different constraint violations; few uncertain constraints; lack of industry data.
Due to these limitations, any additional insight would likely be too problem-specific
to be generalizable to other problems. Instead, this investigation has shown the
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Figure 73: Recovery Estimate Error for Cases with Multiple Constraint Violations
promise of such a hybrid implementation (speed, accuracy, ability to deal with difficult
portions of the design space). It is recommended that any future implementation of
this methodology investigate the best hybrid approach for its own specific problem.
This hybrid one-dimensional and random search implementation will be used in
the implementation developed in Chapter 6. This strategy affords the advantage that
the recovery assessment (i.e. mitigation action analyses) will take a known, fixed
amount of time.
7.5 Impact of Mitigation Penalty
The penalties imposed in Section 6.4 are assumed values. Thus, it would be beneficial
to examine the extent of their impact on the probability of recovery seen by designs.
To investigate this, the same design space exploration used in Section 7.4 was explored
again.
A test of reducing the penalty associated with additional fuel was executed. The
penalty imposed in Section 6.4.1 was reduced by a factor of four. This reduction
lowered the amount of empty weight added to the aircraft for the same amount of fuel
weight. Furthermore, it allowed the mitigation action further range of applicability
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before the additional weight on the aircraft was no longer fuel weight.
This mitigation action is intended to fix the range constraint violation. Thus, it is
expected that reducing the associated penalty and increasing the range of applicability
will increase the probability of recovery for any designs where range was an active
constraint. The design space exploration from Section 7.4 was executed with this
reduced penalty. After the data was generated, designs were grouped based on their
most stringent compliance constraint – the constraint with which the design was least
compliant compared to the other constraints.
The probability of recovery for a given design with the reduced penalty mentioned
above was compared to the probability of recovery measure when the full mitigation
penalty was imposed. By subtracting the new probability of recovery from the old
and dividing by the old recovery, a multiplicative factor was constructed which shows
how much more recovery was seen by reducing the mitigation penalty. The designs
were then grouped based on whether or not range was the most stringent compliance
constraint.
Figure 74 shows the results of this study. The two columns correspond to whether
or not range was the most stringent active constraint for that design. The y-axis plots
the additional recovery is seen by reducing the penalty applied to the fuel addition
mitigation action. The bar chart shows the additional recovery, averaged over all
designs and normalized by the design’s recovery under normal penalty conditions. The
error bars indicate the variability of this recovery when examining different designs
by showing plus or minus one standard deviation.
It is clear that a reduction in mitigation penalty can have a very large impact
on the probability of recovery. Reduction of the penalty does not change the basic
behavior of the mitigation action. The post-sizing fuel mitigation action still recovers
the same performance shortfall as with the normal penalty. Instead, it simply makes
the mitigation action more effective by giving it a further range of applicability and
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Figure 74: Change in Recovery Estimate with Reduced Mitigation Penalty
causing fewer conflicts between competing performance constraints.
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7.6 Design Space Exploration
A large design space exploration will be performed to explore the trade space between
expected block fuel, probability of compliance, and probability of recovery. To per-
form this exploration, a Monte Carlo simulation of the design space is constructed.
Each of these resulting design points is executed through the framework discussed in
Chapter 6. The reliability of each point will be assessed through a different Monte
Carlo Simulation on the uncertainty space. The failed uncertainty scenarios are eval-
uated through the mitigation space exploration to see how many can be recovered.
This information is compiled as discussed in Section 3.5 to calculate the expected
economic block fuel and the probability of success. It is expected that multiple de-
signs which have similar probabilities of compliance and expected block fuel will have
different probabilities of recovery. This will occur when the designs have different
active constraints.
Figure 75 shows the results of an exploration of the design space including all
design and mitigation variables. These designs are assessed through the entire pro-
cess described in Chapter 6. The resulting expected block fuel and reliabilities are
plotted on this chart. The x-axis shows the expected economic range block fuel for
a given design when measured across all uncertainty scenarios. On the y-axis multi-
ple probabilities are displayed simultaneously. The probability of compliance for the
design, the probability that the design will meet all constraints without any mitiga-
tion actions, is displayed as a blue diamond. For the same design, a vertical green
line indicates the additional probability of recovery possible through the considered
mitigation actions, which must by definition be strictly positive. The triangle at the
top of this green line represents the total probability of success of the design, i.e. the
probability that the design can meet all constraints either without or through the
application of mitigation actions. Designs with less than 75 percent probability of
compliance or with greater than an expected 114,000 pounds of economic range block
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fuel were excluded from the plot.
Figure 75: Design Space Exploration with Recovery
Figure 76 shows the same diagram with the details annotated. A specific design
is highlighted. The probability of compliance is pointed out at the bottom of the
design. The probability of success shown at the top. The length of the line between
these data points corresponds to the probability of recovery for that same design.
Now that the design space has been viewed in mass, other details can be investi-
gated. It was expected that the probability of recovery of a design through mitigation
actions would not necessarily correlate with the expected performance of that design
or its probability of compliance. To examine whether or not a trend exists, it will be
helpful to examine designs with similar probabilities of compliance. Figure 77 shows
the same design space exploration as Figure 75; however, only designs with a similar
level of compliance are included. Specifically, any designs with less than 75 percent
probability of compliance or greater than 77 percent compliance were removed from
the chart. The remaining designs still show their probability of compliance via a blue
diamond. The green line extending from the design shows its probability of recovery.
The green triangle at the top of the line shows the resulting probability of success for
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Figure 76: Design Space Exploration with Recovery - Annotated
that given design.
From Figure 77, it is possible to examine designs which will appear almost iden-
tical in a traditional reliability study and observe hidden differences between them.
Examining the the left most two designs – the ones with the lowest expected economic
block fuel – it appears that the designs would be almost indistinguishable via tradi-
tional RBDO. Indeed, the two designs differ by 110 lbs of expected block fuel and less
than eight tenths of a percent probability of compliance. However, one design has
less than one (1) percent probability of recovery through mitigation actions while the
other has over 13 percent probability of recovery via those same mitigation actions.
In the end, selecting one of these two “very similar” designs would yield an aircraft
with either an 88 percent total probability of success including mitigation actions
or one with on 77 percent probability of success. Again, this level of information is
completely new for a conceptual design study and could be very useful when deciding
which design to move forward with for development.
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Figure 77: Design Space Exploration - 75% to 77% Compliance
7.7 Pareto Frontiers
It is evident from Figure 75 that a trade-off exists between reliability goals and the
expected block fuel for this design space. Such behavior is expected and implies that
a single objective optimization in one of these dimensions will increasingly penalize
the other objective. This concept is reminiscent of the Pareto Frontier discussed in
Section 2.5. Thus, it may be beneficial for a designer to investigate in some sort of
Pareto Frontier finding algorithm to find the “best” designs from which to select a
final concept.
Ideally, the designer would have the ability to select any probability of compliance,
probability of success, and expected block fuel that he or she wanted. Anyone familiar
with aircraft design, or any kind of design for that matter, knows that this is an
unreasonable expectation. Instead, it is expected that there will necessarily be a
trade-off between competing objectives and that some hard decisions will need to
be made. To make this decision, the trade-off between these competing objectives
must be quantified in some manner. This trade-off is the same trade-off as the one
discussed in Section 2.5 – a Pareto Frontier.
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To find a Pareto Frontier for the process in question, an optimizer was attached
to the implementation described in Chapter 6 to find an optimal set of designs. This
optimizer employed a genetic algorithm to examine the design space to find the best
possible set of designs given an objective function and constraints on the result. The
optimizer was given access to both design variables and margin, allowing it full control
over the design selected. For any selected design, the implementation returned the
expected economic range block fuel along with probabilities of compliance and success.
In order to construct a Pareto Frontier, a sweep through the objective space
was performed. A single objective was selected: expected block fuel. Each time
the optimizer was called, it would try to minimize this objective. To perform the
sweep and create a Pareto Frontier, a constraint was imposed on one of the reliability
measures. Each time the optimizer was called, a different minimum level of reliability
was required, constraining the design space available to the optimizer.
The Pareto Frontier shown in Figure 78 was constructed using an optimizer looking
for the minimum expected block fuel (E[𝐵𝐹𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛(𝑥, ℎ)]), shown on the x-axis. For each
call to the optimizer, a minimum level of probability of compliance was imposed. This
minimum level of compliance was different for each optimization and ranged from
75 percent compliance up to 100 percent compliance, in increments of one percent.
It was not mandated that the optimizer meet this minimum level of compliance;
the optimizer merely needed to exceed it. The resulting reliabilities for the final
selected designs is shown on the y-axis. Additionally, the probabilities of recovery
and success were determined for each resulting design. For a given design, the lower
point corresponds to the probability of compliance, while the higher point corresponds
to the probability of success. The line connecting these two points is the probability of
recovery for that design. The results of the design space exploration from Section 7.6
are also shown on this chart for reference. They are colored entirely in green, but still
show the probabilities of compliance, recovery, and success for each design.
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Figure 78: Probability of Compliance vs. Expected Block Fuel Trade Space
Using the capabilities enabled by the proposed methodology, a Pareto frontier
was constructed between the expected block fuel objective function and the overall
probability of success, accounting for mitigation actions. To construct this frontier
an optimizer operated on the design and margin variables, searching for the lowest
expected block fuel while maintaining at least a minimum level of probability of
success and probability of compliance. For all optimizer runs, the optimizer was
constrained by a minimum of 70 percent probability of compliance. Each optimization
was given a different minimum level of probability of success, ranging from 75 percent
up to 100 percent in one percent increments.
This new Pareto frontier between expected block fuel and probability of compli-
ance is shown in Figure 79 in red. The reliabilities for a design are once again shown
on the y-axis versus the expected block fuel for the design on the x-axis. For each
individual design the probability of compliance is shown as the lower red block, the
probability of success is shown as the higher red block, and the probability of recovery
is the red line connecting the two points. The Pareto frontier established for Figure 78
and the design space exploration from Section 7.6 are shown for comparison.
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Figure 79: Probability of Success vs. Expected Block Fuel Trade Space
7.8 Chapter Summary
This chapter containts a demonstration of some of the capabilities enabled by the
ARMOUR methodology. Exercising the formulation from Chapter 5 for a specific ex-
ample of the conceptual design of a large civil transport aircraft developed in Chap-
ter 6 allows for multiple trade studies and assessments which could not have been
performed previously. By including uncertainty margin in an uncertainty quantifica-
tion framework, the impact of uncertainty margins on the probability of compliance
could be investigated. The addition of mitigation actions allowed for the assessment
of the impact that uncertainty margins have on the probability of recovery across the
design space. The importance of accurately estimating appropriate penalty functions
on these mitigation actions was shown by studying the impact of changing a miti-
gation penalty. The design space was explored using the new methodology, allowing
for previously indistinguishable designs to be separated by the new metric of their
probability of recovery. This new methodology was used to select designs optimized
using the new metrics, which allows for the visualization of a trade space which has




This chapter examines the contributions of this thesis to the state of the art in
aircraft design. The research questions and hypotheses developed in Chapter 3 are
reviewed and the evidence presented in Chapter 4 to support or refute each of them
is recalled. Finally, future opportunities arising from the concepts explored in this
work are discussed.
8.1 Review of Research Questions and Hypotheses
The motivating problem for this work was defined in Section 1.4. In brief, it states
that uncertainty during the aircraft design process can lead to the selection of a
vehicle which will to fail to meet its performance constraints when analyzed in detail
during later design stages, even with preventative measures like uncertainty margins
in place. This occurs because the conceptual design is typically executed with faster,
less detailed, and deterministic design tools. Chapter 2 illustrated that uncertainty
quantification methods like RBDO have the potential to address some of this design
uncertainty.
However, existing methods do not explicitly take into account some of the reali-
ties of aircraft design. A sophisticated sizing process, frequently a central tenant of
conceptual design is not accounted for by the processes. There is limited treatment
existing of uncertainty margins and traditional methods which do treat these margins
do not allow for the quantitative assessment of the resulting reliability. Most existing
RBDO methods do not allow for the assessment of the impact of mitigation actions;
those methods that do account for late stage design changes do so either at the ex-
pense of either abolishing the design freeze present in the stages of aircraft design
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or with significant additional costs in terms of detailed analyses which are difficult
to perform during conceptual design. Thus, in Section 2.7 the following Research
Objective was developed.
Research Objective: Quantify uncertainty during the design process
for a new aircraft, including a sophisticated sizing analysis, uncertainty
margins, and mitigation actions.
In order to develop a methodology to achieve this objective, the problem was
broken down into smaller components. Specific focus was given to design uncertainty
given the stages of aircraft design, the treatment of uncertainty margins in a proba-
bilistic framework, and the concept of mitigation actions – late stage-design, non-ideal
changes to a design made to bring the aircraft back into compliance with constraints.
8.1.1 Treatment of Design Uncertainty with Aircraft Sizing
Upon comparing the stages of aircraft design to the available uncertainty quantifi-
cation literature, it became clear that simply modeling the uncertainty in a rigorous
way while paying heed to the requirements of the design process was in itself a non-
trivial problem, and that this concept would need to be formalized as in Research
Question 1.
Research Question 1 How should aircraft design with uncertainty be
modeled for reliability analysis, accounting for the stages of design?
Detailed examination of the stages of aircraft design and the implied outcomes
of modeling uncertainty during processes representing various phases was discussed.
The implications of applying an uncertainty variable to either sizing or performance
analysis were explored and, ultimately, the concept of uncertainty during the stages
of aircraft design aligned with sizing the vehicle, freezing its configuration and design
parameters, and only then doing a performance analysis as stated in Hypothesis 1.
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Hypothesis 1 To emulate the aircraft conceptual and preliminary design
process, uncertainty must be implemented after the sizing of the aircraft
is complete. Modeling uncertainty during sizing will yield incorrect results
for aircraft conceptual design under uncertainty.
The experiment in Section 4.1 tested this hypothesis. A simple weight-based
canonical sizing problem was developed based on equations from aircraft design liter-
ature. The problem was augmented with two different uncertainty implementations:
modeling uncertainty during sizing and during performance analysis. These two im-
plementations were compared, and the results showed that the two implementations
differed greatly in their effect on resulting aircraft weights. Further, by addressing
the implications of these weights on different performance parameters, the difference
in vehicle performance between these two implementations was clarified. In the end,
modeling during sizing was determined to have significant deficiencies, leading to
the result that uncertainty quantification must be measured by implementing uncer-
tainty scenarios during the performance analysis, after sizing is completed, justifying
Hypothesis 1.
8.1.2 Margins as Design Variables in a Probabilistic Formulation
The traditional use of uncertainty margins in a deterministic design process as a
method to account for uncertainty was examined. Further, it was determined that
uncertainty margins had uses during later design stages and, thus, it would be bene-
ficial to include these margins during a reliability analysis. It was hoped, as inquired
in Research Question 2, that this margin could be integrated into a reliability study
and that such a study could actually be used to set uncertainty margins.
Research Question 2 Is it possible to select a desired probability of com-
pliance and then quantitatively determine a level of margin which will yield
that probability of compliance?
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To answer Research Question 2, uncertainty quantification studies were examined
which explored concepts similar to uncertainty margins (in the form of safety factors)
by assessing overall reliability. It was therefore theorized in Hypothesis 2 that margins
can be treated similarly and that reliability goals could be used to set uncertainty
margins.
Hypothesis 2 By including an uncertainty margin during the sizing pro-
cess and removing it (but not its effect) before the uncertainty analysis,
the impact of margin on the probability of compliance can be seen. Using
an optimizer, it will be straight-forward to determine an appropriate level
of margin to achieve a desired probability of compliance.
Experiment 2 was designed to test the validity of Hypothesis 2. A partially con-
structed version of the implementation from Chapter 6 was used to test the ability
to use the established reliability framework to set uncertainty margins. It was found
that if a level of margin exists which can satisfy a probability of compliance goal,
an optimizer is easily able to find that level of margin. Further, by allowing the op-
timizer to adjust both design variables and uncertainty margins simultaneously, the
optimizer will produce even better designs with higher reliability, better performance,
or both.
8.1.3 Quantification of Probability of Recovery
This work was motivated by the concept of mitigation actions. An important overall
goal was to introduce these mitigation actions into a probabilistic aircraft conceptual
design process. Very few studies with similar goals could be located, and they did
not account for actions after a design freeze. Since no suitable framework existed, a
new one must be developed, motivating Research Question 3.
Research Question 3 How should mitigation be represented in a prob-
abilistic conceptual design model?
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Based on the thought experiment in Section 3.3.2, Hypothesis 3 was developed.
Hypothesis 3 It will be necessary to perform a mitigation assessment
for each failed uncertainty outcome to get an accurate determination of
the probability of recovery.
This hypothesis was tested in Section 4.2. A canonical problem was developed
using equations from aircraft design texts. This canonical problem was intended to
assess the uncertainty space and resulting mitigation spaces of a single design. Us-
ing these spaces, different uncertainty scenarios were implemented and their resulting
mitigation space investigated. It was shown that even with only one mitigation ac-
tion, the required level of mitigation action needed would be different depending on
the uncertainty scenario investigated. This was further evaluated to show that the
maximum recovery for an “overall best” mitigation action setting would provide lower
recovery than investigating mitigation actions separately for all designs, supporting
Hypothesis 3.
Finally, Research Question 4 was asked to inform the needs of the specific imple-
mentation of a reliability analysis that includes mitigation actions.
Research Question 4 What reliability assessment method should be
used to model the aircraft Conceptual and preliminary design process with
mitigation actions?
The support for Hypothesis 3 meant that the reliability assessment method must
allow for the sampling of individual uncertainty scenarios. Thus, a sampling method
must be implemented to assess the reliability of a design, and other methods like
boundary approximation methods did not appear to be feasible for this method. Of
the sampling methods, Monte Carlo simulation was selected due to its relative ease
of implementation and the ability to emulate any desired distribution on uncertainty
variables.
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Based on the results of Hypothesis 1 to 3, a new methodology was developed to fix
the identified gaps. This new Aircraft Recovery through Mitigation & Optimization
under Uncertainty for Reliability (ARMOUR) method incorporated aircraft sizing,
uncertainty margins, and mitigation actions into a reliability framework. This new
method gives the decision maker more information than could previously be gleaned
from preliminary design. Reliability methods are an initial and integral step to under-
standing the results of the uncertainty experienced in the conceptual design process;
however, they do not account for actions taken by engineers during later stages of
the process which could remedy encountered problems – mitigation actions. These
actions, which have not been included in reliability analyses previously, allow for the
calculation of a probability of recovery from encountered failures. This probability
of recovery can be combined with the probability of compliance through traditional
RBDO to determine the overall probability of success for an aircraft design.
With this new information, a decision maker gains information about how likely a
design is to be successful in complying with all performance requirements, including
preliminary design mitigation actions, as well as how likely it is that a design would
be compliant with performance requirements without these reactions. These proba-
bilities can be traded with traditional aircraft design objective functions to allow the
designer to select the combination of performance and reliability which which s/he is
most comfortable. In the end, the decision maker can select designs which perform
better against traditional metrics, designs which have a lower probability of failure,
or some combination of the two.
The ARMOUR method was implemented for the concpetual design of a large
civil transport aircraft. Design variables, margins, uncertainty variables, mitigation
actions, and mitigation penalties were established. Performance responses, a design
objective, and reliability requirements were established for the aircraft. A physics-
based aircraft model was developed which used a set of aircraft and engine design
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tools to emulate the design process. The resulting data were regressed against the set
of inputs to generate surrogate models to improve the speed of the analyses. These
surrogates were integrated into a newly constructed uncertainty quantification and
management framework which allowed for the calculation of the performance and
reliability of any design as well as the optimization of the designs selected.
Substantiating Hypothesis 1 to 3 and extracting new, useful information from the
resulting implementation demonstrates that this work has successfully addressed the
stated research objective. The impacts of mitigation actions are assessed probabilisti-
cally in a conceptual design study by using a reliability framework. The inclusion of a
mitigation exploration emulates the process by which a design team would attempt to
recover aircraft which fail to meet their requirements. By evaluating these situations
which could occur in preliminary design and bringing their impacts into conceptual
design, the decision maker can now account for the probability of recovery in addi-
tion to expected performance and probability of compliance when selecting an initial
design to develop. The inclusion of mitigation actions in a reliability framework will
allow the decision maker to know with confidence whether a design can be fixed with
the selected mitigation actions. This new information, which can be made available
during conceptual design, brings knowledge forward in the design process and fulfils
the underlying motivation of this thesis.
8.2 Contributions to the State of the Art
The Aircraft Recovery through Mitigation & Optimization under Uncertainty for
Reliability (ARMOUR) method has been developed to assess the reliability of an
aircraft under uncertainty during conceptual design. The ARMOURmethod accounts
for the use of a sophisticated aircraft sizing process. The method indicates the order
in which design variables and uncertainty variables must be applied with regards
to sizing and performance analysis. The potential error associated with incorrectly
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implementing these steps is quantified.
ARMOUR incorporates the ability to set uncertainty margins into the aircraft reli-
ability analysis. An implementation of uncertainty margins in the stages of reliability
analysis is established which allows margins to treat all uncertainty variables rather
than directly treating only uncertainty variables which affect the same direct param-
eters as the margin. This allows for uncertainty margins to be set to specify a desired
probability of compliance of a given design. By integrating this information into an
optimizer, design variables can be varied simultaneously with uncertainty margins to
select designs which have the best combination of performance and reliability.
By comparing real aircraft and engine design processes to reliability analyses in the
literature, it was identified that existing methods have no tools which can account for
actions taken by the preliminary design team to recover failed designs. These actions
were dubbed “mitigation actions” and a method was proposed to incorporate these
mitigation actions into an uncertain aircraft design process. The ARMOUR method
allows for the calculation of a probability of recovery through these mitigation actions.
The construction of the ARMOUR methodology lead to a new reliability metric:
the probability of recovery (𝑃 (𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 | 𝑥, ℎ)). This metric indicates the likelihood
that mitigation actions will be bring the design back into compliance with perfor-
mance constraints when the inherent uncertainty in the design process has cause the
aircraft to violate one or more of these constraints. Combining this new information
with the probability of compliance (𝑃 (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 | 𝑥, ℎ)) generated through stan-
dard reliability methods allows for the calculation of the total probability of success
(𝑃 (𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 | 𝑥, ℎ)) of a given design. The probability of success indicates the likeli-
hood that an aircraft will meet all performance constraints. This metric accounts for
both design uncertainty and the ability of a preliminary design team to recover the
performance of the design should a constraint be violated.
The ARMOURmethodology is formulated to allow for the optimization of a design
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with respect to traditional design metrics. Reliability goals in the form of probability
of compliance and probability of success are enforced. This will enable the designer
to limit the amount of risk to an acceptable level.
The ARMOUR methodology has been implemented for a large (300 passenger
class) civil transport design. The methodology allows for the selection of design
variables and uncertainty margins which meet reliability goals on both the compli-
ance and success of the aircraft and simultaneously optimize a traditional aircraft
design performance metric. This implementation of the ARMOUR methodology was
used to explore and quantify the relationships between probability of compliance
(𝑃 (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 | 𝑥, ℎ)) and uncertainty margins. Attempts were also made to quan-
tify the relationship between the probability of success (𝑃 (𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 | 𝑥, ℎ)) and these
margins.
8.3 Future Work
This study has opened multiple avenues for future work. Possibilities which seem par-
ticularly fruitful include the examination of recovery estimation while using boundary
approximation methods and the application of the current methodology to later stages
of design.
It may prove useful to examine the quantitative change in accuracy of the prob-
ability of recovery estimate when using boundary approximation methods. If the
use of boundary approximation methods can be shown not to adversely affect the
probability of recovery estimation, then these methods may allow for the relaxation
of some assumed restrictions which led to the selected implementation in this thesis.
By using these boundary approximation methods, it may be possible to avoid the
use of sampling methods to estimate the reliability of a design; this could decrease
the required number of function calls to a large degree. This reduction in function
calls may even allow aircraft design tools to be called directly without the need for
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surrogate models. Such an implementation may require significant changes to the
assumed forms of Equations (19) to (23)
The ARMOUR method may be adaptable to handle other design problems. En-
gine design is an area which is particularly of interest. Engine design has many of the
same problems associated with aircraft design. The design of an engine takes place
under the presence of uncertainty due to the use of lower fidelity modeling during the
initial conceptual phase. Engine design often goes through a sizing process, though
engines are sized to match thrust targets rather than a mission range. Higher fidelity
tools are very expensive to operate and require extensive data about the engine be-
fore being operated, preventing designers from using these tools during conceptual
design. Further, an engine design problem in which mitigation actions were employed
was found as a clear example in the literature [43]. Thus, many of the same benefits
would exist for using ARMOUR on the conceptual design of an engine.
The methodology established here may have further applications during later de-
sign stages. If this method were used for conceptual design, an easy-to-update imple-
mentation would exist. During later design stages when more information is known
about a previously uncertainty variable, the assumed distributions of uncertainty
variables could be updated. With these updated distributions, the method could be
executed again to update the probability of compliance and probability of recovery
estimations for that design. This update could help a design team to know which
constraints will be problematic as the design changes. Further, knowledge of the
likelihood of these constraint violations could help the design team prepare potential
mitigation actions as it becomes more and more apparent that a particular action may
be needed. This concept is particularly appealing because in later design stages, the
aircraft will be frozen. Thus, only a single design needs to be investigated. This will
remove the outside loop optimization, allowing for the analysis to take place much
229
more quickly. Because of the resulting decrease in the number of function calls re-
quired to analyze the probabilities of compliance and success, more detailed analyses
may be used to further refine the extracted information.
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APPENDIX A
HYPOTHESIS 3 TEST EQUATIONS
To test this hypothesis, a simplified example problem will be constructed. Two un-
certain variables will be implemented: an empty weight factor (𝑈𝑊 ) and a drag factor
(𝑈𝐷). These should to allow for sufficient variation while keeping the problem sim-
ple. The empty weight factor is expected to affect both range and approach speed
equations. The drag factor is expected to only impact the Breguet range equation.
Impacts from the drag factor on approach speed are expected to be negligible.
Only a single mitigation action will be considered: a post-sizing fuel increase with
an associated penalty. The mitigation action is intended to improve range; however,
the penalty will eventually restrict its effectiveness. It is expected that mitigation will
degrade approach speed. The post-sizing fuel increase will directly affect the aircraft’s
maximum takeoff weight (MTOW). Also, an associated penalty will be imposed on
the vehicle empty weight to account for the added structure necessary to carry the
extra load. This penalty is expected to increase faster as the additional fuel weight
increases.
A.1 Constraints
In this example, two constraints will be considered: the aircraft range at a design
payload and the landing approach speed (Vapp). Range will be assessed using the
Breguet range equation [75]. The approach speed with be estimated using the aircraft




For the purposes of regulation, the approach speed (Vapp) of a vehicle, the speed just
before landing, is calculated as 1.3 times the stall speed of the airplane[75]. The stall
speed can be calculated as show in Equation (33).









Stall speed is a function of the landing weight of the vehicle, its wing area, the
local air density, and maximum lift coefficient of the vehicle. For this example, it is
assumed that the local air density (𝜌) is fixed. Additionally, the wing area (𝑆) and
maximum lift coefficient (𝐶𝐿𝑚𝑎𝑥) will have been set during conceptual design and thus
will not change in this example. Only the landing weight (𝑊𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔) will be affected
during this experiment.
A.1.2 Range
The Breguet range equation demonstrated in Equation (35) calculates the distance




















, optimizing altitude as the weight of the vehicle changes. The fuel
consumption (𝐶𝑡) of the engine is assumed to be constant throughout the cruise
segment. The equation is also dependent on the ratio of the initial cruise weight to





, indicating how much fuel is consumed during flight.
A.2 Implementing Uncertainty and Mitigation
The maximum takeoff weight (𝑀𝑇𝑂𝑊 ) of a vehicle can be broken down into com-
ponents of empty vehicle weight (𝑊𝐸), payload weight (𝑊𝑃𝐿), crew weight (𝑊𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑤),
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and fuel weight (𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙).
𝑊0 = 𝑊𝐸 +𝑊𝑃𝐿 +𝑊𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑤 +𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙 (54)
The payload weight will be set by the number of passengers, which is dictated by
market forces and is assumed to remain constant. The crew weight is derived based
on the number of crew required for the operation of the vehicle and flight attendants
to take care of the passengers. The uncertainty in the weight of the passengers or
crew will not be assessed in this study.
In order to assess the performance at different stages of the flight, fuel weight can
broken down by flight segment. Generally, this breakdown will depend on the data
available and the information to be derived.
𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙 = 𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑂𝑢𝑡 +𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑇𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑜𝑓𝑓 +𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑏 +𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑒
+𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 +𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 +𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖𝐼𝑛 +𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒
(55)
For the purposes of this example, fuel will be broken down as show in Equation (56)
into fuel consumed before cruise, cruise fuel, descent fuel, and fuel after descent. Fuel
consumed before cruise includes taxi out, takeoff, and climb. Fuel consumed after
descent includes landing, taxi in, and reserves.
𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙 = 𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑒 +𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑒 +𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 +𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 (56)
This equation contains all the different segments required to assess both the vehicle
range and approach speed.
The initial cruise weight can be found by subtracting the fuel used in pre-cruise
flight segments from the maximum takeoff weight of the vehicle.
𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 = 𝑊0 −𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑒 (57)
The weight of the vehicle at the end of cruise is equal to the initial cruise weight
minus the fuel used in cruise.
𝑊𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 = 𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 −𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑒 (58)
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The landing weight is simply the final cruise weight minus fuel used in descent.
𝑊𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑊𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 −𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 (59)
Substituting from definitions of MTOW and fuel weight, landing weight can also
be found by summing the empty weight, payload, crew, and post-touchdown fuel
consumed, including unusable fuel.
𝑊𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑊𝐸 +𝑊𝑃𝐿 +𝑊𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑤 +𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 (60)
The final cruise weight can be calculated as the sum the empty weight, payload, crew,
and fuel consumed after cruise as shown in Equation (61).
𝑊𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 = 𝑊𝐸 +𝑊𝑃𝐿 +𝑊𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑤 +𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 +𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 (61)
𝑊𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 = 𝑊𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 +𝑊𝐹𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∝ 𝑊𝑍𝐹𝑊 (62)
The initial cruise weight is equal to the takeoff weight minus the fuel used before
cruise.
𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 = 𝑊0 −𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑒
= 𝑊𝐸 +𝑊𝑃𝐿 +𝑊𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑤 +𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙 −𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑒
(63)
𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 ∝ 𝑊0 (64)
A.2.1 Weight
Uncertainty associated with the empty weight will, logically, directly affect the empty
weight of the vehicle. Taking 𝑈𝐸𝑊 to be the uncertain scenario associated with empty
weight, the change in empty weight can be expressed as Equation (65).
𝑊𝐸𝑁𝑒𝑤 = 𝑊𝐸 (1 + 𝑈𝐸𝑊 ) (65)
The maximum takeoff weight is fixed based in the initial sizing analysis which pre-
cedes and is therefore outside the scope of this study. Thus, MTOW it is expected to
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remain constant as the empty weight changes. As referenced in Appendix A.2 payload
and crew weights are expected to be fixed requirements. Since all other parameters
are fixed, an increase in empty weight via 𝑈𝐸𝑊 is expected to directly correspond to
a decrease of fuel available for the same mission, as show in Equations (66) and (67).
𝑊0 = 𝑊𝐸 (1 + 𝑈𝐸𝑊 ) +𝑊𝑃𝐿 +𝑊𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑤 +𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙 (1− 𝑈𝐸𝑊 ) (66)
Δ𝑊0 = 𝑊𝐸 *Δ𝑈𝐸𝑊 −𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙 *Δ𝑈𝐸𝑊 (67)
A.2.2 Treatment of fuel consumption changes
Based on force balance logic, fuel consumption for a given segment is expected to
scale with the weight of the vehicle in that segment. Thus, in order to determine
what the appropriate scaling factor for the fuel should be, the relationship between
the individual segment weight and the more macro weights like MTOW and empty
weight must be determined.
At the start of taxi out, the aircraft will be at its takeoff gross weight. For this
mission, that will be the maximum takeoff gross weight of the vehicle. Thus, taxi out
fuel will be scaled with any changes in 𝑊0.
Since the fuel consumed for most segments will be proportional to the weight of
the vehicle at that point, it would be convenient to have a functional form which
scaled the fuel based off weight. Weight fractions, used in conceptual sizing analyses,
are already conveniently in this format. Thus, it will be assumed for most segments
that the weight fraction will remain constant. By knowing either the initial or final
weight for the segment and the weight fraction from the deterministic sizing, the fuel
consumed during that segment can be calculated.
Taxi out, takeoff and climb fuel consumption will scale with changes in maximum
takeoff weight
𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑒 ∝ 𝑊0 (68)
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Cruise fuel consumption will be calculated as a fallout of the initial and final cruise
weights.
𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑒 = 𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 −𝑊𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 (69)
Descent fuel consumption will scale with the vehicle landing weight.
𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∝ 𝑊𝑍𝐹𝑊 +𝑊𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∝ 𝑊𝑍𝐹𝑊 (70)
Landing fuel consumption will scale with vehicle landing weight. For the purpose
of this analysis, landing weight will be assumed to be equal to the empty weight plus
payload, reserves, taxi fuel, landing fuel, and crew.
𝑊𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑊𝐸𝑊 +𝑊𝑃𝐿 +𝑊𝐶 +𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 (71)
The zero-fuel weight ((𝑊𝑍𝐹𝑊 )) of the aircraft is the weight of the vehicle without
any remaining fuel. This is equivalent to the weight of the empty vehicle plus crew
and payload weights, as shown in Equation (72).
𝑊𝑍𝐹𝑊 = 𝑊𝐸 +𝑊𝑃𝐿 +𝑊𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑤 (72)
Substituting into Equation (72) into Equation (71) yields Equation (73).
𝑊𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑊𝑍𝐹𝑊 +𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 (73)
Thus, it can be assumed that landing weight is proportional to the aircraft zero-fuel
weight.
𝑊𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∝ 𝑊𝑍𝐹𝑊 (74)
Reserve fuel is potentially complicated. Reserve fuel consumption will scale with
total fuel weight. For rudimentary sizing analyses, reserve fuel is often calculated
as a percent of the total fuel consumed during a sizing mission. In more detailed
analyses, a reserve mission profile is specified and the fuel required is assessed to
meet that mission. This mission is expected to be flown after descent, thus the fuel
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required for this mission will scale with the landing weight of the vehicle. The change
of reserve fuel during the more detailed analyses conveniently mimics the behavior of
other post-cruise fuel consumption. Thus, reserve fuel will be scaled with the empty
weight of the vehicle.
Trapped fuel is often combined into the reserve fuel calculation. Unlike all the
other post-cruise mission segments which change proportional to the empty weight
of the vehicle, trapped fuel scales with the size of the fuel tanks. However, since this
fuel will be on the order of 1% of the total fuel, this difference will be ignored for
traceability, and trapped fuel will instead be incorporated into and treated as part of
the reserve fuel calculation.
Later segments are proportional to zero fuel weight.
𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑛 ∝ 𝑊𝑍𝐹𝑊 (75)






It has been assumed that non-cruise segments will not be significantly affected
by changes in the drag prediction. This assumption was made to maintain some
simplicity in the mathematics for the sake of the analysis; however, it is not strictly
true. Drag may affect amount of fuel used during climb, descent, and the reserve
mission. These effects will be much smaller than the effect on cruise and ignoring
their impact should not impact the trends of this analysis.
Since 𝑈𝐸𝑊 will not affect MTOW, it will is expected to have no direct impact on
fuel consumption during taxi out, takeoff, or climb mission segments.
Generally, all fuel consumed in pre-cruise segments will scale with maximum take-




Increasing the post-sizing fuel of the aircraft is expected to incur a penalty on the
empty weight of the vehicle. The amount of penalty per percent increase in fuel will be
aircraft specific; however, the general form of the impact is easy to address. Once the
penalty function has been determined and converted to a percent empty weight, the
additional weight will affect the vehicle’s empty weight in exactly the same manner
as the empty weight uncertainty parameter (𝑈𝐸𝑊 ). However, the penalty will not
degrade the aircraft’s fuel as 𝑈𝐸𝑊 did, instead increasing the takeoff weight of the
vehicle. Thus, the direct impact of . . . Both the additional fuel and the weight penalty
for that fuel will increase the MTOW of the aircraft.
𝑊0 = 𝑊𝐸 (1 + 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦 (𝑀𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙)) +𝑊𝑃𝐿 +𝑊𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑤 +𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙 (1 +𝑀𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙) (78)
Δ𝑊 0 = 𝑊𝐸 (𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦 (𝑀𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙)) +𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙 (𝑀𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙) (79)
A.2.3 All impacts
A.2.3.1 Initial cruise weight
𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 = 𝑊0 −𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑡 −𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑜𝑓𝑓 −𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑏 (80)
𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 ∝ 𝑊0 (81)
Since 𝑊0 is fixed with regards to changes in uncertain variables, the aircraft
fuel weight must adjust when the empty weight factor is non-zero. Rearranging
Equation (54), yields Equation (82).
𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙 = 𝑊0 −𝑊𝐸 −𝑊𝑃𝐿 −𝑊𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑤 (82)
𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙 (𝑈𝐸𝑊 ) = 𝑊0 −𝑊𝐸 * (1 + 𝑈𝐸𝑊 )−𝑊𝑃𝐿 −𝑊𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑤 (83)
Δ𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙 (𝑈𝐸𝑊 ) = −𝑊𝐸 * 𝑈𝐸𝑊 (84)
The initial cruise weight is assumed to be proportional to MTOW. Thus, the new
initial cruise weight will change proportionally to the change in MTOW, as shown in
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Equation (85)




It was assumed that the maximum takeoff weight is not dependent on the uncertain
variables. Thus, Equation (79) shows MTOW to be only dependent on the impact of
the fuel addition mitigation action.
Substituting Equation (79) into Equation (85), yields Equation (86) where the
initial cruise weight is dependent only upon the fuel addition mitigation action.
𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑁𝑒𝑤 =𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
* 𝑊𝐸 (1 + 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦 (𝑀𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙)) +𝑊𝑃𝐿 +𝑊𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑤 +𝑊𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙 (1 +𝑀𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙)
𝑊0
(86)
new initial cruise weight, simplified




















𝑊𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∝ 𝑊𝑍𝐹𝑊 (89)
Zero-fuel weight
𝑊𝑍𝐹𝑊 = 𝑊𝐸 (1 + 𝑈𝐸𝑊 ) (1 + 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦 (𝑀𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙)) +𝑊𝑃𝐿 +𝑊𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑤 (90)
Percent change in zero-fuel weight
Δ𝑊𝑍𝐹𝑊 = 𝑊𝐸 * 𝑈𝐸𝑊 +𝑊𝐸 * 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦 (𝑀𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙) +𝑊𝐸 * 𝑈𝐸𝑊 * 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦 (𝑀𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙) (91)
Since 𝑈𝐸𝑊 and the weight penalty from the fuel addition mitigation action are ex-
pected to be small, their product will be considered negligible.
𝑈𝐸𝑊 * 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦 (𝑀𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙) ≈ 0 (92)
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Thus, the change in zero-fuel weight is
Δ𝑊𝑍𝐹𝑊 ≈ 𝑊𝐸 * 𝑈𝐸𝑊 +𝑊𝐸 * 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦 (𝑀𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙) (93)
and the percent change in zero-fuel weight is
%𝑊𝑍𝐹𝑊 ≈
𝑊𝐸 * 𝑈𝐸𝑊 +𝑊𝐸 * 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦 (𝑀𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙)
𝑊𝐸 +𝑊𝑃𝐿 +𝑊𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑤
(94)
Since landing weight it proportional to zero-fuel weight
𝑊𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∝ 𝑊𝑍𝐹𝑊 (95)
%𝑊𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 = %𝑊𝑍𝐹𝑊 ≈






(𝑈𝐸𝑊 + 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦 (𝑀𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙)) (97)
A.2.3.2 Final Cruise Weight
The logic for the determining the new final cruise weight is identical to that of the
landing weight. Thus, the details of the math will be omitted for brevity.
%𝑊𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 = %𝑊𝑍𝐹𝑊 ≈










(𝑈𝐸𝑊 + 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦 (𝑀𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙)) (100)
A.2.4 Weight Impact on L/D







































𝑊𝐸 (1 + 𝑈𝐸𝑊 ) (1 + 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦 (𝑀𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙)) +𝑊𝑃𝐿 +𝑊𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑤
𝑊𝑍𝐹𝑊
(104)
Since both 𝑈𝐸𝑊 and 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦 (𝑀𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙) are small, it will be assume that their product
is negligible. This yields Equation (105).





* (𝑈𝐸𝑊 + 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦 (𝑀𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙))
)︂
(105)
Substituting Equations (87) and (105) into Equation (103) yields the solution for






















* (𝑈𝐸𝑊 + 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦 (𝑀𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙))
)︂ (106)











𝐶𝐷𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑒 = 𝐶𝐷𝑚𝑖𝑛 +𝐾(𝐶𝐿𝐶𝑟𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑒 − 𝐶𝐿𝑚𝑖𝑛)
2 (108)


































Also recall that the other uncertainty parameter, drag uncertainty, will have a large
impact on cruise. The drag uncertainty will apply a direct scalar to the cruise drag.
This will alter the lift-to-drag ratio from Equation (111) by adding the drag factor as































)︁2)︂ 1(1 + 𝑈𝐷)
(113)





























































































































































































































)︁ − 1 (123)
A.4 Compliance
To test for compliance, M is set to 0 and the above equations are evaluated. This will
reduce the complexity of previous equations.
Adding a constraint on the maximum approach speed of the vehicle to Equa-





(1 + 𝑈𝐸𝑊 ) (1 + 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦 (𝑀)) (124)






(1 + 𝑈𝐸𝑊 ) (125)

















When measuring compliance without mitigation actions, the range equation can
















The probability of compliance can be calculated by evaluating these equations




GOODNESS OF FIT METRICS FOR NEURAL
NETWORKS
The following tables and figures contain the goodness of fit measures for the surrogate
models used in Chapter 6. The data used to create these responses are based off
the the model in Section 6.7. These surrogate models were generated using the
Basic Regression Analysis for Integrated Neural Networks (BRAINN) [42], which
also created these goodness of fit metrics.
Tables 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 25, 27, 29, 31 and 33 show the basic statistical measures
of accuracy of each response. Tables 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, 32 and 34 contain
detailed percentiles of the error distributions associated with each response model.
Figures 80 to 89 show the distribution of the model fit error and model representation
error as well as both actual and residual by predicted plots of the surrogate model.
Table 15: Block Fuel for Design Range (𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒) Statistics
Statistic Value
Number of hidden nodes 5
R-square of Training Set 0.999375
R-square of Validation Set 0.999356
R-square of Test Set N/A
Model Fit Error (𝜇) 0.000408014
Model Fit Error (𝜎) 0.346837
Model Representation Error (𝜇) 0.00449382
Model Representation Error (𝜎) 0.3517
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Table 16: Block Fuel for Design Range (𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒) Quantiles












Figure 80: Goodness of Fit: Block Fuel for Design Range
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Table 17: Block Fuel for Economic Mission Range (𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛) Statistics
Statistic Value
Number of hidden nodes 5
R-square of Training Set 0.995435
R-square of Validation Set 0.998758
R-square of Test Set N/A
Model Fit Error (𝜇) -0.000505608
Model Fit Error (𝜎) 0.548162
Model Representation Error (𝜇) -0.00657038
Model Representation Error (𝜎) 0.28511
Table 18: Block Fuel for Economic Mission Range (𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛) Quantiles












Table 19: Maximum Fuel Capacity (MaxFuel) Statistics
Statistic Value
Number of hidden nodes 5
R-square of Training Set 0.999026
R-square of Validation Set 0.998991
R-square of Test Set N/A
Model Fit Error (𝜇) -0.000452863
Model Fit Error (𝜎) 0.403246
Model Representation Error (𝜇) -0.000724607
Model Representation Error (𝜎) 0.409915
247
Figure 81: Goodness of Fit: Block Fuel for Economic Mission Range
Table 20: Maximum Fuel Capacity (𝑀𝑎𝑥𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙) Quantiles













Figure 82: Goodness of Fit: Maximum Fuel Capacity
Table 21: Operating Empty Weight (𝑂𝐸𝑊𝑢) Statistics
Statistic Value
Number of hidden nodes 5
R-square of Training Set 0.998432
R-square of Validation Set 0.998325
R-square of Test Set N/A
Model Fit Error (𝜇) -0.00219417
Model Fit Error (𝜎) 0.530251
Model Representation Error (𝜇) -0.0026155
Model Representation Error (𝜎) 0.536177
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Table 22: Operating Empty Weight (𝑂𝐸𝑊𝑢) Quantiles












Figure 83: Goodness of Fit: Operating Empty Weight
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Table 23: Ramp Weight (𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑊𝑡) Statistics
Statistic Value
Number of hidden nodes 5
R-square of Training Set 0.998881
R-square of Validation Set 0.998797
R-square of Test Set N/A
Model Fit Error (𝜇) 0.000956923
Model Fit Error (𝜎) 0.43256
Model Representation Error (𝜇) -0.00435292
Model Representation Error (𝜎) 0.440997
Table 24: Ramp Weight (𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑊𝑡) Quantiles












Table 25: Range at Design Payload (𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒) Statistics
Statistic Value
Number of hidden nodes 5
R-square of Training Set 0.999565
R-square of Validation Set 0.999549
R-square of Test Set N/A
Model Fit Error (𝜇) 0.000235218
Model Fit Error (𝜎) 0.300397
Model Representation Error (𝜇) -0.000797779
Model Representation Error (𝜎) 0.302675
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Figure 84: Goodness of Fit: Ramp Weight
Table 26: Range at Design Payload (𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒) Quantiles













Figure 85: Goodness of Fit: Range at Design Payload
Table 27: Rate of Climb (𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑜𝑓𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑏) Statistics
Statistic Value
Number of hidden nodes 5
R-square of Training Set 0.99964
R-square of Validation Set 0.999686
R-square of Test Set N/A
Model Fit Error (𝜇) -0.000143708
Model Fit Error (𝜎) 0.29485
Model Representation Error (𝜇) -0.00334495
Model Representation Error (𝜎) 0.271658
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Table 28: Rate of Climb (𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑜𝑓𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑏) Quantiles












Figure 86: Goodness of Fit: Rate of Climb
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Table 29: Span (𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑛) Statistics
Statistic Value
Number of hidden nodes 5
R-square of Training Set 0.999328
R-square of Validation Set 0.999266
R-square of Test Set N/A
Model Fit Error (𝜇) -0.00182156
Model Fit Error (𝜎) 0.343902
Model Representation Error (𝜇) -0.00303405
Model Representation Error (𝜎) 0.350375
Table 30: Span (𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑛) Quantiles












Table 31: Takeoff Field Length (𝑇𝑂𝐹𝐿) Statistics
Statistic Value
Number of hidden nodes 5
R-square of Training Set 0.95659
R-square of Validation Set 0.946081
R-square of Test Set N/A
Model Fit Error (𝜇) -1.31359E-05
Model Fit Error (𝜎) 1.96838
Model Representation Error (𝜇) 0.0215579
Model Representation Error (𝜎) 2.19783
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Figure 87: Goodness of Fit: Span
Table 32: Takeoff Field Length (𝑇𝑂𝐹𝐿) Quantiles













Figure 88: Goodness of Fit: Takeoff Field Length
Table 33: Approach Speed (𝑉𝐴𝑝𝑝) Statistics
Statistic Value
Number of hidden nodes 5
R-square of Training Set 0.99975
R-square of Validation Set 0.999755
R-square of Test Set N/A
Model Fit Error (𝜇) -0.000575597
Model Fit Error (𝜎) 0.224677
Model Representation Error (𝜇) -0.00103335
Model Representation Error (𝜎) 0.223749
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Table 34: Approach Speed (𝑉𝐴𝑝𝑝) Quantiles












Figure 89: Goodness of Fit: Approach Speed
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APPENDIX C
CODE FOR ARMOUR UNCERTAINTY
QUANTIFICATION & MANAGEMENT ENVIRONMENT
This appendix contains the logic behind the actual code implemented for the uncer-
tainty quantification and management environment behind the ARMOUR method-
ology. The method used to construct this environment is described in Section 5.9,
and the specific implementation used to generate results in Chapter 7 is described
in Section 6.9. This uncertainty Quantification and management environment was
constructed and tested in MATLAB 2014a.
1 % Run Opt UQM
2 clear
3 start time = datestr(now);
4 fprintf(1,'Start Time is %s∖n',start time);
5
6 % Disable parallel pools
7 ps = parallel.Settings;
8 ps.Pool.AutoCreate = false;
9
10 % General Settings
11 optimization method = 'GA'; % Options: GA, DIRect
12 distribution type = 'uniform'; % Options:tri-centered, ...
Rayleigh, normal, uniform, marg set distrib
13 Num Reliability Cases = 10000; % 5000;
14 Num Constr = 6;
15 GA PopulationSize = 100;
16 Mitigation Method = 'none'; %'optimize'; 'none', ...
'random search', 'sweep', '1D', 'hybrid1D'
17 default Mitigation Method = 'hybrid1D';
18 num MA levels = 5; % number of levels to divide a mitigation ...
action into for sweep
19 random search cases = 10 * num MA levels; % number of ...





23 Reliability Goal Array = [0.75; 0.76; 0.77; 0.78; 0.79; 0.8; ...
0.81; 0.82; 0.83; 0.84; 0.85; 0.86; 0.87; 0.88; 0.89; 0.9; ...
0.91; 0.92; 0.93; 0.94; 0.95; 0.96; 0.97; 0.98; 0.99; 1];
24 %Reliability Goal Array = [0.80];
25
26 Mitigation Wt Array = [0.0];
27
28 %Success Goal Array = [0.84; 0.86; 0.88; 0.94; 0.96; 0.98];
29 SSuccess Goal Array = [0.0];
30 %Success Goal Array = [0.75; 0.76; 0.77; 0.78; 0.79; 0.8; 0.81; ...
0.82; 0.83; 0.84; 0.85; 0.86; 0.87; 0.88; 0.89; 0.9; 0.91; ...
0.92; 0.93; 0.94; 0.95; 0.96; 0.97; 0.98; 0.99; 1];
31
32 % ------ File Name ------
33 file iteration = 1750;
34 sub type = [optimization method, num2str(GA PopulationSize)];
35 sub type = [sub type, ' C', num2str(Reliability Goal Array(1)), ...
'-', ...
num2str(Reliability Goal Array(size(Reliability Goal Array,1)))];
36 sub type = [sub type, ' S', num2str(Success Goal Array(1)), '-', ...
num2str(Success Goal Array(size(Success Goal Array,1)))];
37 if strcmp(Mitigation Method, 'none')
38 mitigation info = [sub type, ' def'];
39 useM = default Mitigation Method;
40 end
41 create out file;
42
43 %------------------------------
44 % GA Options
45 options GA = gaoptimset('Display', 'iter'); % iter
46 options GA = gaoptimset(options GA, 'PopulationSize', ...
GA PopulationSize);
47 %------------------------------
48 % fmincon Options
49 options = optimset('UseParallel', 'never');
50 options = optimset(options, 'Display', 'off');
51 options = optimset(options, 'Algorithm', 'sqp');





57 total time = toc;
58
59 % bound for gradient-based optimization
60 Aeq = [];
61 beq = [];
62 A = [eye(size(X0,1));-1*eye(size(X0,1))];
63 b = [UB;LB];
64 bounds = [LB,UB];
65
66 % Declaring variables
67 Reliability goal sweep count = size(Reliability Goal Array,1);
68 Mitigation Sweep count = size(Mitigation Wt Array,1);
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69 Success goal sweep count = size(Success Goal Array,1);
70 runs to perform = Reliability goal sweep count * ...
Mitigation Sweep count * Success goal sweep count;




75 fprintf(1, '============ Running %i scenarios ============∖n', ...
runs to perform);
76 fprintf(1, 'Start Time is ∖t%s∖n', datestr(now));
77 fprintf(1, 'Saving to file %s.∖n', out file);
78
79 % Establish uncertainty cases
80 S Cases = Random Cases Setup(Num Reliability Cases, Num S Vars, ...
distribution type);




85 % Main Loop
86 for j main = 1:Reliability goal sweep count
87 Reliability goal = Reliability Goal Array(j main);
88
89 for l main = 1:Success goal sweep count
90 Success goal = Success Goal Array(l main);
91
92 for k main = 1:Mitigation Sweep count
93 i main = (j main - 1)*Mitigation Sweep count * ...
Success goal sweep count + (l main - ...
1)*Mitigation Sweep count + k main;
94 if i main > 1
95 X0 = x;
96 end
97
98 Mitigation Weighting = Mitigation Wt Array(k main);
99
100 Mitigation Method = remember Mitigation Method;
101 if ((Mitigation Weighting > 0 | | Success goal > 0) && ...
strcmp(Mitigation Method, 'none'))
102 Mitigation Method = default Mitigation Method;
103 fprintf(1,'Activating Mitigation Method = %s∖n', ...
Mitigation Method);
104 end
105 temp remember Mitigation Method = Mitigation Method;
106
107 fprintf(1, '====================================∖n');
108 fprintf(1, 'Run %i of %i∖n', i main, runs to perform);
109 fprintf(1, 'Reliability goal = %5.3f, Success goal ...
= %5.3f, Mitigation Wt = %5.3f∖n', ...
Reliability goal, Success goal, Mitigation Weighting);
110 fprintf(1, 'Num Reliab Cases = %5i, Constraints = ...
%5i, Mitigation Method = %s∖n', ...
Num Reliability Cases, Num Constr, Mitigation Method);
111 if strcmp(optimization method, 'DIRect')
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112 fprintf(1, 'DIRect evals = %5i∖n', ...
DIRect maxevals);
113 elseif strcmp(optimization method, 'GA')
114 fprintf(1, 'GA PopulationSize = %5i∖n', ...
GA PopulationSize);
115 end
116 fprintf(1, '%s∖tStart Loop∖n',datestr(now));
117 StartingPoint
118
119 % Functions to optimize
120 fitness GA = @(x) fmincon interface EXS( ...
x, S Cases, Reliability goal, Num Constr, ...
Mitigation Weighting, Mitigation Method, ...
num MA levels, random search cases);
121 constraint GA = @(x) ...
fmincon interface EXS constraint(x, S Cases, ...
Reliability goal, Success goal, Num Constr, ...
Mitigation Weighting, Mitigation Method, ...
num MA levels, random search cases);
122
123 % Run global optimizer
124 fprintf(1, '%s∖tRunning %s∖n',datestr(now), ...
optimization method);
125 if strcmp(optimization method, 'DIRect')
126 [minval,xatmin] = ...
Direct(to optimize,bounds,DIRect opts,S Cases, ...
Reliability goal, Num Constr, ...
Mitigation Weighting, Mitigation Method);
127 elseif strcmp(optimization method, 'GA')
128 [xatmin, minval,EXITFLAG,OUTPUT] = ga(fitness GA, ...
size(X0,1), [], [], [], [], LB, UB, ...
constraint GA, options GA);
129 elseif strcmp(optimization method, 'skip')
130 xatmin = X0;
131 end
132 fprintf(1, '%s∖t%s Finished∖n',datestr(now), ...
optimization method);
133
134 % Calculate final values
135 if strcmp(Mitigation Method, 'none')
136 Mitigation Method = default Mitigation Method;
137 end
138 [AA final Block Fuel, AA final Reliability, ...
AA final Reliability MA, S fail, S fail MA, ...
Reliability Individual, Expected BlockFuel Des, ...
Expected BlockFuel DOC] = Evaluate X S(xatmin, ...
S Cases, Reliability goal, Mitigation Method, ...
Num Constr, num MA levels, random search cases,1);
139 Mitigation Method = temp remember Mitigation Method;
140
141 % Save global results
142 xatmin array(:,i main) = xatmin;
143 x = xatmin;
144 AA Global Reliability(i main) = AA final Reliability;
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145 AA Global Reliability MA(i main) = ...
AA final Reliability MA;
146 AA Global Reliability Individual(:,i main) = ...
Reliability Individual;
147 AA Global Block Fuel(i main) = AA final Block Fuel;
148 AA Global Expected BF Des(i main) = ...
Expected BlockFuel Des;
149 AA Global Expected BF DOC(i main) = ...
Expected BlockFuel DOC;
150 if strcmp(optimization method, 'GA')




154 % Run gradient-based optimizer
155 fprintf(1, '%s∖tRunning fmincon∖n',datestr(now));
156 [x,FVAL,EXITFLAG,OUTPUT] = fmincon(fitness GA, x, A, ...
b, Aeq, beq, LB, UB, constraint GA, options);
157 fprintf(1, '%s∖tFinished fmincon∖n',datestr(now));
158
159 % Final Values
160 fprintf(1, '%s∖tCalculating Final ...
Values∖n',datestr(now));
161 if strcmp(Mitigation Method, 'none')
162 Mitigation Method = default Mitigation Method;
163 end
164 [AA final Block Fuel, AA final Reliability, ...
AA final Reliability MA, ~, ~, ...
Reliability Individual, Expected BlockFuel Des, ...
Expected BlockFuel DOC, Expected Range, ...
Expected TOFL, Expected VAPP, ...
Expected RateofClimb, Expected Span, ...
Expected RampWt, Expected MaxFuel, Expected OEW, ...
Expected Fuel Used] = Evaluate X S(x, S Cases, ...
Reliability goal, Mitigation Method, Num Constr, ...
num MA levels, random search cases,1);
165 Mitigation Method = temp remember Mitigation Method;
166
167 % Save results
168 fprintf(1, '%s∖tSaving Results∖n',datestr(now));
169 x array(:,i main) = x;
170 AA array Reliability(i main) = AA final Reliability;
171 AA array Reliability MA(i main) = ...
AA final Reliability MA;
172 AA array Reliability Individual(:,i main) = ...
Reliability Individual;
173 AA array Block Fuel(i main) = AA final Block Fuel;
174 AA array Expected BF Des(i main) = ...
Expected BlockFuel Des;
175 AA array Expected BF DOC(i main) = ...
Expected BlockFuel DOC;
176 EXITFLAG array(i main) = EXITFLAG;
177 iterations array(i main) = OUTPUT.iterations;
178 function calls array(i main) = OUTPUT.funcCount;
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179 Reliability goal out array(i main) = Reliability goal;
180 Success goal out array(i main) = Success goal;
181 Mitigation Weight out array(i main) = ...
Mitigation Weighting;
182
183 % Time per call
184 total time = total time + toc;














198 fprintf(1,'Start Time was %s∖n',start time);
199 fprintf(1,'End Time is %s∖n',datestr(now));
200
201 fid = fopen(out file,'a+');




1 % Run MCS
2 clear
3 start time = datestr(now);
4 fprintf(1,'Start Time is %s∖n',start time);
5
6 % General Settings
7 x cases = 5000;
8 optimization method = 'MCS'; % Options: GA, DIRect
9 distribution type = 'uniform'; % Options:tri-centered, ...
Rayleigh, normal, uniform, marg set distrib
10 Num Reliability Cases = 5000; % 50000;
11 Num Constr = 6;
12 Mitigation Method = '1D'; %'optimize'; 'none', ...
'random search', 'sweep', '1D', 'hybrid1D'
13 num MA levels = 5; % number of levels to divide a mitigation ...
action into for sweep
14 random search cases = 10 * num MA levels; % number of ...




18 % ------ File Name ------
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19 file iteration = 2011;
20 sub type = ['x', int2str(x cases)];





26 total time = toc;
27
28 % Declaring variables
29 runs to perform = x cases;
30 basic variable declaration;
31 x array = rand(size(X0,1), runs to perform);
32 Reliability goal = 0;




37 fprintf(1, '============ Running %i scenarios ============∖n', ...
runs to perform);
38 fprintf(1,'Start Time is ∖t%s∖n',datestr(now));
39 fprintf(1,'Saving to file %s.∖n',out file);
40
41 % Establish uncertainty cases
42 rng(0);
43 S Cases = Random Cases Setup(Num Reliability Cases, Num S Vars, ...
distribution type);
44 Set S matrix;
45 rng('shuffle');
46




51 % Main Loop
52 for i main = 1:x cases
53 x = x array(:, i main);
54 if (rem(i main,check after) == 0)
55 fprintf(1,'%s ∖tRunning Case %i of %i∖n', datestr(now), ...
i main, x cases);
56 end
57
58 % Calculate performance
59 [AA final Block Fuel, AA final Reliability, ...
AA final Reliability MA, ~, ~, Reliability Individual, ...
Expected BlockFuel Des, Expected BlockFuel DOC, ...
Expected Range, Expected TOFL, Expected VAPP, ...
Expected RateofClimb, Expected Span, Expected RampWt, ...
Expected MaxFuel, Expected OEW, Expected Fuel Used] = ...
60 Evaluate X S(x, S Cases, 0.8, Mitigation Method, ...
Num Constr, num MA levels, random search cases);
61
62 % Save results
63 %x array(:,i main) = x;
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64 AA array Reliability(i main) = AA final Reliability;
65 AA array Reliability MA(i main) = AA final Reliability MA;
66 AA array Reliability Individual(:,i main) = ...
Reliability Individual;
67 AA array Block Fuel(i main) = AA final Block Fuel;
68 AA array Expected BF Des(i main) = Expected BlockFuel Des;







76 fprintf(1, 'Start Time was %s∖n', start time);
77 fprintf(1, 'End Time is %s∖n', datestr(now));
78
79 fid = fopen(out file,'a+');




1 % Run DOE.m
2 clear
3 start time = datestr(now);
4 fprintf(1,'Start Time is %s∖n',start time);
5
6 % Read in design of experiments
7 doe filename = 'doe baseline opt.txt';
8 delimiterIn = '∖t';
9 headerlinesIn = 1;
10 DoeTable = importdata(doe filename,delimiterIn,headerlinesIn);
11 x cases = size(DoeTable.data,1);
12
13 first col = DoeTable.colheaders(1);
14 if strcmp (first col, 'Case') | | strcmp (first col, 'CASE')
15 has case col = 1;
16 elseif strcmp (first col, 'TWR')
17 has case col = 0;
18 else





23 % General Settings
24 optimization method = 'DoE'; % Options: GA, DIRect
25 distribution type = 'uniform';
26 Num Reliability Cases = 10000; %5000;
27 Num Constr = 6;
28 Mitigation Method = 'hybrid1D'; %random search, 'optimize', ...
'sweep', '1D', 'hybrid1D'
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29 num MA levels = 20; % number of levels to divide a mitigation ...
action into for sweep
30 random search cases = 40 * num MA levels; % number of ...




34 % ------ File Name ------
35 file iteration = 3000;
36 sub type = doe filename;





42 total time = toc;
43
44 % Declaring variables
45 runs to perform = x cases;
46 basic variable declaration;
47 Reliability goal = 0.0;
48 Mitigation Weighting = 0;
49
50 % Establish uncertainty cases
51 rng(0);
52 S Cases = Random Cases Setup(Num Reliability Cases, Num S Vars, ...
distribution type);
53 Set S matrix;
54 rng('shuffle');
55




60 % Main Loop
61 for i main = 1:x cases
62 if (rem(i main,check after) == 0)
63 fprintf(1,'%s ∖tRunning Case %i of %i∖n', datestr(now), ...
i main, x cases);
64 end
65
66 % Read design
67 i var = 0 + has case col;
68 TWR = DoeTable.data(i main,i var+1); i var=i var+1;
69 WSR = DoeTable.data(i main,i var+1); i var=i var+1;
70 AR = DoeTable.data(i main,i var+1); i var=i var+1;
71 EWMARG = DoeTable.data(i main,i var+1); i var=i var+1;
72 FCDSUB = DoeTable.data(i main,i var+1); i var=i var+1;
73 FACT = DoeTable.data(i main,i var+1); i var=i var+1;
74 LapseRate = DoeTable.data(i main,i var+1); i var=i var+1;
75 FPR = DoeTable.data(i main,i var+1); i var=i var+1;
76 OPR = DoeTable.data(i main,i var+1); i var=i var+1;
77




81 % Set values for records
82 for i var = 1:9




86 % Calculate performance
87 [AA final Block Fuel, AA final Reliability, ...
AA final Reliability MA, ~, ~, Reliability Individual, ...
Expected BlockFuel Des, Expected BlockFuel DOC, ...
Expected Range, Expected TOFL, Expected VAPP, ...
Expected RateofClimb, Expected Span, Expected RampWt, ...
Expected MaxFuel, Expected OEW, Expected Fuel Used] = ...
88 Evaluate X S(x, S Cases, Reliability goal, ...
Mitigation Method, Num Constr, num MA levels, ...
random search cases);
89
90 % Save results
91 x array(:,i main) = x;
92 AA array Reliability(i main) = AA final Reliability;
93 AA array Reliability MA(i main) = AA final Reliability MA;
94 AA array Reliability Individual(:,i main) = ...
Reliability Individual;
95 AA array Block Fuel(i main) = AA final Block Fuel;
96 AA array Expected BF Des(i main) = Expected BlockFuel Des;







104 fprintf(1,'Start Time was %s∖n',start time);
105 fprintf(1,'End Time is %s∖n',datestr(now));
106
107 fid = fopen(out file,'a+');




1 %basic variable declaration.m
2
3 xatmin array = zeros(size(X0, 1), ...
runs to perform);
4 AA Global Reliability = zeros(1, runs to perform);
5 AA Global Reliability MA = zeros(1, runs to perform);
6 AA Global Block Fuel = zeros(1, runs to perform);
7 AA Global Expected BF Des = zeros(1, runs to perform);
8 AA Global Expected BF DOC = zeros(1, runs to perform);
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9 AA Global Reliability Individual = zeros(Num Constr, ...
runs to perform);
10 Reliability goal out array = zeros(runs to perform, 1);
11 Mitigation Weight out array = zeros(runs to perform, 1);
12 Success goal out array = zeros(runs to perform, 1);
13
14 x array = zeros(size(X0,1), ...
runs to perform);
15 x scaled = zeros(size(X0,1), ...
runs to perform);
16 AA array Reliability = zeros(1, runs to perform);
17 AA array Reliability MA = zeros(1, runs to perform);
18 AA array Block Fuel = zeros(1, runs to perform);
19 AA array Expected BF Des = zeros(1, runs to perform);
20 AA array Expected BF DOC = zeros(1, runs to perform);
21 AA array Reliability Individual = zeros(Num Constr, ...
runs to perform);
22 EXITFLAG array = zeros(1, runs to perform);
23 iterations array = zeros(1, runs to perform);
24 function calls array = zeros(1, runs to perform);
25 function calls global array = zeros(1, runs to perform);
1 % calculate MA penalty.m
2
3 if MTOW MA > 0
4 OWE delta = 0.0002608 .* MTOW MA .ˆ2 - 0.0063233 .* MTOW MA;
5 else
6 OWE delta = 0;
7 end
8
9 OWE delta = OWE delta + 85000/7 .* (u CLLDM - u CLLDM base) .ˆ2 + ...
3250/7 .* (u CLLDM - u CLLDM base) - 3/7;
10
11 if OWE delta < 0




3 constr Range = 7530; %6800; % 7530;
4 constr TOFL = 11000; %12000; % 11000;
5 constr VAPP = 145; % 140;
6 constr RateofClimb = 300; % 300;
7 constr Span = 215; %230; % 215;
8 constr Fuel = 0;
9
10 case constraints = zeros(Num Reliability Cases, Num Constr);
11
12 % Evaluate surrogates
13 surrogates 777 X 2014 08 19
14
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15 case constraints(:, 1) = (Range(:) - constr Range) /constr Range;
16 case constraints(:, 2) = (constr TOFL - TOFL(:)) /constr TOFL;
17 case constraints(:, 3) = (constr VAPP - VAPP(:)) /constr VAPP;
18 case constraints(:, 4) = (RateofClimb(:) - constr RateofClimb) ...
/constr RateofClimb;
19 case constraints(:, 5) = (constr Span - Span(:)) /constr Span;
20 case constraints(:, 6) = ((MaxFuel(:) - Fuel Used(:)) - ...
constr Fuel) ./ MaxFuel(:);
21 if MTOW MA <= 0
22 case constraints(:, 6) = 1;
23 end
1 %create out file.m
2 out folder = 'results∖';
3 run type = [optimization method, ' '];
4 rel info = ['R', int2str(Num Reliability Cases), ' '];
5
6 if ~exist('useM','var')
7 useM = Mitigation Method;
8 end
9 mitigation info = [' ', useM];
10
11 if (strcmp(useM,'1D'))
12 mitigation info = [mitigation info, ' ', int2str(num MA levels)];
13 elseif (strcmp(useM,'sweep'))
14 mitigation info = [mitigation info, ' ', int2str(num MA levels)];
15 elseif (strcmp(useM,'optimize'))
16 mitigation info = mitigation info;
17 elseif (strcmp(useM,'random search'))
18 mitigation info = [mitigation info, ' ', ...
int2str(random search cases)];
19 elseif (strcmp(useM,'hybrid1D'))
20 mitigation info = [mitigation info, ' ', ...
int2str(num MA levels), ' ', int2str(random search cases)];
21 else
22 mitigation info = mitigation info;
23 end
24
25 out file = [out folder, run type, rel info, sub type, ...
mitigation info, '-', int2str(file iteration), '.csv'];
26 while exist(out file)
27 file iteration = file iteration + 1;
28 out file = [out folder, run type, rel info, sub type, ...
mitigation info, '-', int2str(file iteration), '.csv'];
29 end
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1 function [met constraints, case constraints, BlockFuel Des, ...
Expected BlockFuel Des, Expected BlockFuel DOC, ...
Expected Range, Expected TOFL, Expected VAPP, ...
Expected RateofClimb, Expected Span, Expected RampWt, ...
Expected MaxFuel, Expected OEW, Expected Fuel Used] = ...
evaluate constraints(Num Constr, Num Reliability Cases, TWR, ...
WSR, AR, EWMARG, FCDSUB, FACT, LapseRate, FPR, OPR, u FCDSUB, ...
u EWMARG, u AITEK, u FACT, MTOW MA, OWE delta, u CLLDM, u Rating)
2
3 if (Num Reliability Cases ~= size(u FCDSUB,1))
4 fprintf(1,'Num Reliability Cases (%i) ~= size(u FCDSUB,1) ...





9 met constraints = min(min(case constraints));
10
11 Expected BlockFuel Des = mean(BlockFuel Des);
12 Expected BlockFuel DOC = mean(BlockFuel DOC);
13 Expected Range = mean(Range);
14 Expected TOFL = mean(TOFL);
15 Expected VAPP = mean(VAPP);
16 Expected RateofClimb = mean(RateofClimb);
17 Expected Span = mean(Span);
18 Expected RampWt = mean(RampWt);
19 Expected MaxFuel = mean(MaxFuel);
20 Expected OEW = mean(OEW);
21 Expected Fuel Used = mean(Fuel Used);
1 function [met constraints, case constraints, BlockFuel DOC] = ...
2 evaluate constraints MA(Num Constr, Num Reliability Cases, ...
3 TWR, WSR, AR, EWMARG, FCDSUB, FACT, LapseRate, FPR, OPR, ...
4 u FCDSUB, u EWMARG, u AITEK, u FACT, ...





10 if to examine > 0
11 met constraints = zeros(Num Reliability Cases, 1);
12 for i = 1:Num Constr
13 met constraints = met constraints + ...
max(10.ˆ(-case constraints(:, i)), 1);
14 end
15 else
16 met constraints = transpose(min( transpose( case constraints)));
17 end
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1 function [met constraints] = evaluate constraints MA opt(MA norm, ...
Num Constr, Num Reliability Cases, TWR, WSR, AR, EWMARG, ...
FCDSUB, FACT, LapseRate, FPR, OPR, u FCDSUB, u EWMARG, ...
u AITEK, u FACT, to examine)
2
3 NN Baselines 2014 08 19
4
5 MTOW MA = MA norm(1) * (MTOW MA max - MTOW MA min) + MTOW MA min;
6 u CLLDM = MA norm(2) * (u CLLDM max - u CLLDM min) + u CLLDM min;
7 u Rating = MA norm(3) * (u Rating max - u Rating min) + u Rating min;




12 if to examine > 0
13 met constraints = zeros(Num Reliability Cases, 1);
14 for i = 1:Num Constr
15 met constraints = met constraints + ...
max(10.ˆ(-case constraints(:, i)), .999);
16 end
17 if MA norm(1) < MTOW MA base
18 MA norm(1) = 0;
19 end
20 met constraints = met constraints + sum(MA norm)/1000;
21
22 elseif to examine == -100
23 met constraints = zeros(Num Reliability Cases, 1);
24
25 for i = 1:Num Constr
26 met constraints = met constraints + ...
max(10.ˆ(-case constraints(:, i)), .999);
27 end
28 if MA norm(1) < MTOW MA base
29 MA norm(1) = 0;
30 end




35 met constraints = max(min(transpose(case constraints)))
36 end
1 function [desBlockFuel, Reliability, Reliability MA, S fail, ...
S fail MA, Reliability Individual, Expected BlockFuel Des, ...
Expected BlockFuel DOC, Expected Range, Expected TOFL, ...
Expected VAPP, Expected RateofClimb, Expected Span, ...
Expected RampWt, Expected MaxFuel, Expected OEW, ...
Expected Fuel Used] = Evaluate X S(x, S Cases, ...
Reliability goal, Mitigation Method, Num Constr, ...




4 NN Baselines 2014 08 19
5 Num Reliability Cases = size(S Cases,1);
6
7 % Reset Variables
8 Reliability = 0;
9 Reliability MA = 0;
10 S fail = S Cases;
11 S fail MA = S Cases;
12 Expected BlockFuel Des = 0;
13 Expected BlockFuel DOC = 0;




18 MTOW MA = MTOW MA base;
19 OWE delta = OWE delta base;
20 u CLLDM = u CLLDM base;
21 u Rating = u Rating base;
22
23 [~, constraints out, desBlockFuel, Expected BlockFuel Des, ...
Expected BlockFuel DOC, Expected Range, Expected TOFL, ...
Expected VAPP, Expected RateofClimb, Expected Span, ...
Expected RampWt, Expected MaxFuel, Expected OEW, ...
Expected Fuel Used] = evaluate constraints(Num Constr, 1, TWR, ...
WSR, AR, EWMARG, FCDSUB, FACT, LapseRate, FPR, OPR, FCDSUB, ...
EWMARG, (u AITEK max - u AITEK min)/2, FACT, MTOW MA, ...
OWE delta, u CLLDM, u Rating);
24
25 if EWMARG > EWMARG max | | EWMARG < EWMARG min
26 Num Reliability Cases = 1;
27 constraints out(1,1) = -1;
28 Expected BlockFuel DOC = Expected BlockFuel DOC * 2;
29 elseif FCDSUB > FCDSUB max | | FCDSUB < FCDSUB min
30 Num Reliability Cases = 1;
31 constraints out(1,1) = -1;
32 Expected BlockFuel DOC = Expected BlockFuel DOC * 2;
33 elseif FACT > FACT max | | FACT < FACT min
34 Num Reliability Cases = 1;
35 constraints out(1,1) = -1;
36 Expected BlockFuel DOC = Expected BlockFuel DOC * 2;
37 end
38
39 if Num Reliability Cases > 1 && ~(Reliability goal == 0 && ...
strcmp(Mitigation Method,'none'))
40 Set S matrix;
41
42 [~, constraints out, ~, Expected BlockFuel Des, ...
Expected BlockFuel DOC, Expected Range, Expected TOFL, ...
Expected VAPP, Expected RateofClimb, Expected Span, ...
Expected RampWt, Expected MaxFuel, Expected OEW, ...
Expected Fuel Used] = evaluate constraints(Num Constr, ...
Num Reliability Cases, TWR, WSR, AR, EWMARG, FCDSUB, FACT, ...
LapseRate, FPR, OPR, u FCDSUB, u EWMARG, u AITEK, u FACT, ...
MTOW MA, OWE delta, u CLLDM, u Rating);
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43
44 constraints passed = transpose(sum( transpose( ...
constraints out>0)));
45 sum success = sum(constraints passed>=Num Constr);
46 mitigate = 1;
47
48 % Catch cases which fail TOFL or Span.
49 % - The impact of uncertain variables is incredibly small.
50 % - Any failures means that the design should fail.
51 min constraints = min(constraints out);
52 if (min constraints(1,2) < 0) | | (min constraints(1,5) < 0)
53 sum success = 0;
54 if (min constraints(1,5) < 0)
55 % span is unrecoverable. Tell the mitigation solver ...
not to bother
56 mitigate = 0;
57 end
58 end
59 Reliability = sum success/Num Reliability Cases;
60 if Reliability < Reliability goal * 0.9;
61 mitigate = 0;
62 end
63
64 if Mitigation Weighting == 0
65 mitigate = 0;
66 end
67
68 % initialize values
69 Num Mitigation Cases = 1;
70 sum recovery = 0;
71
72 if (Reliability > 1)
73 fprintf(1,'Reliability = %f; This should never ...
happen!∖n',Reliability);
74 elseif(mitigate == 0)
75 % something has told the algorithm not to mitigate
76 elseif (Reliability == 1)
77 %fprintf(1,'Full reliability∖n');
78 elseif (Reliability < 1)
79 S and results = [S Cases, constraints passed, ...
constraints out];
80 S and results sorted = sortrows(S and results, Num S Vars ...
+ 1);
81 S fail and results = ...
S and results sorted(1:(Num Reliability Cases - ...
sum success), :);
82 S fail and results(:, Num S Vars + 1) = rand(1, ...
Num Reliability Cases - sum success);
83 S fail and results = sortrows(S fail and results, ...
Num S Vars + 1);
84 S fail = S fail and results(1:(Num Reliability Cases - ...
sum success), 1:Num S Vars);
85 Num Mitigation Cases = size(S fail, 1);
86
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87 %clear S Cases
88 S Cases = S fail;
89 Set S matrix;
90
91 if strcmp(Mitigation Method,'none')
92
93 elseif strcmp(Mitigation Method,'sweep')
94 constraints passed MA = zeros(Num Mitigation Cases, 1);
95
96 if Num Mitigation Cases > 0
97 for i = 0:num MA levels
98 for j = 0:num MA levels
99 for k = 0:num MA levels
100 MA 0 = [i, j, k] / num MA levels;
101 MA 0(1) = MA 0(1);
102
103 MTOW MA = MA 0(1) * (MTOW MA max - ...
MTOW MA min) + MTOW MA min;
104 u CLLDM = MA 0(2) * (u CLLDM max - ...
u CLLDM min) + u CLLDM min;
105 u Rating = MA 0(3) * (u Rating max - ...
u Rating min) + u Rating min;
106 calculate MA penalty;
107 [~, constraints out MA, ~, ...
Expected BlockFuel Des, ...
Expected BlockFuel DOC] = ...
evaluate constraints(Num Constr, ...
Num Mitigation Cases, TWR, WSR, ...
AR, EWMARG, FCDSUB, FACT, ...
LapseRate, FPR, OPR, u FCDSUB, ...
u EWMARG, u AITEK, u FACT, ...
MTOW MA, OWE delta, u CLLDM, ...
u Rating);
108 constraints passed MA = ...
max(constraints passed MA, ...
transpose(sum( transpose( ...
constraints out MA > 0))));
109 sum recovery = sum( ...
constraints passed MA >= Num Constr);
110 end % k
111 end % j
112 end % i
113 end
114
115 elseif strcmp(Mitigation Method,'optimize')
116
117 % Don't waste time assessing low reliability cases
118 assess full R above = 0; %max(Reliability goal, 0.75);
119 minimum assess factor = 0.01;
120 if ((Reliability < assess full R above) && ...
strcmp(Mitigation Method, 'optimize'))
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121 Num Mitigation Cases = ...
ceil(((1-assess full R above - ...
minimum assess factor) / assess full R aboveˆ2 ...
* Reliabilityˆ2 + minimum assess factor) * ...
Num Reliability Cases);
122 else
123 Num Mitigation Cases = size(S fail, 1);
124 end
125 S fail MA = ...
S fail and results(1:Num Mitigation Cases, ...
1:Num S Vars);
126 case constraints all = ...
S fail and results(1:Num Mitigation Cases, ...
Num S Vars + 2:Num S Vars + 1 + Num Constr);
127 Num Mitigation Cases = size(S fail MA, 1);
128 clear S Cases
129 S Cases = S fail MA;
130 Set S matrix;
131
132
133 options = optimset('Display','off', 'Algorithm', 'sqp');
134 MA 0 = [(MTOW MA base - MTOW MA min) / (MTOW MA max ...
- MTOW MA min), (u CLLDM base - u CLLDM min) / ...
(u CLLDM max - u CLLDM min), (u Rating base - ...
u Rating min) / (u Rating max - u Rating min)];
135 MA LB = [0, 0, 0]; MA UB = [1, 1, 1];
136 MA reset = MA 0;
137 sqp function count = 0;
138 MA memory = zeros(Num Mitigation Cases, 3);
139
140 if case constraints all(1,5) > 0 % if Span fails, ...
it's unrecoverable. Don't waste time
141 BF DOC keep = zeros(Num Mitigation Cases,1);
142 for i = 1:Num Mitigation Cases
143 clear S Cases
144 S Cases = S fail MA(i,:);
145 Set S matrix;
146 [~, case constraints test] = ...
evaluate constraints MA(Num Constr, 1, ...
TWR, WSR, AR, EWMARG, FCDSUB, FACT, ...
LapseRate, FPR, OPR, u FCDSUB, u EWMARG, ...
u AITEK, u FACT, .00001, OWE delta base, ...
u CLLDM base, u Rating base, 0);
147
148 if (case constraints test(1,1) > 0) | | ...
(case constraints test(1,6) > 0)
149 to optimize = @(MA norm) ...
evaluate constraints MA opt(MA norm, ...
Num Constr, 1, TWR, WSR, AR, EWMARG, ...
FCDSUB, FACT, LapseRate, FPR, OPR, ...
u FCDSUB, u EWMARG, u AITEK, u FACT, i);
150 MA 0 = MA reset;
151
152 if case constraints all(i,1) < 0
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153 MA 0(1) = 0.9;
154 end
155 if case constraints all(i,2) < 0 | | ...
case constraints all(i,4) < 0
156 MA 0(3) = 0.5;
157 end
158 if case constraints all(i,3) < 0
159 MA 0(2) = 0.5;
160 end
161
162 [MA out, FVAL, EXITFLAG, OUTPUT] = ...
fmincon(to optimize, MA 0, [], [], [], ...
[], MA LB, MA UB, [], options);
163
164 MTOW MA = MA out(1) * (MTOW MA max - ...
MTOW MA min) + MTOW MA min;
165 u CLLDM = MA out(2) * (u CLLDM max - ...
u CLLDM min) + u CLLDM min;
166 u Rating = MA out(3) * (u Rating max - ...
u Rating min) + u Rating min;
167 calculate MA penalty;
168
169 [met constraints, ~, BlockFuel DOC i] = ...
evaluate constraints MA(Num Constr, 1, ...
TWR, WSR, AR, EWMARG, FCDSUB, FACT, ...
LapseRate, FPR, OPR, u FCDSUB, ...
u EWMARG, u AITEK, u FACT, MTOW MA, ...
OWE delta, u CLLDM, u Rating, 0);
170
171 BF DOC keep(i) = BlockFuel DOC i;
172 sqp function count = sqp function count + ...
OUTPUT.funcCount;
173
174 if met constraints >= 0
175 sum recovery = sum recovery + 1;











187 elseif strcmp(Mitigation Method,'random search') | | ...
strcmp(Mitigation Method,'1D') | | ...
strcmp(Mitigation Method,'hybrid1D')
188
189 M0 = [(MTOW MA base - MTOW MA min) / (MTOW MA max - ...
MTOW MA min), (u CLLDM base - u CLLDM min) / ...
(u CLLDM max - u CLLDM min), (u Rating base - ...
u Rating min) / (u Rating max - u Rating min)];
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190 num MA = size(M0,2);
191 MA LB = zeros(1,num MA);
192 MA UB = ones(1,num MA);
193
194 recover test = -1*ones(Num Mitigation Cases,1);
195 M keep = ones(Num Mitigation Cases,1) * MA UB * 999;
196 M scalar = ones(Num Mitigation Cases,1) * 999;
197 BF DOC keep = zeros(Num Mitigation Cases,1);
198
199 rand Mitigation array = rand(random search cases,num MA);
200
201 oneD Mitigation array = ones((num MA levels) * 3, 1) ...
* M0;
202 for i = 1:num MA levels
203 for j = 1:size(M0,2)
204 if M0(j) == MA LB(j)
205 oneD Mitigation array(i + ...
(j-1)*num MA levels, j) = i / ...
num MA levels;
206 elseif M0(j) == MA UB(j)
207 oneD Mitigation array(i + ...
(j-1)*num MA levels, j) = (i-1) / ...
num MA levels;
208 else
209 if i/num MA levels < 0.5
210 oneD Mitigation array(i + (j-1) * ...
num MA levels, j) = (i-1) / ...
floor(num MA levels / 2) * (M0(j) ...
- MA LB(j)) + MA LB(j);
211 else
212 oneD Mitigation array(i + (j-1) * ...
num MA levels, j) = (i - ...
floor(num MA levels / 2)) / ...
ceil(num MA levels / 2) * ...






218 if (strcmp(Mitigation Method, 'random search'))
219 Mitigation array = rand Mitigation array;
220 elseif (strcmp(Mitigation Method, '1D'))
221 Mitigation array = oneD Mitigation array;
222 elseif (strcmp(Mitigation Method, 'hybrid1D'))




226 for i = 1:size(Mitigation array,1)
227 mi = sumsqr(Mitigation array(i,:) - M0);
228
229 MTOW MA = Mitigation array(i,1) .* (MTOW MA max ...
- MTOW MA min) + MTOW MA min;
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230 u CLLDM = Mitigation array(i,2) .* (u CLLDM max ...
- u CLLDM min) + u CLLDM min;
231 u Rating = Mitigation array(i,3) .* (u Rating max ...
- u Rating min) + u Rating min;
232 calculate MA penalty;
233
234 [met constraints, ~, BlockFuel DOC] = ...
evaluate constraints MA(Num Constr, ...
Num Mitigation Cases, TWR, WSR, AR, EWMARG, ...
FCDSUB, FACT, LapseRate, FPR, OPR, u FCDSUB, ...
u EWMARG, u AITEK, u FACT, MTOW MA, OWE delta, ...
u CLLDM, u Rating, 0);
235
236 M scalar(met constraints >= 0) = ...
min(M scalar(met constraints >= 0),mi);
237 recover test = max(recover test,met constraints);
238
239 for j ma = 1:num MA
240 M keep(M scalar == mi, j ma) = ...
Mitigation array(i, j ma);
241 end
242 BF DOC keep(M scalar == mi) = ...
BlockFuel DOC(M scalar == mi);
243 end
244 sum recovery = sum(recover test >=0);
245 else
246 Mitigation Method = 'not recognized';





251 Reliability MA = sum recovery / Num Mitigation Cases * (1 - ...
Reliability) + Reliability;
252 if exist('M keep','var')
253 M keep = sortrows(M keep);
254 M keep = M keep(1:sum(M keep(:,1)<999),:);
255 end
256 else
257 Reliability = 1;
258 if min(constraints out) < 0





264 if exist('constraints out','var')
265 Reliability Individual = ...
transpose(sum(constraints out>0)/Num Reliability Cases);
266 else
267 Reliability Individual = zeros(Num Constr,1);
268 end
269
270 if exist('sum recovery','var') && sum recovery>0
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271 Recovered BF DOC = mean(BF DOC keep(BF DOC keep > 0));
272 oldExpected BlockFuel DOC = Expected BlockFuel DOC;
273 Expected BlockFuel DOC = (Expected BlockFuel DOC * ...
Reliability + Recovered BF DOC * sum recovery / ...
Num Mitigation Cases * (1 - Reliability)) / Reliability MA;
274 end
1 function [to return, desBlockFuel, Reliability MA, S fail, ...
S fail MA, Reliability] = fmincon interface EXS(x, S Cases, ...
Reliability goal, Num Constr, Mitigation Weighting, ...
Mitigation Method, num MA levels, random search cases)
2
3 [desBlockFuel, Reliability, Reliability MA, S fail, S fail MA, ~, ...
~, Expected BlockFuel DOC] = Evaluate X S(x, S Cases, ...
Reliability goal, Mitigation Method, Num Constr, ...
num MA levels, random search cases, Mitigation Weighting);
4 to return = (1 - Mitigation Weighting) * ...
Expected BlockFuel DOC/100000 - Mitigation Weighting * ...
Reliability MA;
1 function [to return, to return2]= ...
fmincon interface EXS constraint(x, S Cases, Reliability goal, ...
Success goal, Num Constr, Mitigation Weighting, ...
Mitigation Method, num MA levels, random search cases)
2
3 if (Success goal == 0)
4 Mitigation Weighting = 0;
5 Mitigation Method = 'none';
6 end
7
8 [~, ~, Reliability MA, ~, ~, Reliability] = ...
fmincon interface EXS(x, S Cases, Reliability goal, ...
Num Constr, 1, Mitigation Method, num MA levels, ...
random search cases);
9 to return = max(Reliability goal - Reliability, Success goal - ...
Reliability MA);
10 if Reliability goal == 0 && Success goal == 0
11 if Reliability == 0
12 to return = 1;
13 end
14 end
15 to return2 = 0;
1 % NN Baselines 2014 08 19.m
2
3 % ---- Design Variables ----
4 Num X Vars = 9;
5 % Baseline, min, and max values for NNs
6 TWR base = 0.296195; TWR min = 0.26; TWR max = 0.34;
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7 WSR base = 133.3391; WSR min = 126; WSR max = 140;
8 AR base = 10.0; AR min = 9.0; AR max = 11.0;
9 EWMARG base = 0.035; EWMARG min = 0.0; EWMARG max = 0.06;
10 FCDSUB base = 1.035; FCDSUB min = 1.0; FCDSUB max = 1.06;
11 FACT base = 1.035; FACT min = 1.0; FACT max = 1.06;
12 LapseRate base = 0.201439; LapseRate min = 0.18; LapseRate max = ...
0.22;
13 FPR base = 1.5; FPR min = 1.425; FPR max = 1.575;
14 OPR base = 42.58; OPR min = 38.322; OPR max = 46.838;
15
16
17 % ---- Uncertainty Variables ----
18 Num S Vars = 4;
19 u FCDSUB base = 1.0; u FCDSUB min = 0.99; u FCDSUB max = 1.06;
20 u EWMARG base = 0.0; u EWMARG min = -.01; u EWMARG max = 0.06;
21 u AITEK base = 1.95; u AITEK min = 1.9; u AITEK max = 2.0;
22 u FACT base = 1.0; u FACT min = 0.99; u FACT max = 1.06;
23
24
25 % ---- Mitigation Variables ----
26 Num M Vars = 3;
27 MTOW MA base = 0.0; MTOW MA min = -1000; MTOW MA max = 1900;
28 OWE delta base = 0.0; OWE delta min = 0.0; OWE delta max = 20000;
29 u CLLDM base = 2.413; u CLLDM min = 2.413; u CLLDM max = 2.53365;




4 fprintf(1, 'P(Compliance) = %5.3f, Goal = %5.3f∖n', ...
AA final Reliability, Reliability goal);
5 fprintf(1, 'P(Success) = %5.3f, Goal = %5.3f∖n', ...
AA final Reliability MA, Success goal);
6 fprintf(1, 'E[BF DOC] = %8.1f, Des = %8.1f∖n', ...
Expected BlockFuel DOC, Expected BlockFuel Des);




10 transpose x = transpose(x);
11 Set X;
12 AA final Output Vector = transpose([TWR; WSR; AR; EWMARG; FCDSUB; ...
FACT; LapseRate; FPR; OPR]);
1 function [S Cases] = Random Cases Setup(Num Reliability Cases, ...
Num S Vars, distribution type)
2
3 % Generate random S settings
4 % Values will be from 0 to 1
5
6 if strcmp(distribution type, 'normal')
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7 % Distribution is truncated at +/- 3 standard deviations
8 std deviations = 3;
9 S Cases = Truncated Gaussian2(0, 1, Num Reliability Cases, ...
Num S Vars, -std deviations, std deviations);
10 S Cases = S Cases / (2*std deviations) + .5;
11 end
12
13 if strcmp(distribution type, 'Rayleigh')
14 % Distribution is truncated at +3
15 S Cases = wblrnd(1, 2, Num Reliability Cases, Num S Vars);
16 for i = 1:Num Reliability Cases
17 for j = 1:Num S Vars
18 if S Cases(i,j) > 3
19 iter check = 0;
20 while S Cases(i,j) > 3 & iter check < 5
21 S Cases(i,j) = wblrnd(1,2,1,1);





27 S Cases = S Cases / 3;
28 end
29
30 if strcmp(distribution type, 'tri-centered')
31 random1 = rand(Num Reliability Cases, Num S Vars);
32 random2 = rand(Num Reliability Cases, Num S Vars);
33 S Cases = (random1 + random2) / 2;
34 end
35
36 if strcmp(distribution type, 'uniform')
37 S Cases = rand(Num Reliability Cases,Num S Vars);
38 end
39
40 if strcmp(distribution type, 'marg set distrib')
41 if strcmp(version, '7.14.0.739 (R2012a)')
42 % Other versions of MATLAB before R2014a will probably fail.
43 fprintf(1, 'You set the distribution type as ''%s''. ...
∖nThat won''t work in this version of MATLAB∖n', ...
distribution type);
44 else
45 S Cases = zeros(Num Reliability Cases, Num S Vars);
46 b = [0.8396; 0.9303; 0.4812; 0.9206];
47 S1 dist = makedist('Triangular', 'a', 0, 'b', b(1), 'c', 1);
48 S2 dist = makedist('Triangular', 'a', 0, 'b', b(2), 'c', 1);
49 S3 dist = makedist('Triangular', 'a', 0, 'b', b(3), 'c', 1);
50 S4 dist = makedist('Triangular', 'a', 0, 'b', b(4), 'c', 1);
51 S Cases(:,1) = random(S1 dist, Num Reliability Cases, 1);
52 S Cases(:,2) = random(S2 dist, Num Reliability Cases, 1);
53 S Cases(:,3) = random(S3 dist, Num Reliability Cases, 1);




1 %Set S matrix.m




5 u FCDSUB = S Cases(:, 1) .* (u FCDSUB max - u FCDSUB min) + ...
u FCDSUB min;
6 u EWMARG = S Cases(:, 2) .* (u EWMARG max - u EWMARG min) + ...
u EWMARG min;
7 u AITEK = S Cases(:, 3) .* (u AITEK max - u AITEK min) + u AITEK min;
8 u FACT = S Cases(:, 4) .* (u FACT max - u FACT min) + u FACT min;
1 %Set X.m
2 % Set Design Variable values
3
4 %Design Variables
5 TWR = x(1) * (TWR max - TWR min) + TWR min;
6 WSR = x(2) * (WSR max - WSR min) + WSR min;
7 AR = x(3) * (AR max - AR min) + AR min;
8 EWMARG = x(4) * (EWMARG max - EWMARG min) + EWMARG min;
9 FCDSUB = x(5) * (FCDSUB max - FCDSUB min) + FCDSUB min;
10 FACT = x(6) * (FACT max - FACT min) + FACT min;
11 LapseRate = x(i set) * (LapseRate max - LapseRate min) + ...
LapseRate min;
12 FPR = x(i set) * (FPR max - FPR min) + FPR min;
13 OPR = x(i set) * (OPR max - OPR min) + OPR min;
1 % StartingPoint.m
2 NN Baselines 2014 08 19;
3
4 % Design variables
5 TWR = TWR base;
6 WSR = WSR base;
7 AR = AR base;
8 LapseRate = LapseRate base;
9 FPR = FPR base;
10 OPR = OPR base;
11 % Margins
12 EWMARG = EWMARG base;
13 FCDSUB = FCDSUB base;
14 FACT = FACT base;
15
16 % Uncertain variables
17 u FCDSUB = u FCDSUB base;
18 u EWMARG = u EWMARG base;
19 u AITEK = u AITEK base;
20 u FACT = u FACT base;
21
22 % Mitigation variables
23 MTOW MA = MTOW MA base;
283
24 OWE delta = OWE delta base;
25 u CLLDM = u CLLDM base;
26 u Rating = u Rating base;
27
28
29 X0 = [TWR base; WSR base; AR base; EWMARG base; FCDSUB base; ...
FACT base; LapseRate base; FPR base; OPR base];
30 LB scaled = [TWR min; WSR min; AR min; EWMARG min; FCDSUB min; ...
FACT min; LapseRate min; FPR min; OPR min];
31 UB scaled = [TWR max; WSR max; AR max; EWMARG max; FCDSUB max; ...
FACT max; LapseRate max; FPR max; OPR max];
32
33 X0 = (X0 - LB scaled) ./ (UB scaled - LB scaled);
34 LB = zeros(size(X0,1),1);
35 UB = ones(size(X0,1),1);
1 %unscale x.m
2 % Change scaled x values (from input DoE) to unscaled values for ...
optimizer
3
4 x(1) = (TWR - TWR min) / (TWR max - TWR min);
5 x(2) = (WSR - WSR min) / (WSR max - WSR min);
6 x(3) = (AR - AR min) / (AR max - AR min);
7 x(4) = (EWMARG - EWMARG min) / (EWMARG max - EWMARG min);
8 x(5) = (FCDSUB - FCDSUB min) / (FCDSUB max - FCDSUB min);
9 x(8) = (FACT - FACT min) / (FACT max - FACT min);
10 x(7) = (LapseRate - LapseRate min) / (LapseRate max - LapseRate min);
11 x(8) = (FPR - FPR min) / (FPR max - FPR min);
12 x(9) = (OPR - OPR min) / (OPR max - OPR min);
1 % WriteOutput case.m
2
3 fid = fopen(out file, 'a+');
4
5 % Results
6 for i out = 1:size(x array, 1)
7 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', x array(i out, i main));
8 end
9
10 % Scaled X values
11 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', x array(1, i main) * (TWR max - TWR min) + ...
TWR min);
12 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', x array(2, i main) * (WSR max - WSR min) + ...
WSR min);
13 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', x array(3, i main) * (AR max - AR min) + ...
AR min);
14 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', x array(4, i main) * (EWMARG max - ...
EWMARG min) + EWMARG min);
15 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', x array(5, i main) * (FCDSUB max - ...
FCDSUB min) + FCDSUB min);
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16 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', x array(6, i main) * (FACT max - FACT min) + ...
FACT min);
17 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', x array(7, i main) * (LapseRate max - ...
LapseRate min) + LapseRate min);
18 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', x array(8, i main) * (FPR max - FPR min) + ...
FPR min);
19 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', x array(9, i main) * (OPR max - OPR min) + ...
OPR min);
20
21 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', AA array Reliability(i main));
22 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', AA array Reliability MA(i main));
23 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', AA array Block Fuel(i main));
24 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', AA array Expected BF Des(i main));
25 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', AA array Expected BF DOC(i main));
26 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', AA array Reliability Individual(:, i main));
27 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', function calls array(i main));
28 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', Mitigation Weight out array(i main));
29 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', Reliability goal out array(i main));




34 %Global Optimizer Results
35 for i out = 1:size(xatmin array, 1)
36 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', xatmin array(i out, i main));
37 end
38
39 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', xatmin array(1, i main) * (TWR max - ...
TWR min) + TWR min);
40 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', xatmin array(2, i main) * (WSR max - ...
WSR min) + WSR min);
41 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', xatmin array(3, i main) * (AR max - AR min) ...
+ AR min);
42 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', xatmin array(4, i main) * (EWMARG max - ...
EWMARG min) + EWMARG min);
43 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', xatmin array(5, i main) * (FCDSUB max - ...
FCDSUB min) + FCDSUB min);
44 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', xatmin array(6, i main) * (FACT max - ...
FACT min) + FACT min);
45 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', xatmin array(7, i main) * (LapseRate max - ...
LapseRate min) + LapseRate min);
46 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', xatmin array(8, i main) * (FPR max - ...
FPR min) + FPR min);
47 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', xatmin array(9, i main) * (OPR max - ...
OPR min) + OPR min);
48
49 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', AA Global Reliability(i main));
50 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', AA Global Reliability MA(i main));
51 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', AA Global Block Fuel(i main));
52 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', AA Global Expected BF Des(i main));
53 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', AA Global Expected BF DOC(i main));
54 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', AA Global Reliability Individual(:, i main));
55 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', function calls global array(i main));
56
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57 if exist('Expected Range', 'var')
58 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', Expected Range);
59 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', Expected TOFL);
60 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', Expected VAPP);
61 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', Expected RateofClimb);
62 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', Expected Span);
63 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', Expected RampWt);
64 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', Expected MaxFuel);
65 fprintf(fid, '%f, ', Expected OEW);





1 % WriteOutput setup.m
2
3 fprintf(1, 'Setting up output file: %s∖n', out file);
4 fid = fopen(out file,'w');
5
6 % Basic information
7 fprintf(fid, 'Settings∖n');
8 fprintf(fid, 'Num Reliability Cases,%i∖n', Num Reliability Cases);
9 fprintf(fid, 'optimization method,%s∖n', optimization method);
10 if strcmp(optimization method, 'DIRect')
11 fprintf(fid, 'DIRect maxevals,%i∖n', DIRect maxevals);
12 elseif strcmp(optimization method, 'GA')
13 fprintf(fid, 'GA PopulationSize,%i∖n', GA PopulationSize);
14 end
15 fprintf(fid, 'distribution type,%s∖n', distribution type);
16 fprintf(fid, 'Mitigation Method,%s∖n', Mitigation Method);
17 useM = Mitigation Method;
18 if strcmp(Mitigation Method, 'none')
19 useM = default Mitigation Method;





24 fprintf(fid, 'num MA levels,%i∖n',num MA levels);
25 elseif (strcmp(useM,'sweep'))
26 fprintf(fid, 'num MA levels,%i∖n',num MA levels);
27 elseif (strcmp(useM,'optimize'))
28
29 elseif (strcmp(useM,'random search'))
30 fprintf(fid, 'random search cases,%i∖n',random search cases);
31 elseif (strcmp(useM,'hybrid1D'))
32 fprintf(fid, 'num MA levels,%i∖n',num MA levels);






38 if strcmp(run type, 'DOE ')
39 fprintf(fid, 'doe filename,%s∖n', doe filename);
40 fprintf(fid, 'x cases,%i∖n', x cases);
41 elseif strcmp(run type, 'MCS ')
42 fprintf(fid, 'x cases,%i∖n', x cases);
43 elseif strcmp(run type, 'Opt ')
44 if size(Reliability Goal Array, 2) > 1
45 fprintf(fid, 'size(Reliability Goal Array,2),%i∖n', ...
size(Reliability Goal Array, 2));
46 else
47 fprintf(fid, 'Reliability Goal,%f∖n', ...
Reliability Goal Array(1));
48 end
49 if size(Success Goal Array,2) > 1
50 fprintf(fid, 'size(Success Goal Array,2),%i∖n', ...
size(Success Goal Array, 2));
51 else






58 %fprintf(fid, 'Optimizer Reults∖n');
59 % X's




64 % Scaled X values




68 fprintf(fid, 'Compliance, Success, BF Det, E[BF Des], E[BF DOC],');
69 for i = 1:size(AA array Reliability Individual, 1)
70 if i == 1
71 fprintf(fid, 'Comp Range,');
72 elseif i == 2
73 fprintf(fid, 'Comp TOFL,');
74 elseif i == 3
75 fprintf(fid, 'Comp Vapp,');
76 elseif i == 4
77 fprintf(fid, 'Comp RoC,');
78 elseif i == 5
79 fprintf(fid, 'Comp Span,');
80 elseif i == 6
81 fprintf(fid, 'Comp Fuel,');
82 else




86 fprintf(fid, 'SQP Function Calls, Mitigation Wt, ...
Reliability goal, Success goal,');
87
88 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
89 %Global Optimizer Results
90 for i = 1:size(xatmin array,1)
91 fprintf(fid, 'x global%s,', int2str(i));
92 end
93
94 fprintf(fid, 'TWR global, WSR global, AR global, h EW global, ...
h Drag global, h FuelFlow global, LapseRate global, ...
FPR global, OPR global, Global Compliance, Global Success, ...
Global BF DES Det, Global E[BF Des], Global E[BF DOC],');
95 for i = 1:size(AA Global Reliability Individual, 1)
96 if i == 1
97 fprintf(fid, 'G Comp Range,');
98 elseif i == 2
99 fprintf(fid, 'G Comp TOFL,');
100 elseif i == 3
101 fprintf(fid, 'G Comp Vapp,');
102 elseif i == 4
103 fprintf(fid, 'G Comp RoC,');
104 elseif i == 5
105 fprintf(fid, 'G Comp Span,');
106 elseif i == 6
107 fprintf(fid, 'G Comp Fuel,');
108 else
109 fprintf(fid, 'Global P(Comp) Ind %s,', int2str(i));
110 end
111 end
112 fprintf(fid, 'Global Function Calls,');
113
114 fprintf(fid, 'E[Range], E[TOFL], E[VAPP], E[RateofClimb], ...
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